Andrey E. Shastitko
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Andrey E. Shastitko has a total of 59 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Natalia S. Pavlova
Lomonosov Moscow State University
16 shared publications Lomonosov Moscow State University
10 shared publicationsS. Avdasheva
National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)
8 shared publications- Alexander A. Kurdin
Lomonosov Moscow State University
6 shared publications Russian Presidential Academy Of National Economy And Public Administration
5 shared publications- Sergei I. Fedorov
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration; Lomonosov Moscow State University
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 19 November 2026
- Published by Institute of Economics Russian Academy of Sciences in Issues of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 33, 200-213
How Is Constructive Interdisciplinary Discourse Beneficial to Antitrust in the Digital Era? (On Herbert Hovenkamp's "Tech Monopoly")
The article presents reflections on the book «Tech Monopoly» by Herbert Hovenkamp, a leading expert in antitrust law, in light of the evolving exchange of ideas between specialists in economic theory (primarily industrial organization) and competition law in the context of the pervasive spread of digital technologies. Comments are provided on the explanation of certain general limits of antitrust (competition) policy in view of a retrospective of interdisciplinary discourse and the approach proposed by Hovenkamp. The article examines variants of anticompetitive conduct by large tech companies, according to Hovenkamp, in the context of such key characteristics of the regulatory object as two-sided markets, digital content, and network effects. The characteristics of the regulatory response to new challenges are revealed, and it is shown why the vision of the subject presented by the author of “Tech Monopoly” can be qualified in terms of a Coasean approach.
- 19 November 2026
- Published by Institute of Economics Russian Academy of Sciences in Issues of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 33, 200-213
How Is Constructive Interdisciplinary Discourse Beneficial to Antitrust in the Digital Era? (On Herbert Hovenkamp's "Tech Monopoly")
The article presents reflections on the book «Tech Monopoly» by Herbert Hovenkamp, a leading expert in antitrust law, in light of the evolving exchange of ideas between specialists in economic theory (primarily industrial organization) and competition law in the context of the pervasive spread of digital technologies. Comments are provided on the explanation of certain general limits of antitrust (competition) policy in view of a retrospective of interdisciplinary discourse and the approach proposed by Hovenkamp. The article examines variants of anticompetitive conduct by large tech companies, according to Hovenkamp, in the context of such key characteristics of the regulatory object as two-sided markets, digital content, and network effects. The characteristics of the regulatory response to new challenges are revealed, and it is shown why the vision of the subject presented by the author of “Tech Monopoly” can be qualified in terms of a Coasean approach.
- 7 April 2026
- Published by NP Voprosy Ekonomiki in Voprosy Ekonomiki
- No. 4,p. 145-160
Metalanguage for conceptual diversity in economics: Edgeworth box reconsidered
The article proposes a concrete example of developing a positive intradisciplinary discourse, based on a new perspective on the Edgeworth box model within the context of a discussion about the prospects of higher economic education in Russia, which unfolded, among other places, on the pages of the journal Voprosy Ekonomiki. By relaxing the explicit and implicit assumptions of zero transaction costs and the availability of structural alternatives for organizing economic exchanges, the paper demonstrates how conceptual diversity within economic science can manifest in relation to a specific model. It further shows how, in this context, critical thinking skills — as understood in the context of economic education — could be engaged both by established researchers and students for the development of a model of positive intradisciplinary discourse. The exposition is built on the idea of a specific form of metalanguage for intradisciplinary discourse, a function performed by neoclassical economic theory as it is presented in university microeconomics courses.
- 7 April 2026
- Published by NP Voprosy Ekonomiki in Voprosy Ekonomiki
- No. 4,p. 145-160
Metalanguage for conceptual diversity in economics: Edgeworth box reconsidered
The article proposes a concrete example of developing a positive intradisciplinary discourse, based on a new perspective on the Edgeworth box model within the context of a discussion about the prospects of higher economic education in Russia, which unfolded, among other places, on the pages of the journal Voprosy Ekonomiki. By relaxing the explicit and implicit assumptions of zero transaction costs and the availability of structural alternatives for organizing economic exchanges, the paper demonstrates how conceptual diversity within economic science can manifest in relation to a specific model. It further shows how, in this context, critical thinking skills — as understood in the context of economic education — could be engaged both by established researchers and students for the development of a model of positive intradisciplinary discourse. The exposition is built on the idea of a specific form of metalanguage for intradisciplinary discourse, a function performed by neoclassical economic theory as it is presented in university microeconomics courses.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations in World Economy and International Relations
- Vol. 70 (8)
Economic Sanctions: Ownership Regimes vs Formal Rights
The protection of property rights is one of the key factors for the sustainable development of an economic system based on voluntary mutually beneficial exchanges. This applies to the international economic system in the era of globalization: in the case of international assets, the protection of rights is ensured by the fundamental principles of international law and is largely de facto based on trust in a number of jurisdictions that have historically developed a reputation as reliable harbors for asset allocation. However, the current geopolitical tensions and related international economic sanctions are exacerbating the problem of asset ownership protection at the international level. Using the example of an analysis of the situation with the freezing (and possible confiscation) of Russian international reserves in the EU, the problem of property rights erosion in international law is investigated. It is shown how, while retaining the formal title of ownership, there is a forced transfer of particular rights, which de facto leads to the confiscation of the asset, although de jure the formal title of ownership remains with the previous owner. This situation becomes possible due to the discrepancy between property regimes and formal property titles – if formal titles are not supported by real mechanisms for their protection, then they de facto cease to operate. Actions aimed at such dilution of powers undermine the institutional foundations of healthy international economic relations – their effects are long-term and may require greater efforts to restore confidence in the system of international law in the future. Based on the case considered, the issue of the universality of the application of neoclassical assumptions to the methodology of law and economics is also discussed: the analysis of current benefits and costs for stakeholders can serve as a justification for such asset confiscation, and the long-term consequences of the decision usually go beyond the scope of the analysis. The study can be useful in shaping foreign economic policy regarding the protection of ownership rights to foreign assets – in particular, it offers such protection tools as the exchange of collateral.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations in World Economy and International Relations
- Vol. 70 (8)
Economic Sanctions: Ownership Regimes vs Formal Rights
The protection of property rights is one of the key factors for the sustainable development of an economic system based on voluntary mutually beneficial exchanges. This applies to the international economic system in the era of globalization: in the case of international assets, the protection of rights is ensured by the fundamental principles of international law and is largely de facto based on trust in a number of jurisdictions that have historically developed a reputation as reliable harbors for asset allocation. However, the current geopolitical tensions and related international economic sanctions are exacerbating the problem of asset ownership protection at the international level. Using the example of an analysis of the situation with the freezing (and possible confiscation) of Russian international reserves in the EU, the problem of property rights erosion in international law is investigated. It is shown how, while retaining the formal title of ownership, there is a forced transfer of particular rights, which de facto leads to the confiscation of the asset, although de jure the formal title of ownership remains with the previous owner. This situation becomes possible due to the discrepancy between property regimes and formal property titles – if formal titles are not supported by real mechanisms for their protection, then they de facto cease to operate. Actions aimed at such dilution of powers undermine the institutional foundations of healthy international economic relations – their effects are long-term and may require greater efforts to restore confidence in the system of international law in the future. Based on the case considered, the issue of the universality of the application of neoclassical assumptions to the methodology of law and economics is also discussed: the analysis of current benefits and costs for stakeholders can serve as a justification for such asset confiscation, and the long-term consequences of the decision usually go beyond the scope of the analysis. The study can be useful in shaping foreign economic policy regarding the protection of ownership rights to foreign assets – in particular, it offers such protection tools as the exchange of collateral.
- 10 December 2025
- Published by NP Voprosy Ekonomiki in Voprosy Ekonomiki
- No. 12
Where is the nostalgic empiricism of the new new institutionalists leading economics?
The article provides a critical analysis of the main cliches and stereotypes surrounding modern economics. Using the work of the 2024 Nobel laureates D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (AJR) as a case study, it is demonstrated that the modern mainstream economics does not conform to the numerous caricatures still drawn of it by critics. It is argued that the popularity of these economists is due not so much to the originality of their approaches, but rather to their excellent command of rhetorical techniques, which allows them to successfully communicate with different audiences and create compelling narratives for them. The authors highlight three contentious features of AJR’s research style:(1) compensating for a lack of theoretical novelty through empirical testing of already known historical “cases”; (2) offering an excessively liberal interpretation of the works of their predecessors; (3) suppressing research results from other scholars that are inconvenient for their interpretations. It is shown that the narrative of empirical rigor in their ideas, skillfully promoted by AJR, is, on the one hand, in tune with the challenges of the time, and on the other hand, deprives the subject area of economics of its distinctiveness, making it hardly distinguishable from other disciplines.
- 10 December 2025
- Published by NP Voprosy Ekonomiki in Voprosy Ekonomiki
- No. 12
Where is the nostalgic empiricism of the new new institutionalists leading economics?
The article provides a critical analysis of the main cliches and stereotypes surrounding modern economics. Using the work of the 2024 Nobel laureates D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (AJR) as a case study, it is demonstrated that the modern mainstream economics does not conform to the numerous caricatures still drawn of it by critics. It is argued that the popularity of these economists is due not so much to the originality of their approaches, but rather to their excellent command of rhetorical techniques, which allows them to successfully communicate with different audiences and create compelling narratives for them. The authors highlight three contentious features of AJR’s research style:(1) compensating for a lack of theoretical novelty through empirical testing of already known historical “cases”; (2) offering an excessively liberal interpretation of the works of their predecessors; (3) suppressing research results from other scholars that are inconvenient for their interpretations. It is shown that the narrative of empirical rigor in their ideas, skillfully promoted by AJR, is, on the one hand, in tune with the challenges of the time, and on the other hand, deprives the subject area of economics of its distinctiveness, making it hardly distinguishable from other disciplines.
- 7 November 2025
- Published by NP Voprosy Ekonomiki in Voprosy Ekonomiki
- No. 11,p. 122-142
The economics of mediation in contractual relationships: From a fat lawsuit to a lean agreement
Effective mechanisms for dispute resolution and the maintenance of contractual relations in voluntary exchanges are an important means of improving the welfare of economic agents under conditions of risk and actual conflicts over limited resources. A mediator is called upon to assist in resolving such conflicts without directly participating in decision-making. The involvement of mediators in the settlement of business disputes has become increasingly common and continues to gain popularity within the framework of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Building on the conceptual core of transaction cost economics, the paper explains the economic rationale and scope of mediation in business disputes. It clarifies how mediation differs from the involvement of a third party in transactions (a tripartite transaction governance mechanism) and why it is particularly suitable for supporting hybrid institutional arrangements. Applying the conceptual framework of transaction cost theory makes it possible to identify the functions of mediation and the mediator in contractual relations through two key aspects — contract incompleteness and information asymmetry. The differences between a mediator and an arbitrator, consultant, and regulator are highlighted, and the mechanics of information exchange between the parties with the mediator’s participation are described. In addition to applying the analytical tools of transaction cost economics to explain the economic foundations of mediation, the novelty of the study lies in a detailed analysis of mandatory (forced) mediation as one of the alternative methods of conflict resolution. The paper demonstrates both the advantages and limitations of this approach. Finally, it outlines directions for further research in this emerging field within the frameworks of transaction cost economics and the theory of executive behavior management, identifying several issues related to the use of mediation as a tool for resolving conflicts in antitrust enforcement.
- 7 November 2025
- Published by NP Voprosy Ekonomiki in Voprosy Ekonomiki
- No. 11,p. 122-142
The economics of mediation in contractual relationships: From a fat lawsuit to a lean agreement
Effective mechanisms for dispute resolution and the maintenance of contractual relations in voluntary exchanges are an important means of improving the welfare of economic agents under conditions of risk and actual conflicts over limited resources. A mediator is called upon to assist in resolving such conflicts without directly participating in decision-making. The involvement of mediators in the settlement of business disputes has become increasingly common and continues to gain popularity within the framework of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Building on the conceptual core of transaction cost economics, the paper explains the economic rationale and scope of mediation in business disputes. It clarifies how mediation differs from the involvement of a third party in transactions (a tripartite transaction governance mechanism) and why it is particularly suitable for supporting hybrid institutional arrangements. Applying the conceptual framework of transaction cost theory makes it possible to identify the functions of mediation and the mediator in contractual relations through two key aspects — contract incompleteness and information asymmetry. The differences between a mediator and an arbitrator, consultant, and regulator are highlighted, and the mechanics of information exchange between the parties with the mediator’s participation are described. In addition to applying the analytical tools of transaction cost economics to explain the economic foundations of mediation, the novelty of the study lies in a detailed analysis of mandatory (forced) mediation as one of the alternative methods of conflict resolution. The paper demonstrates both the advantages and limitations of this approach. Finally, it outlines directions for further research in this emerging field within the frameworks of transaction cost economics and the theory of executive behavior management, identifying several issues related to the use of mediation as a tool for resolving conflicts in antitrust enforcement.
- 25 September 2025
- Published by Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (FCTAS RAS) in Science management: theory and practice
- Vol. 7 (3) , 24-36
State Policy in the Field of Economics: Foundations, Opportunities, Guidelines
Taking into account discussions on relations regarding scientific economic knowledge in terms of public goods, we consider the general foundations of state policy in the field of economic science management and support for its development. One of the ways to explain the reasons for government intervention is the alleged underproduction of scientific economic knowledge due to the free-rider problem as one of the manifestations of market failure. At the same time, based on the concept of dispersed and implicit knowledge, it is shown that economics is characterized by properties that limit the possibilities of effective direct impact on the development of research programs by measures of vertical industrial policy. The proposed direction is complementary to traditional methods of government support (subsidies, grants, government procurement) – investments in the development of an information infrastructure for the exchange of scientific ideas, which would create a separating equilibrium and answer the question of who is who in economics. The complementarity of state scientific policy instruments is explained in the light of the principle of sufficient diversity. It is shown that such a scenario is possible and even more likely in the case of competition between digital platforms – scientific databases.
- 25 September 2025
- Published by Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (FCTAS RAS) in Science management: theory and practice
- Vol. 7 (3) , 24-36
State Policy in the Field of Economics: Foundations, Opportunities, Guidelines
Taking into account discussions on relations regarding scientific economic knowledge in terms of public goods, we consider the general foundations of state policy in the field of economic science management and support for its development. One of the ways to explain the reasons for government intervention is the alleged underproduction of scientific economic knowledge due to the free-rider problem as one of the manifestations of market failure. At the same time, based on the concept of dispersed and implicit knowledge, it is shown that economics is characterized by properties that limit the possibilities of effective direct impact on the development of research programs by measures of vertical industrial policy. The proposed direction is complementary to traditional methods of government support (subsidies, grants, government procurement) – investments in the development of an information infrastructure for the exchange of scientific ideas, which would create a separating equilibrium and answer the question of who is who in economics. The complementarity of state scientific policy instruments is explained in the light of the principle of sufficient diversity. It is shown that such a scenario is possible and even more likely in the case of competition between digital platforms – scientific databases.
- 7 September 2025
- Published by NP Voprosy Ekonomiki in Voprosy Ekonomiki
- No. 9,p. 142-158
Competition among digital scientometric platforms: Foundations, limitations, and expected effects on Russian economic science
The article examines the impact of the monopolization of the digital scientometric platform services market in Russia. Special attention is given to the analysis of methodological and technological limitations of Russia’s leading provider of scientometric data — eLIBRARY (RSCI) platform, including slow and partial innovations, limited integration into the international scientific community, and insufficient instrumental support for the methodological aspect of scientometric evaluation. The relationship between industrial and competition policy tools is considered for overcoming existing barriers for alternative scientometric solutions. The design of mechanisms for these two economic policy directions becomes particularly significant in light of structural alternatives for scientometric and bibliographic support of research activities. The article proposes ways to eliminate coordination flaws resulting from the monopolization of the digital infrastructure of scientific communication. Competitive pressure can be increased through agile technology companies capable of correctly integrating modern artificial intelligence and machine learning solutions with the methodological specifics of the scientific context.
- 7 September 2025
- Published by NP Voprosy Ekonomiki in Voprosy Ekonomiki
- No. 9,p. 142-158
Competition among digital scientometric platforms: Foundations, limitations, and expected effects on Russian economic science
The article examines the impact of the monopolization of the digital scientometric platform services market in Russia. Special attention is given to the analysis of methodological and technological limitations of Russia’s leading provider of scientometric data — eLIBRARY (RSCI) platform, including slow and partial innovations, limited integration into the international scientific community, and insufficient instrumental support for the methodological aspect of scientometric evaluation. The relationship between industrial and competition policy tools is considered for overcoming existing barriers for alternative scientometric solutions. The design of mechanisms for these two economic policy directions becomes particularly significant in light of structural alternatives for scientometric and bibliographic support of research activities. The article proposes ways to eliminate coordination flaws resulting from the monopolization of the digital infrastructure of scientific communication. Competitive pressure can be increased through agile technology companies capable of correctly integrating modern artificial intelligence and machine learning solutions with the methodological specifics of the scientific context.
- 9 July 2025
- Published by NP Voprosy Ekonomiki in Voprosy Ekonomiki
- No. 7,p. 143-159
New adventures of oligopolist companies in Russia: On the compatibility of economic theory and law in antitrust
We offer an economic explanation of the position of the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Court regarding the application of the norm on collective dominance which was formulated in the “Review of judicial practice related to bringing to administrative responsibility for violations of antimonopoly legislation”. Our results are based on a literature review and a brief retrospective analysis of antimonopoly cases concerning collectively dominant companies. This paper provides arguments for the conclusion on the restoration of the principle of complementarity, compatibility of economic theory and law, the theory of oligopoly and the concept of collective dominance. The significance of the approach proposed by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to the application of the norm on collective dominance is explained using the concept of meso-institutions. We have uncovered potential challenges and opportunities for various interest groups in the light of expected significant institutional changes which are not related with changes in the relevant norms of the Russian legislation.
- 9 July 2025
- Published by NP Voprosy Ekonomiki in Voprosy Ekonomiki
- No. 7,p. 143-159
New adventures of oligopolist companies in Russia: On the compatibility of economic theory and law in antitrust
We offer an economic explanation of the position of the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Court regarding the application of the norm on collective dominance which was formulated in the “Review of judicial practice related to bringing to administrative responsibility for violations of antimonopoly legislation”. Our results are based on a literature review and a brief retrospective analysis of antimonopoly cases concerning collectively dominant companies. This paper provides arguments for the conclusion on the restoration of the principle of complementarity, compatibility of economic theory and law, the theory of oligopoly and the concept of collective dominance. The significance of the approach proposed by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to the application of the norm on collective dominance is explained using the concept of meso-institutions. We have uncovered potential challenges and opportunities for various interest groups in the light of expected significant institutional changes which are not related with changes in the relevant norms of the Russian legislation.
- 22 May 2025
- Published by Institute of Economics Russian Academy of Sciences in Issues of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 27 (2) , 07-21
Mediation through the Lens of Transaction Cost Economics: Subject Field and Policy Implications
Based on the application of the conceptual core of the economic theory of transaction costs, an explanation is offered of the grounds and possibilities of using mediation in economic disputes as a way to ensure the stability of contracts and continuity of transactions in value chains. The place of mediation among alternative mechanisms of transaction management in the spectrum between the hierarchical and market mechanisms is explained using the conceptual schemes of O. Williamson and C. Menard. The paper shows how mediation differs from involving a third party in transactions and why mediation is most appropriate and in demand for maintaining hybrid institutional agreements, which in this case can be ensured by bilateral mechanisms of transaction management. The paper also shows why the participation of mediators in dispute resolution is not a special case of a trilateral transaction management mechanism, but can be attributed to bilateral mechanisms, despite the independence of mediators from the parties to the dispute. Approaches to determining the economic effects of mediation and identifying the limits of the mediator's competence are disclosed. The role, functions and competences of mediators are considered in the context of problems caused by the incompleteness of concluded contracts. The role of diffuse (in the understanding of F. Hayek) and tacit knowledge and their combination as sources of the need for mediation is emphasized. A description of structural alternatives to mediation is proposed, including voluntary and compulsory mediation in their various forms. It is shown that one of the main problems of voluntary mediation as an element of a hybrid transaction management mechanism is enforcement of the agreements reached. This problem can be solved in various ways, including by switching to mandatory mediation. The experience of using mandatory mediation in antitrust regulation is considered. Issues for further economic research of the new subject area are presented in the context of the economic theory of transaction costs. The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.
- 22 May 2025
- Published by Institute of Economics Russian Academy of Sciences in Issues of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 27 (2) , 07-21
Mediation through the Lens of Transaction Cost Economics: Subject Field and Policy Implications
Based on the application of the conceptual core of the economic theory of transaction costs, an explanation is offered of the grounds and possibilities of using mediation in economic disputes as a way to ensure the stability of contracts and continuity of transactions in value chains. The place of mediation among alternative mechanisms of transaction management in the spectrum between the hierarchical and market mechanisms is explained using the conceptual schemes of O. Williamson and C. Menard. The paper shows how mediation differs from involving a third party in transactions and why mediation is most appropriate and in demand for maintaining hybrid institutional agreements, which in this case can be ensured by bilateral mechanisms of transaction management. The paper also shows why the participation of mediators in dispute resolution is not a special case of a trilateral transaction management mechanism, but can be attributed to bilateral mechanisms, despite the independence of mediators from the parties to the dispute. Approaches to determining the economic effects of mediation and identifying the limits of the mediator's competence are disclosed. The role, functions and competences of mediators are considered in the context of problems caused by the incompleteness of concluded contracts. The role of diffuse (in the understanding of F. Hayek) and tacit knowledge and their combination as sources of the need for mediation is emphasized. A description of structural alternatives to mediation is proposed, including voluntary and compulsory mediation in their various forms. It is shown that one of the main problems of voluntary mediation as an element of a hybrid transaction management mechanism is enforcement of the agreements reached. This problem can be solved in various ways, including by switching to mandatory mediation. The experience of using mandatory mediation in antitrust regulation is considered. Issues for further economic research of the new subject area are presented in the context of the economic theory of transaction costs. The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.
- Open Access
- 7 May 2025
- Published by Economic Policy in Economic Policy
- Vol. 20 (2) , 56-81
Risks From Introducing the Anticartel Government IT System
The paper provides an ex ante assessment of risks incurred by developing and implementing the Anticartel state information system (GIS), which will conduct automated screening of Russia’s state procurement in order to detect bid rigging (in other words, software analysis of procurement data using algorithms that identify collusion based on certain formal characteristics). The system will also apply artificial intelligence. Determining the risks of implementing this system is difficult because there is no publicly available information on the specific criteria that will be used in this screening process. This forces specialists to make do with partial data. This paper attempts to reconstruct the operating principles of the Anticartel GIS from external sources including public speeches by representatives of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia together with the technical specifications provided to developers entering the competition to build and implement the system. Key questions prompted by examining Anticartel’s reconstructed features are put forward in order to facilitate analysis during an “expedited” regulatory impact assessment based on the assumption that the decision to employ such a digital screening system is irreversible. The questions and analysis will structure discussion of the risks, associated benefits, and costs of different options for implementation. The principal risks result from probable Type I errors in law enforcement and from the extent of their consequences, which will be amplified as the automated screening system rolls out to include the entire body of regulated procurement, as well as by the use of artificial intelligence. The main consequences of this type of error and how it would arise are explained in the article. In addition, certain risks from using digital tools for identifying collusion especially in commodity markets are identified.
- 7 May 2025
- Published by Economic Policy in Economic Policy
- Vol. 20 (2) , 56-81
Open AccessRisks From Introducing the Anticartel Government IT System
The paper provides an ex ante assessment of risks incurred by developing and implementing the Anticartel state information system (GIS), which will conduct automated screening of Russia’s state procurement in order to detect bid rigging (in other words, software analysis of procurement data using algorithms that identify collusion based on certain formal characteristics). The system will also apply artificial intelligence. Determining the risks of implementing this system is difficult because there is no publicly available information on the specific criteria that will be used in this screening process. This forces specialists to make do with partial data. This paper attempts to reconstruct the operating principles of the Anticartel GIS from external sources including public speeches by representatives of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia together with the technical specifications provided to developers entering the competition to build and implement the system. Key questions prompted by examining Anticartel’s reconstructed features are put forward in order to facilitate analysis during an “expedited” regulatory impact assessment based on the assumption that the decision to employ such a digital screening system is irreversible. The questions and analysis will structure discussion of the risks, associated benefits, and costs of different options for implementation. The principal risks result from probable Type I errors in law enforcement and from the extent of their consequences, which will be amplified as the automated screening system rolls out to include the entire body of regulated procurement, as well as by the use of artificial intelligence. The main consequences of this type of error and how it would arise are explained in the article. In addition, certain risks from using digital tools for identifying collusion especially in commodity markets are identified.