Endogenous Choice of Trade Instrument Under Uncertainty*
- 1 December 2002
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Economic Journal
- Vol. 16 (4) , 75-96
Abstract
This Paper endogenizes the choice between import tariffs and quotas of two policy active countries in a duopsonistic world market. Without uncertainty, import quotas are welfare superior to import tariffs in equilibrium. If two importers can precommit to a type of instrument before deciding the level of the instrument to use in a future period, an import quota equilibrium emerges. We introduce asymmetric risk in the import demand schedule of the two importers. There exists a range of parameters in which a mixed equilibrium emerges, i.e. one country uses a tariff while the other restricts trade with an import quota. The likelihood that both importers choose a different trade instrument in equilibrium is increasing with the correlation coefficient of the two random shocks. [F13]Keywords
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- Strategic Trade Policy under Uncertainty: Sufficient Conditions for the Optimality of Ad Valorem, Specific and Quadratic Trade TaxesInternational Economic Review, 1997
- UNCERTAINTY AND THE CHOICE OF PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTOxford Economic Papers, 1991
- Optimal tariffs on exhaustible resourcesJournal of International Economics, 1991
- ON NEGOTIATED QUOTAS, TARIFFS, AND TRANSFERSOxford Economic Papers, 1989
- TARIFFS VERSUS QUOTAS UNDER UNCERTAINTY: RESTRICTING IMPORTS AND THE ROLE OF PREFERENCEInternational Economic Journal, 1988
- Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria: A Geometric ApproachThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1985
- Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated DuopolyThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1984
- Risk Aversion and Optimal Trade RestrictionsReview of Economic Studies, 1982
- Ranking optimal tariffs and quotas for a large country under uncertaintyJournal of International Economics, 1979
- The (non)equivalence of optimal tariffs and quotas under uncertaintyJournal of International Economics, 1975