Jean-Philippe Gervais
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Jean-Philippe Gervais has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Bruno Larue
Department of Agri-food Economics and Consumer Studies, Laval University
2 shared publications- Olivier Bonroy
Université Grenoble Alpes, INRAE, UMR GAEL, Grenoble, France
2 shared publications - Abdessalem Abbassi
Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Agricultural Economics and Consumer Studies and CRÉA, 2425 Rue de l'agriculture, Room 4407, Laval University, Quebec City, QC, Canada, G1K 7P4 (phone: +418-656-2131, ext. 2122; fax: +418-656-7821;
1 shared publication - Harvey E. Lapan
Iowa State University
1 shared publication James Rude
Department of Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics , University of Manitoba , Canada
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 July 2008
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie
- Vol. 56 (3) , 313-335
Dairy Trade Liberalization Impacts in Canada
- 17 July 2008
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie
- Vol. 56 (3) , 313-335
Dairy Trade Liberalization Impacts in Canada
- 30 August 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Economic Journal
- Vol. 21 (3) , 441-463
An Analysis of a Rules-based Approach to Disciplining Export Credits in Agriculture
This paper examines the comparative static effects of rules-based disciplines for government supported export credit arrangements. The arrangements provide traders in the country offering the guarantees more favourable borrowing conditions. This may provide an advantage relative to rival exporters since the supported trader may offer better financial terms to importers. Rules that discipline implicit interest rate subsidies are appropriate when an importing country does not face liquidity constraints when borrowing. However, these rules may not be appropriate with liquidity constraints because of the potential for additionality and benefits for all exporting countries. Rules on benchmarks for insurance premiums are always appropriate because insurance subsidies unambiguously have the potential to distort markets.
- 30 August 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Economic Journal
- Vol. 21 (3) , 441-463
An Analysis of a Rules-based Approach to Disciplining Export Credits in Agriculture
This paper examines the comparative static effects of rules-based disciplines for government supported export credit arrangements. The arrangements provide traders in the country offering the guarantees more favourable borrowing conditions. This may provide an advantage relative to rival exporters since the supported trader may offer better financial terms to importers. Rules that discipline implicit interest rate subsidies are appropriate when an importing country does not face liquidity constraints when borrowing. However, these rules may not be appropriate with liquidity constraints because of the potential for additionality and benefits for all exporting countries. Rules on benchmarks for insurance premiums are always appropriate because insurance subsidies unambiguously have the potential to distort markets.
- 1 February 2007
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 40 (1) , 127-154
Are exports a monotonic function of exchange rate volatility? Evidence from disaggregated pork exports
- 1 February 2007
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 40 (1) , 127-154
Are exports a monotonic function of exchange rate volatility? Evidence from disaggregated pork exports
- 1 December 2002
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Economic Journal
- Vol. 16 (4) , 75-96
Endogenous Choice of Trade Instrument Under Uncertainty*
This Paper endogenizes the choice between import tariffs and quotas of two policy active countries in a duopsonistic world market. Without uncertainty, import quotas are welfare superior to import tariffs in equilibrium. If two importers can precommit to a type of instrument before deciding the level of the instrument to use in a future period, an import quota equilibrium emerges. We introduce asymmetric risk in the import demand schedule of the two importers. There exists a range of parameters in which a mixed equilibrium emerges, i.e. one country uses a tariff while the other restricts trade with an import quota. The likelihood that both importers choose a different trade instrument in equilibrium is increasing with the correlation coefficient of the two random shocks. [F13]
- 1 December 2002
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Economic Journal
- Vol. 16 (4) , 75-96
Endogenous Choice of Trade Instrument Under Uncertainty*
This Paper endogenizes the choice between import tariffs and quotas of two policy active countries in a duopsonistic world market. Without uncertainty, import quotas are welfare superior to import tariffs in equilibrium. If two importers can precommit to a type of instrument before deciding the level of the instrument to use in a future period, an import quota equilibrium emerges. We introduce asymmetric risk in the import demand schedule of the two importers. There exists a range of parameters in which a mixed equilibrium emerges, i.e. one country uses a tariff while the other restricts trade with an import quota. The likelihood that both importers choose a different trade instrument in equilibrium is increasing with the correlation coefficient of the two random shocks. [F13]
- 1 August 2001
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 26 (3) , 525-551
Do reductions in black market exchange rate premia cause inflation?
- 1 August 2001
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 26 (3) , 525-551
Do reductions in black market exchange rate premia cause inflation?