Supersubstantivalism and the argument from harmony
Author:
- 13 January 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 10 (1) , 53-57
Abstract
The core doctrine of supersubstantivalism is that material objects are identical to their spacetime locations. One powerful consideration for the view is the argument from harmony—supersubstantivalism, it is claimed, is in a position to offer an elegant explanation of a number of platitudes concerning objects and their locations. However, I will argue that identifying material objects with their locations does not provide a satisfying explanation of harmony. What the supersubstantivalist needs is not a theory about the identity of objects, but another theory about the identity of some relations. This paper proposes such a theory and shows that with it in place, the argument from harmony can be repaired.Keywords
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