Push vs. Pull Contracts in Retail Supply Chains: Risk Aversion, Information Asymmetry, and Outside Opportunity
Authors:
Preprint
- 12 December 2022
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Recent global crises have caused unprecedented economic uncertainty and intensified retailers’ concerns over inventory risks. Mitigating inventory risks is critical to managing retail supply chains and restoring their norms after severe impacts. Problem definition: We study the allocation of inventory risks using contracts in a retail supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer. We consider two factors that affect the effectiveness of contracting: (1) asymmetric risk aversion information—retailers’ attitudes are typically diverse and unknown to the manufacturer, and (2) uncertain outside opportunity—retailers typically face a volatile external business environment. Methodology: With a game-theoretic model that captures the interaction among risk aversion, outside opportunity, and information asymmetry, we derive the contracting equilibria under two widely adopted risk allocation schemes---push (i.e., the retailer bears the inventory risk) and pull (i.e., the manufacturer bears the inventory risk) contracts. We then compare the supply chain performance in terms of order quantities and expected profits and study the impact of the outside opportunity risk and the disparity between risk attitudes. Results: We show that—contrary to conventional wisdom that pull contracts are more effective in risk mitigation—push contracts may induce larger retailer order quantities and achieve the highest supply chain efficiency due to the interaction of asymmetric risk aversion information and risky outside opportunities. We also find that the manufacturer may obtain higher profits with push contracts when both the heterogeneity in the retailer’s risk attitude and the risk of the outside opportunity are sufficiently high. In addition, when the risk of the outside opportunity is in a medium range, the push contract allows the manufacturer to fully eliminate the information rent and achieve the supply chain’s first-best outcomes, while the pull contract has to forfeit an information rent to a more risk-averse retailer. We further discuss the manufacturer’s choice to exclude trading with retailers with certain risk attitudes and evaluate the effects of product profitability and demand uncertainty. Managerial implications: Our results highlight the importance of modeling asymmetric risk aversion information and risky outside opportunities in analyzing supply chain contracting. When considering these practical factors, it may be better to allocate more inventory risks to a risk-averse retailer instead of a risk-neutral manufacturer. Our results provide novel insights into the selection of proper contract types for managing inventory risks in retail supply chains.Keywords
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