Mengshi Lu
Mengshi Lu has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Zuo-Jun Max Shen
Faculty of Engineering & Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
3 shared publications Chengfan Hou
International Institute of Finance, School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China
2 shared publications- Chengfan Hou
School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
2 shared publications Chengzhang Li
Purdue University - Krannert School of Management
2 shared publications- Tianhu Deng
Dongwu Business School, Soochow University, Suzhou, Jiangsu 215006, China
2 shared publications - Chengzhang Li
The Chinese University of Hong Kong Shanghai Jiao Tong University Shanghai Jiao Tong University The Chinese University of Hong Kong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 28 (3) , 802-821
Penalizing Lateness or Sharing Cost: Project Outsourcing via Request-for-Quote
Request-for-quote (RFQ) is the most commonly used mechanism for contractor selection in project outsourcing. Problem definition: We study how RFQ design interacts with the time-cost trade-off in project execution and compare two common contract forms: time-incentive contracts (penalizing lateness) and cost-sharing contracts (reimbursing direct costs). Methodology/results: Using a game-theoretic model, we characterize optimal RFQ designs under incomplete information about contractors’ direct cost efficiency. Time-incentive contracts weaken competition, whereas cost-sharing contracts strengthen it, increasing work rates and shortening completion times. Clients prefer cost-sharing contracts, with this preference being stronger when time urgency is high, contractor heterogeneity is substantial, or the contractor pool is small; time-incentive contracts yield higher overall system efficiency in low-urgency settings, consistent with their prevalence in public projects. We derive a closed-form bound on the relative decrease in the client’s payoff when using a fixed-term RFQ instead of a more complex upfront-fee RFQ and numerically show that fixed-term RFQs lose less than 0.28% of client payoff. Audit noise has no effect when correction costs are negligible or very high, but it introduces bidding frictions and lowers the optimal cost-sharing ratio when correction costs are moderate. Managerial implications: These insights guide contract selection by time urgency and market conditions and support the use of simple fixed-term RFQs with minimal profit loss. Funding: This work was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72501203, 72525012, 72188101, and 72242107]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0894 .
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 28 (3) , 802-821
Penalizing Lateness or Sharing Cost: Project Outsourcing via Request-for-Quote
Request-for-quote (RFQ) is the most commonly used mechanism for contractor selection in project outsourcing. Problem definition: We study how RFQ design interacts with the time-cost trade-off in project execution and compare two common contract forms: time-incentive contracts (penalizing lateness) and cost-sharing contracts (reimbursing direct costs). Methodology/results: Using a game-theoretic model, we characterize optimal RFQ designs under incomplete information about contractors’ direct cost efficiency. Time-incentive contracts weaken competition, whereas cost-sharing contracts strengthen it, increasing work rates and shortening completion times. Clients prefer cost-sharing contracts, with this preference being stronger when time urgency is high, contractor heterogeneity is substantial, or the contractor pool is small; time-incentive contracts yield higher overall system efficiency in low-urgency settings, consistent with their prevalence in public projects. We derive a closed-form bound on the relative decrease in the client’s payoff when using a fixed-term RFQ instead of a more complex upfront-fee RFQ and numerically show that fixed-term RFQs lose less than 0.28% of client payoff. Audit noise has no effect when correction costs are negligible or very high, but it introduces bidding frictions and lowers the optimal cost-sharing ratio when correction costs are moderate. Managerial implications: These insights guide contract selection by time urgency and market conditions and support the use of simple fixed-term RFQs with minimal profit loss. Funding: This work was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72501203, 72525012, 72188101, and 72242107]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0894 .
- Open Access
Dynamic Redeployment of Nurses Across Hospitals: A Sample Robust Optimization Approach
Problem definition: We study a workforce redeployment problem in hospital networks, where clinical staff, such as nurses, are temporarily reassigned from overstaffed to understaffed sites to address short-term imbalances. This practice of ``internal travel,'' which gained traction during the COVID-19 pandemic to tackle nurse shortages, presents new operational challenges that require tailored analytical support. Key requirements such as advance notice and short-term secondments must be incorporated. Moreover, in rapidly evolving environments, reliance on historical data leads to unreliable forecasts, limiting the effectiveness of traditional sample-based methods. Methodology: We formulate the problem as a stochastic dynamic program and incorporate demand uncertainty via a sample robust optimization (SRO) framework. Using linear decision rule approximation, we reformulate the problem as a tractable linear program. Results: We evaluate the impact of key network design components on system performance. Network connectivity has the largest effect in reducing the total cost, number of redeployments, and travel distance, but its benefits depend on aligning the secondment duration with the network structure. Full connectivity without proper secondments can be counterproductive. The SRO approach outperforms the traditional sample-average method in the presence of demand surges or under-forecasts by better anticipating emergency redeployments. Managerial implications: Internal travel programs offer a promising strategy to alleviate workforce shortages in healthcare systems. Our results highlight the importance of network design, aligning secondment durations with the network structure, and adopting planning methods that are robust to demand surges or inaccurate predictions.
Open AccessDynamic Redeployment of Nurses Across Hospitals: A Sample Robust Optimization Approach
Problem definition: We study a workforce redeployment problem in hospital networks, where clinical staff, such as nurses, are temporarily reassigned from overstaffed to understaffed sites to address short-term imbalances. This practice of ``internal travel,'' which gained traction during the COVID-19 pandemic to tackle nurse shortages, presents new operational challenges that require tailored analytical support. Key requirements such as advance notice and short-term secondments must be incorporated. Moreover, in rapidly evolving environments, reliance on historical data leads to unreliable forecasts, limiting the effectiveness of traditional sample-based methods. Methodology: We formulate the problem as a stochastic dynamic program and incorporate demand uncertainty via a sample robust optimization (SRO) framework. Using linear decision rule approximation, we reformulate the problem as a tractable linear program. Results: We evaluate the impact of key network design components on system performance. Network connectivity has the largest effect in reducing the total cost, number of redeployments, and travel distance, but its benefits depend on aligning the secondment duration with the network structure. Full connectivity without proper secondments can be counterproductive. The SRO approach outperforms the traditional sample-average method in the presence of demand surges or under-forecasts by better anticipating emergency redeployments. Managerial implications: Internal travel programs offer a promising strategy to alleviate workforce shortages in healthcare systems. Our results highlight the importance of network design, aligning secondment durations with the network structure, and adopting planning methods that are robust to demand surges or inaccurate predictions.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 26 (4) , 1508-1525
Allocating Inventory Risk in Retail Supply Chains: Risk Aversion, Information Asymmetry, and Outside Opportunity
Problem definition: Recent global crises have caused unprecedented economic uncertainty and intensified retailers’ concerns over inventory risks. Mitigating inventory risks and incentivizing retailer orders is critical to managing retail supply chains and restoring their norms after severe impacts. We study the allocation of inventory risk using contracts in a retail supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer. We consider two factors that affect the effectiveness of contracting: (1) asymmetric risk aversion information—retailers’ attitudes are typically diverse and unknown to the manufacturer, and (2) uncertain outside opportunity—retailers typically face a volatile external business environment. Methodology/results: With a game-theoretic model that captures the interaction among risk aversion, information asymmetry, and outside opportunity, we derive the contracting equilibrium under two widely adopted risk allocation schemes—push (i.e., the retailer bears the inventory risk) and pull (i.e., the manufacturer bears the inventory risk) contracts. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that pull contracts are more effective in risk mitigation, we show that push contracts may induce larger expected order quantities and achieve the highest supply chain efficiency due to the interaction of asymmetric risk aversion information and risky outside opportunities. We also find that the manufacturer may obtain higher profits with push contracts when both the heterogeneity in the retailer’s risk attitude and the risk of the outside opportunity are sufficiently high. In addition, when the risk of the outside opportunity is in a medium range, the push contract allows the manufacturer to fully eliminate the information rent and achieve the supply chain’s first-best outcomes. We further evaluate the effects of product profitability and demand uncertainty and generalize the retailer’s risk measure to any coherent risk measure. Managerial implications: Our analysis highlights the importance of modeling asymmetric risk aversion information and risky outside opportunities in analyzing supply chain contracting. When considering these practical factors, allocating more inventory risks to a risk-averse retailer may be better than a risk-neutral manufacturer. Our results provide novel insights into the selection of proper contract types for managing inventory risks in retail supply chains. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0624 .
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 26 (4) , 1508-1525
Allocating Inventory Risk in Retail Supply Chains: Risk Aversion, Information Asymmetry, and Outside Opportunity
Problem definition: Recent global crises have caused unprecedented economic uncertainty and intensified retailers’ concerns over inventory risks. Mitigating inventory risks and incentivizing retailer orders is critical to managing retail supply chains and restoring their norms after severe impacts. We study the allocation of inventory risk using contracts in a retail supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer. We consider two factors that affect the effectiveness of contracting: (1) asymmetric risk aversion information—retailers’ attitudes are typically diverse and unknown to the manufacturer, and (2) uncertain outside opportunity—retailers typically face a volatile external business environment. Methodology/results: With a game-theoretic model that captures the interaction among risk aversion, information asymmetry, and outside opportunity, we derive the contracting equilibrium under two widely adopted risk allocation schemes—push (i.e., the retailer bears the inventory risk) and pull (i.e., the manufacturer bears the inventory risk) contracts. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that pull contracts are more effective in risk mitigation, we show that push contracts may induce larger expected order quantities and achieve the highest supply chain efficiency due to the interaction of asymmetric risk aversion information and risky outside opportunities. We also find that the manufacturer may obtain higher profits with push contracts when both the heterogeneity in the retailer’s risk attitude and the risk of the outside opportunity are sufficiently high. In addition, when the risk of the outside opportunity is in a medium range, the push contract allows the manufacturer to fully eliminate the information rent and achieve the supply chain’s first-best outcomes. We further evaluate the effects of product profitability and demand uncertainty and generalize the retailer’s risk measure to any coherent risk measure. Managerial implications: Our analysis highlights the importance of modeling asymmetric risk aversion information and risky outside opportunities in analyzing supply chain contracting. When considering these practical factors, allocating more inventory risks to a risk-averse retailer may be better than a risk-neutral manufacturer. Our results provide novel insights into the selection of proper contract types for managing inventory risks in retail supply chains. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0624 .
- Open Access
- 12 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Push vs. Pull Contracts in Retail Supply Chains: Risk Aversion, Information Asymmetry, and Outside Opportunity
Recent global crises have caused unprecedented economic uncertainty and intensified retailers’ concerns over inventory risks. Mitigating inventory risks is critical to managing retail supply chains and restoring their norms after severe impacts. Problem definition: We study the allocation of inventory risks using contracts in a retail supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer. We consider two factors that affect the effectiveness of contracting: (1) asymmetric risk aversion information—retailers’ attitudes are typically diverse and unknown to the manufacturer, and (2) uncertain outside opportunity—retailers typically face a volatile external business environment. Methodology: With a game-theoretic model that captures the interaction among risk aversion, outside opportunity, and information asymmetry, we derive the contracting equilibria under two widely adopted risk allocation schemes---push (i.e., the retailer bears the inventory risk) and pull (i.e., the manufacturer bears the inventory risk) contracts. We then compare the supply chain performance in terms of order quantities and expected profits and study the impact of the outside opportunity risk and the disparity between risk attitudes. Results: We show that—contrary to conventional wisdom that pull contracts are more effective in risk mitigation—push contracts may induce larger retailer order quantities and achieve the highest supply chain efficiency due to the interaction of asymmetric risk aversion information and risky outside opportunities. We also find that the manufacturer may obtain higher profits with push contracts when both the heterogeneity in the retailer’s risk attitude and the risk of the outside opportunity are sufficiently high. In addition, when the risk of the outside opportunity is in a medium range, the push contract allows the manufacturer to fully eliminate the information rent and achieve the supply chain’s first-best outcomes, while the pull contract has to forfeit an information rent to a more risk-averse retailer. We further discuss the manufacturer’s choice to exclude trading with retailers with certain risk attitudes and evaluate the effects of product profitability and demand uncertainty. Managerial implications: Our results highlight the importance of modeling asymmetric risk aversion information and risky outside opportunities in analyzing supply chain contracting. When considering these practical factors, it may be better to allocate more inventory risks to a risk-averse retailer instead of a risk-neutral manufacturer. Our results provide novel insights into the selection of proper contract types for managing inventory risks in retail supply chains.
- 12 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPush vs. Pull Contracts in Retail Supply Chains: Risk Aversion, Information Asymmetry, and Outside Opportunity
Recent global crises have caused unprecedented economic uncertainty and intensified retailers’ concerns over inventory risks. Mitigating inventory risks is critical to managing retail supply chains and restoring their norms after severe impacts. Problem definition: We study the allocation of inventory risks using contracts in a retail supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer. We consider two factors that affect the effectiveness of contracting: (1) asymmetric risk aversion information—retailers’ attitudes are typically diverse and unknown to the manufacturer, and (2) uncertain outside opportunity—retailers typically face a volatile external business environment. Methodology: With a game-theoretic model that captures the interaction among risk aversion, outside opportunity, and information asymmetry, we derive the contracting equilibria under two widely adopted risk allocation schemes---push (i.e., the retailer bears the inventory risk) and pull (i.e., the manufacturer bears the inventory risk) contracts. We then compare the supply chain performance in terms of order quantities and expected profits and study the impact of the outside opportunity risk and the disparity between risk attitudes. Results: We show that—contrary to conventional wisdom that pull contracts are more effective in risk mitigation—push contracts may induce larger retailer order quantities and achieve the highest supply chain efficiency due to the interaction of asymmetric risk aversion information and risky outside opportunities. We also find that the manufacturer may obtain higher profits with push contracts when both the heterogeneity in the retailer’s risk attitude and the risk of the outside opportunity are sufficiently high. In addition, when the risk of the outside opportunity is in a medium range, the push contract allows the manufacturer to fully eliminate the information rent and achieve the supply chain’s first-best outcomes, while the pull contract has to forfeit an information rent to a more risk-averse retailer. We further discuss the manufacturer’s choice to exclude trading with retailers with certain risk attitudes and evaluate the effects of product profitability and demand uncertainty. Managerial implications: Our results highlight the importance of modeling asymmetric risk aversion information and risky outside opportunities in analyzing supply chain contracting. When considering these practical factors, it may be better to allocate more inventory risks to a risk-averse retailer instead of a risk-neutral manufacturer. Our results provide novel insights into the selection of proper contract types for managing inventory risks in retail supply chains.
- 1 April 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (4) , 2579-2599
Implementing Environmental and Social Responsibility Programs in Supply Networks Through Multiunit Bilateral Negotiation
Involving suppliers deep in the supply chain is critical for the success of environmental and social responsibility (ESR) initiatives. Administering ESR programs throughout a complex supply network, however, is challenging. In this paper, we apply a multiunit bilateral bargaining framework to coordinate ESR investments in a general supply network and analyze to what extent an ESR initiator should directly engage the higher-tier suppliers as opposed to delegating that responsibility to the first-tier suppliers. Our bargaining framework not only generalizes the conventional Shapley value approach by allowing the flexibility of modeling imbalanced power distribution among the firms but also provides an explicit way of implementing the resulting gain sharing among the firms through negotiated contract terms. We show that the eventual structure of ESR negotiation relationships can be derived by finding a shortest path tree in the supply network with the arc cost defined as the logarithm of the negotiating parties’ relative bargaining power. These developments allow us to analyze ESR implementation in generally extended supply networks. We find that the ESR initiator tends to delegate ESR negotiations to a supplier that is strong in negotiations with higher-tier suppliers. When the supply network is complex (i.e., wide and deep), directly engaging all suppliers can lead to a larger gain by the initiator than fully delegating the negotiations with higher-tier suppliers to the first-tier ones. However, as the network gets increasingly complex, the ESR initiator tends to directly engage a reduced percentage of higher-tier suppliers. We further extend our analysis to situations where the ESR relationships are sequentially formed in a decentralized manner, where the benefit of ESR depends on the collective choice of the firms’ investment levels, where multiple ESR programs are implemented in the network, and where ESR investments depend on the negotiation relationships.This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, operations management.
- 1 April 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (4) , 2579-2599
Implementing Environmental and Social Responsibility Programs in Supply Networks Through Multiunit Bilateral Negotiation
Involving suppliers deep in the supply chain is critical for the success of environmental and social responsibility (ESR) initiatives. Administering ESR programs throughout a complex supply network, however, is challenging. In this paper, we apply a multiunit bilateral bargaining framework to coordinate ESR investments in a general supply network and analyze to what extent an ESR initiator should directly engage the higher-tier suppliers as opposed to delegating that responsibility to the first-tier suppliers. Our bargaining framework not only generalizes the conventional Shapley value approach by allowing the flexibility of modeling imbalanced power distribution among the firms but also provides an explicit way of implementing the resulting gain sharing among the firms through negotiated contract terms. We show that the eventual structure of ESR negotiation relationships can be derived by finding a shortest path tree in the supply network with the arc cost defined as the logarithm of the negotiating parties’ relative bargaining power. These developments allow us to analyze ESR implementation in generally extended supply networks. We find that the ESR initiator tends to delegate ESR negotiations to a supplier that is strong in negotiations with higher-tier suppliers. When the supply network is complex (i.e., wide and deep), directly engaging all suppliers can lead to a larger gain by the initiator than fully delegating the negotiations with higher-tier suppliers to the first-tier ones. However, as the network gets increasingly complex, the ESR initiator tends to directly engage a reduced percentage of higher-tier suppliers. We further extend our analysis to situations where the ESR relationships are sequentially formed in a decentralized manner, where the benefit of ESR depends on the collective choice of the firms’ investment levels, where multiple ESR programs are implemented in the network, and where ESR investments depend on the negotiation relationships.This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, operations management.
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 23 (6) , 1543-1561
Coordinating Project Outsourcing Through Bilateral Contract Negotiations
Problem definition: Project outsourcing has been a pronounced trend in many industries but is also recognized as a major cause for project delays. We study how companies can coordinate outsourced projects with uncertain completion times through bilateral contract negotiations. Academic/practical relevance: Misaligned subcontractor incentives may result in substantial losses to both project clients and subcontractors. Coordinating subcontractors’ efforts through proper contracts is imperative to the success of project outsourcing. Most previous studies on project contracting have not addressed subcontractors’ bargaining powers or the dynamic bargaining process in negotiations. We fill in this gap by studying bilateral bargaining between the client and subcontractors, which better reflects real-world negotiations. Methodology: We model project contract negotiations as a multiunit bilateral bargaining game. We derive the conditions such that bilateral negotiations can achieve system coordination and characterize the equilibrium negotiation outcomes. We then compare the conditions and equilibria under various model settings to study their impact on project contracting. Results: Our study uncovers how the coordination of project outsourcing is impacted by the contract form, bargaining power structure, precedence network topology, payment timing, external opportunities, and negotiation protocols. For single-task projects, the widely used fixed-price (cost-plus) contract can achieve system coordination only when the subcontractor (client) possesses full bargaining power. Cost-sharing and time-based incentive contracts, which perform well for single-task projects, may not be effective for projects with parallel tasks when any subcontractor’s bargaining power is sufficiently high. Projects with serial tasks can be coordinated only under certain extreme bargaining power structures. Delaying payments always exacerbates the incentive misalignment. Managerial implications: Our analysis provides insights and guidelines to companies regarding how to select proper contract forms and payment timing schemes, based on the characteristics of the projects and subcontractors, to ensure the effectiveness of project outsourcing. Our results also highlight the importance of bargaining modeling in project contracting.
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 23 (6) , 1543-1561
Coordinating Project Outsourcing Through Bilateral Contract Negotiations
Problem definition: Project outsourcing has been a pronounced trend in many industries but is also recognized as a major cause for project delays. We study how companies can coordinate outsourced projects with uncertain completion times through bilateral contract negotiations. Academic/practical relevance: Misaligned subcontractor incentives may result in substantial losses to both project clients and subcontractors. Coordinating subcontractors’ efforts through proper contracts is imperative to the success of project outsourcing. Most previous studies on project contracting have not addressed subcontractors’ bargaining powers or the dynamic bargaining process in negotiations. We fill in this gap by studying bilateral bargaining between the client and subcontractors, which better reflects real-world negotiations. Methodology: We model project contract negotiations as a multiunit bilateral bargaining game. We derive the conditions such that bilateral negotiations can achieve system coordination and characterize the equilibrium negotiation outcomes. We then compare the conditions and equilibria under various model settings to study their impact on project contracting. Results: Our study uncovers how the coordination of project outsourcing is impacted by the contract form, bargaining power structure, precedence network topology, payment timing, external opportunities, and negotiation protocols. For single-task projects, the widely used fixed-price (cost-plus) contract can achieve system coordination only when the subcontractor (client) possesses full bargaining power. Cost-sharing and time-based incentive contracts, which perform well for single-task projects, may not be effective for projects with parallel tasks when any subcontractor’s bargaining power is sufficiently high. Projects with serial tasks can be coordinated only under certain extreme bargaining power structures. Delaying payments always exacerbates the incentive misalignment. Managerial implications: Our analysis provides insights and guidelines to companies regarding how to select proper contract forms and payment timing schemes, based on the characteristics of the projects and subcontractors, to ensure the effectiveness of project outsourcing. Our results also highlight the importance of bargaining modeling in project contracting.
- 13 July 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 30 (6) , 1927-1943
A Review of Robust Operations Management under Model Uncertainty
Over the past two decades, there has been explosive growth in the application of robust optimization in operations management (robust OM), fueled by both significant advances in optimization theory and a volatile business environment that has led to rising concerns about model uncertainty. We review some common modeling frameworks in robust OM, including the representation of uncertainty and the decision‐making criteria, and sources of model uncertainty that have arisen in the literature, such as demand, supply, and preference. We discuss the successes of robust OM in addressing model uncertainty, enriching decision criteria, generating structural results, and facilitating computation. We also discuss several future research opportunities and challenges.
- 13 July 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 30 (6) , 1927-1943
A Review of Robust Operations Management under Model Uncertainty
Over the past two decades, there has been explosive growth in the application of robust optimization in operations management (robust OM), fueled by both significant advances in optimization theory and a volatile business environment that has led to rising concerns about model uncertainty. We review some common modeling frameworks in robust OM, including the representation of uncertainty and the decision‐making criteria, and sources of model uncertainty that have arisen in the literature, such as demand, supply, and preference. We discuss the successes of robust OM in addressing model uncertainty, enriching decision criteria, generating structural results, and facilitating computation. We also discuss several future research opportunities and challenges.
- 30 March 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 23 (2) , 488-507
On the Values of Vehicle-to-Grid Electricity Selling in Electric Vehicle Sharing
Problem definition: We study electric vehicle (EV) sharing systems and explore the opportunity for incorporating vehicle-to-grid (V2G) electricity selling in EV sharing. Academic/practical relevanc...
- 30 March 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 23 (2) , 488-507
On the Values of Vehicle-to-Grid Electricity Selling in Electric Vehicle Sharing
Problem definition: We study electric vehicle (EV) sharing systems and explore the opportunity for incorporating vehicle-to-grid (V2G) electricity selling in EV sharing. Academic/practical relevanc...
- Open Access
- 3 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Implementing Environmental and Social Responsibility Programs in Supply Networks through Multi-Unit Bilateral Negotiation
Involving suppliers deep in the supply chain is critical for the success of environmental and social responsibility (ESR) initiatives. Administering ESR programs throughout a complex supply network, however, is challenging. In this paper, we apply a bilateral bargaining framework to analyze to what extent an ESR initiator should directly engage higher-tier suppliers, as opposed to delegating the assurance of ESR compliance to its first-tier suppliers. Our bargaining framework not only generalizes the conventional Shapley value approach by allowing the flexibility of modeling imbalanced power distribution among the firms, but also provides an explicit way of implementing the resulting gain sharing among the firms through negotiated contract terms. We show that the eventual structure of negotiation relationships can be derived by finding a shortest path tree in the supply network with the arc cost defined as a monotone function of the negotiating parties' relative bargaining power. These developments allow us to analyze ESR implementation in generally extended supply networks. We find that the ESR initiator tends to delegate ESR compliance negotiation to a supplier that is strong in negotiations with higher-tier suppliers. When the supply network is complex (i.e., wide and deep), directly engaging all suppliers for ESR compliance can lead to a larger gain by the initiator than fully delegating the negotiations with higher-tier suppliers to the first-tier ones. However, as the network gets increasingly complex, the ESR initiator tends to directly engage with a reduced percentage of higher-tier suppliers.
- 3 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessImplementing Environmental and Social Responsibility Programs in Supply Networks through Multi-Unit Bilateral Negotiation
Involving suppliers deep in the supply chain is critical for the success of environmental and social responsibility (ESR) initiatives. Administering ESR programs throughout a complex supply network, however, is challenging. In this paper, we apply a bilateral bargaining framework to analyze to what extent an ESR initiator should directly engage higher-tier suppliers, as opposed to delegating the assurance of ESR compliance to its first-tier suppliers. Our bargaining framework not only generalizes the conventional Shapley value approach by allowing the flexibility of modeling imbalanced power distribution among the firms, but also provides an explicit way of implementing the resulting gain sharing among the firms through negotiated contract terms. We show that the eventual structure of negotiation relationships can be derived by finding a shortest path tree in the supply network with the arc cost defined as a monotone function of the negotiating parties' relative bargaining power. These developments allow us to analyze ESR implementation in generally extended supply networks. We find that the ESR initiator tends to delegate ESR compliance negotiation to a supplier that is strong in negotiations with higher-tier suppliers. When the supply network is complex (i.e., wide and deep), directly engaging all suppliers for ESR compliance can lead to a larger gain by the initiator than fully delegating the negotiations with higher-tier suppliers to the first-tier ones. However, as the network gets increasingly complex, the ESR initiator tends to directly engage with a reduced percentage of higher-tier suppliers.
- Open Access
- 27 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Joint Price and Inventory Optimization Under Minimax Regret
We study the problem of jointly optimizing the price and order quantity for a perishable product, also known as the pricing-newsvendor problem. We consider the case with demand ambiguity where the demand is a function of the price and an uncertain factor, of which only the support information is known. We employ the minimax regret decision criterion to minimize the worst-case regret, which is defined as the difference between the optimal profit that could be obtained with perfect information and the realized profit using the decision made with ambiguous information. First, we characterize the optimal pricing and ordering decisions under the minimax regret criterion and compare their properties with those in the classical models that seek to maximize the expected profit. Specifically, we explore the impact of inventory risk by comparing the optimal price and the risk-free price, and study comparative statics with respect to the degree of demand ambiguity and the unit ordering cost. Second, we compare the minimax regret approach with two other approaches that are commonly used under demand ambiguity, namely the max-min robust approach and the regression-based data-driven approach. In the demand ambiguity setting, we show that the minimax regret approach avoids the high degree of conservativeness that is often incurred in the max-min approach. In the data-driven setting, we show via a numerical study that the minimax regret approach outperforms the classical regression-based approach when data is scarce, when the demand has high volatility, or when the demand model is misspecified.
- 27 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessJoint Price and Inventory Optimization Under Minimax Regret
We study the problem of jointly optimizing the price and order quantity for a perishable product, also known as the pricing-newsvendor problem. We consider the case with demand ambiguity where the demand is a function of the price and an uncertain factor, of which only the support information is known. We employ the minimax regret decision criterion to minimize the worst-case regret, which is defined as the difference between the optimal profit that could be obtained with perfect information and the realized profit using the decision made with ambiguous information. First, we characterize the optimal pricing and ordering decisions under the minimax regret criterion and compare their properties with those in the classical models that seek to maximize the expected profit. Specifically, we explore the impact of inventory risk by comparing the optimal price and the risk-free price, and study comparative statics with respect to the degree of demand ambiguity and the unit ordering cost. Second, we compare the minimax regret approach with two other approaches that are commonly used under demand ambiguity, namely the max-min robust approach and the regression-based data-driven approach. In the demand ambiguity setting, we show that the minimax regret approach avoids the high degree of conservativeness that is often incurred in the max-min approach. In the data-driven setting, we show via a numerical study that the minimax regret approach outperforms the classical regression-based approach when data is scarce, when the demand has high volatility, or when the demand model is misspecified.