On Popper’s strong inductivism (or strongly inconsistent anti-inductivism)
Author:
- 1 March 2011
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 42 (1) , 105-116
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- Karl Popper's Philosophical BreakthroughPhilosophy of Science, 2004
- The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure SensitivityPhilosophy of Science, 1999
- Why probabilistic support is not inductivePhilosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, 1987
- A proof of the impossibility of inductive probabilityNature, 1983
- Degree of Factual SupportPhilosophy of Science, 1952