Abstract
Problem definition: We study online demand fulfillment with limited flexibility in highly asymmetric markets, where some locations represented by the set [Formula: see text] have moderate to high market shares, whereas others have very low shares. Xu et al. was the first to establish that a positive generalized chaining gap (GCG) is a necessary and sufficient condition for bounded performance, which is defined as the expected lost sales as the total market size grows. Although a high GCG signals a better performance, the presence of high market asymmetry results in a low GCG and a larger performance bound, making the bound less useful for assessing actual system performance. Therefore, understanding system performance in highly asymmetric markets remains an important question. Methodology/results: We introduce a network condition called [Formula: see text]-connectivity, which ensures that after removing the markets with very low shares, the markets in [Formula: see text] are still connected through the available suppliers. We prove that [Formula: see text]-connectivity is both necessary and sufficient for maintaining bounded performance in highly asymmetric markets. This is achieved through a carefully designed online fulfillment policy that utilizes network partitioning and advanced analyses of mean-reverting processes using probability methods in an asymptotic context. Additionally, we offer strategies for network design to reduce the risk of [Formula: see text]-disconnectivity. Managerial implications: Our findings indicate that even the well-known long-chain structure may not ensure bounded performance in highly asymmetric markets, especially when low-demand markets are dispersed throughout the network. Instead, a “hub-and-spoke” network configuration with a shorter embedded long chain can help reduce the risk of [Formula: see text]-disconnectivity and enhance system performance. Funding: This research was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72671048 and 72192805] and the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grants 16200617, 16200821, 16200019, and 16500225]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1002 .