Rachel Q. Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Rachel Q. Zhang has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jiheng Zhang
Department of Industrial Engineering and Decision Analytics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong
6 shared publications - Jiahao He
Department of Industrial Engineering and Decision Analytics, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
3 shared publications - Jie Zhang
Guangdong University of Business Studies
2 shared publications - Zhen Xu
Management School, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom
2 shared publications Guangyuan Zhang
Department of Industrial Engineering and Decision Analytics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong
1 shared publication- Hailun Zhang
CUHK, Shenzhen
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 12 November 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Online Demand Fulfillment in Highly Asymmetric Markets
Problem definition: We study online demand fulfillment with limited flexibility in highly asymmetric markets, where some locations represented by the set [Formula: see text] have moderate to high market shares, whereas others have very low shares. Xu et al. was the first to establish that a positive generalized chaining gap (GCG) is a necessary and sufficient condition for bounded performance, which is defined as the expected lost sales as the total market size grows. Although a high GCG signals a better performance, the presence of high market asymmetry results in a low GCG and a larger performance bound, making the bound less useful for assessing actual system performance. Therefore, understanding system performance in highly asymmetric markets remains an important question. Methodology/results: We introduce a network condition called [Formula: see text]-connectivity, which ensures that after removing the markets with very low shares, the markets in [Formula: see text] are still connected through the available suppliers. We prove that [Formula: see text]-connectivity is both necessary and sufficient for maintaining bounded performance in highly asymmetric markets. This is achieved through a carefully designed online fulfillment policy that utilizes network partitioning and advanced analyses of mean-reverting processes using probability methods in an asymptotic context. Additionally, we offer strategies for network design to reduce the risk of [Formula: see text]-disconnectivity. Managerial implications: Our findings indicate that even the well-known long-chain structure may not ensure bounded performance in highly asymmetric markets, especially when low-demand markets are dispersed throughout the network. Instead, a “hub-and-spoke” network configuration with a shorter embedded long chain can help reduce the risk of [Formula: see text]-disconnectivity and enhance system performance. Funding: This research was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72671048 and 72192805] and the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grants 16200617, 16200821, 16200019, and 16500225]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1002 .
- 12 November 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Online Demand Fulfillment in Highly Asymmetric Markets
Problem definition: We study online demand fulfillment with limited flexibility in highly asymmetric markets, where some locations represented by the set [Formula: see text] have moderate to high market shares, whereas others have very low shares. Xu et al. was the first to establish that a positive generalized chaining gap (GCG) is a necessary and sufficient condition for bounded performance, which is defined as the expected lost sales as the total market size grows. Although a high GCG signals a better performance, the presence of high market asymmetry results in a low GCG and a larger performance bound, making the bound less useful for assessing actual system performance. Therefore, understanding system performance in highly asymmetric markets remains an important question. Methodology/results: We introduce a network condition called [Formula: see text]-connectivity, which ensures that after removing the markets with very low shares, the markets in [Formula: see text] are still connected through the available suppliers. We prove that [Formula: see text]-connectivity is both necessary and sufficient for maintaining bounded performance in highly asymmetric markets. This is achieved through a carefully designed online fulfillment policy that utilizes network partitioning and advanced analyses of mean-reverting processes using probability methods in an asymptotic context. Additionally, we offer strategies for network design to reduce the risk of [Formula: see text]-disconnectivity. Managerial implications: Our findings indicate that even the well-known long-chain structure may not ensure bounded performance in highly asymmetric markets, especially when low-demand markets are dispersed throughout the network. Instead, a “hub-and-spoke” network configuration with a shorter embedded long chain can help reduce the risk of [Formula: see text]-disconnectivity and enhance system performance. Funding: This research was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72671048 and 72192805] and the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grants 16200617, 16200821, 16200019, and 16500225]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1002 .
- 2 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Estimation Errors as Regret Lower Bounds for Linear Contextual Bandits
Linear contextual bandits and their variants represent a fundamental class of models with wide real-world applications, usually solved using algorithms guided by parameter estimation. The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality established analytically that estimation errors dominate algorithm regrets. Therefore, accurate parameter estimation suffices to guarantee algorithms with low regrets. In this paper, we establish the necessity of accurate estimations in effective algorithms for linear contextual bandit problems by first constructing an estimator for any given algorithm. We then show that algorithm regrets dominate the estimation errors of their induced estimators under mild conditions. In other words, low-regret algorithms must imply accurate estimators, and developing low-regret algorithms is equivalent to finding efficient estimators, either implicitly or explicitly. Thus, our analysis reduces regret lower bounds to estimation errors, bridging lower bound analysis in bandit problems and regression analysis. This provides a framework for finding practical and informative regret lower bounds by leveraging the extensive estimation literature in Statistics. It leads to insightful lower bounds for a variety of contextual bandit problems in the literature, which are either new or tighter than existing ones. This paper was accepted by J. George Shanthikumar, data science. Funding: Financial support from the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grants 16200821, 16500023, 16500225, and T32-615/24-R] is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02827 .
- 2 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Estimation Errors as Regret Lower Bounds for Linear Contextual Bandits
Linear contextual bandits and their variants represent a fundamental class of models with wide real-world applications, usually solved using algorithms guided by parameter estimation. The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality established analytically that estimation errors dominate algorithm regrets. Therefore, accurate parameter estimation suffices to guarantee algorithms with low regrets. In this paper, we establish the necessity of accurate estimations in effective algorithms for linear contextual bandit problems by first constructing an estimator for any given algorithm. We then show that algorithm regrets dominate the estimation errors of their induced estimators under mild conditions. In other words, low-regret algorithms must imply accurate estimators, and developing low-regret algorithms is equivalent to finding efficient estimators, either implicitly or explicitly. Thus, our analysis reduces regret lower bounds to estimation errors, bridging lower bound analysis in bandit problems and regression analysis. This provides a framework for finding practical and informative regret lower bounds by leveraging the extensive estimation literature in Statistics. It leads to insightful lower bounds for a variety of contextual bandit problems in the literature, which are either new or tighter than existing ones. This paper was accepted by J. George Shanthikumar, data science. Funding: Financial support from the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grants 16200821, 16500023, 16500225, and T32-615/24-R] is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02827 .
- 25 June 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
Effort Decisions in Contests with Shared Attributes
Individuals and organizations often face contests that require various skills, which can be developed through time and resource investments. Consider homogeneous contestants participating in multiple contests, each with multiple attributes and a reward for the winner or shared equally in case of a tie. Contestants can invest effort, at a cost, to enhance their skills in these attributes to maximize their expected net gain. Because contests may share some attributes while having unique ones, improving one attribute can impact winning chances differently across contests. This makes deciding how to allocate effort to each attribute a complex challenge. By reformulating the problem, we combine the effects of a contestant’s efforts into their expected scores in the contests, simplifying the problem from many attributes to just the number of contests. We find that with two contests, contestants generally adopt a mixed strategy unless the contests are highly random. In less random scenarios, they tend to use more varied mixed strategies. The overall randomness of the equilibrium strategy closely resembles that of the mixed strategy in deterministic contests. We extend some of our analytical results and propose simple heuristic strategies for multiple contests, and we shed light on strategies for contestants with diverse skills. Funding: This work was supported by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grants 16200821, 16500023, and T32-615/24-R].
- 25 June 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
Effort Decisions in Contests with Shared Attributes
Individuals and organizations often face contests that require various skills, which can be developed through time and resource investments. Consider homogeneous contestants participating in multiple contests, each with multiple attributes and a reward for the winner or shared equally in case of a tie. Contestants can invest effort, at a cost, to enhance their skills in these attributes to maximize their expected net gain. Because contests may share some attributes while having unique ones, improving one attribute can impact winning chances differently across contests. This makes deciding how to allocate effort to each attribute a complex challenge. By reformulating the problem, we combine the effects of a contestant’s efforts into their expected scores in the contests, simplifying the problem from many attributes to just the number of contests. We find that with two contests, contestants generally adopt a mixed strategy unless the contests are highly random. In less random scenarios, they tend to use more varied mixed strategies. The overall randomness of the equilibrium strategy closely resembles that of the mixed strategy in deterministic contests. We extend some of our analytical results and propose simple heuristic strategies for multiple contests, and we shed light on strategies for contestants with diverse skills. Funding: This work was supported by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grants 16200821, 16500023, and T32-615/24-R].
- 1 May 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (3) , 1117-1135
Blockchain Operations in the Presence of Security Concerns
Problem definition: A blockchain payment system, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, validates electronic transactions and stores them in a chain of blocks without a central authority. Miners with computing power compete for the rights to create blocks according to a preset protocol, referred to as hashing or mining, and, in return, earn fees paid by users who submit transactions. Because of security concerns caused by decentralization, a transaction is confirmed after a number of additional blocks are subsequently extended to the block containing it. This confirmation latency introduces an intricate interplay between miners and users. This paper provides approximate system equilibria and studies optimal designs of a blockchain. Methodology/results: The hashing process is essentially a single-server queue with batch services based on a fee-based priority discipline, and confirmation latency adds complexity to the equilibrium behavior and optimal design. We analyze how miners’ participation decisions interact with users’ participation and fee decisions and identify optimal designs when the goal is to maximize the throughput or social welfare. We validate our model and conduct numerical studies using data from Bitcoin. Managerial implications: By incorporating security issues, we uncover the interdependence of the decisions between users and miners and the driver for nonzero entrance fees in practice. We show that miners and users may end up in either a vicious or virtuous cycle, depending on the initial system state. By allowing the entrance fee to be a design parameter, we are able to establish that it is optimal to simply run a blockchain system at its full capacity and a block size as small as possible. Funding: This work was supported by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grants 16200019, 16200617, 16200821, 16208120, and 16214121]. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1197 .
- 1 May 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (3) , 1117-1135
Blockchain Operations in the Presence of Security Concerns
Problem definition: A blockchain payment system, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, validates electronic transactions and stores them in a chain of blocks without a central authority. Miners with computing power compete for the rights to create blocks according to a preset protocol, referred to as hashing or mining, and, in return, earn fees paid by users who submit transactions. Because of security concerns caused by decentralization, a transaction is confirmed after a number of additional blocks are subsequently extended to the block containing it. This confirmation latency introduces an intricate interplay between miners and users. This paper provides approximate system equilibria and studies optimal designs of a blockchain. Methodology/results: The hashing process is essentially a single-server queue with batch services based on a fee-based priority discipline, and confirmation latency adds complexity to the equilibrium behavior and optimal design. We analyze how miners’ participation decisions interact with users’ participation and fee decisions and identify optimal designs when the goal is to maximize the throughput or social welfare. We validate our model and conduct numerical studies using data from Bitcoin. Managerial implications: By incorporating security issues, we uncover the interdependence of the decisions between users and miners and the driver for nonzero entrance fees in practice. We show that miners and users may end up in either a vicious or virtuous cycle, depending on the initial system state. By allowing the entrance fee to be a design parameter, we are able to establish that it is optimal to simply run a blockchain system at its full capacity and a block size as small as possible. Funding: This work was supported by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [Grants 16200019, 16200617, 16200821, 16208120, and 16214121]. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1197 .
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 44 (3) , 943-965
Instantaneous Control of Brownian Motion with a Positive Lead Time
Consider a storage system where the content is driven by a Brownian motion in the absence of control. At any time, one may increase or decrease the content at a cost proportional to the amount of adjustment. A decrease of the content takes effect immediately, while an increase is realized after a fixed lead time [ ]. Holding costs are incurred continuously over time and are a convex function of the content. The objective is to find a control policy that minimizes the expected present value of the total costs. Because of the positive lead time for upward adjustments, one needs to keep track of all of the outstanding upward adjustments as well as the actual content at time [ ] as there may also be downward adjustments during [ ]—that is, the state of the system is a function on [ ]. We first extend the concept of [ ]-convexity to function spaces and establish the [ ]-convexity of the optimal cost function. We then derive various properties of the cost function and identify the structure of the optimal policy as a state-dependent two-sided reflection mapping making the minimum amount of adjustment necessary to keep the system states within a certain region.
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 44 (3) , 943-965
Instantaneous Control of Brownian Motion with a Positive Lead Time
Consider a storage system where the content is driven by a Brownian motion in the absence of control. At any time, one may increase or decrease the content at a cost proportional to the amount of adjustment. A decrease of the content takes effect immediately, while an increase is realized after a fixed lead time [ ]. Holding costs are incurred continuously over time and are a convex function of the content. The objective is to find a control policy that minimizes the expected present value of the total costs. Because of the positive lead time for upward adjustments, one needs to keep track of all of the outstanding upward adjustments as well as the actual content at time [ ] as there may also be downward adjustments during [ ]—that is, the state of the system is a function on [ ]. We first extend the concept of [ ]-convexity to function spaces and establish the [ ]-convexity of the optimal cost function. We then derive various properties of the cost function and identify the structure of the optimal policy as a state-dependent two-sided reflection mapping making the minimum amount of adjustment necessary to keep the system states within a certain region.
- 1 August 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 66 (4) , 1119-1135
Management of a Shared-Spectrum Network in Wireless Communications
We consider a band of the electromagnetic spectrum with a finite number of identical channels shared by both licensed and unlicensed users. Such a network differs from most many-server, two-class queues in service systems, including call centers, because of the restrictions imposed on the unlicensed users to limit interference to the licensed users. We first approximate the key performance indicators—namely the throughput rate of the system and the delay probability of the licensed users under the asymptotic regime, which requires the analysis of both scaled and unscaled processes simultaneously using the averaging principle. Our analysis reveals a number of distinctive properties of the system. For example, sharing does not affect the level of service provided to the licensed users in an asymptotic sense even when the system is critically loaded. We then study the optimal sharing decisions of the system to maximize the system throughput rate while maintaining the delay probability of the licensed users below a certain level when the system is overloaded. Finally, we extend our study to systems with time-varying arrival rates and propose a diffusion approximation to complement our fluid one. The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1707 .
- 1 August 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 66 (4) , 1119-1135
Management of a Shared-Spectrum Network in Wireless Communications
We consider a band of the electromagnetic spectrum with a finite number of identical channels shared by both licensed and unlicensed users. Such a network differs from most many-server, two-class queues in service systems, including call centers, because of the restrictions imposed on the unlicensed users to limit interference to the licensed users. We first approximate the key performance indicators—namely the throughput rate of the system and the delay probability of the licensed users under the asymptotic regime, which requires the analysis of both scaled and unscaled processes simultaneously using the averaging principle. Our analysis reveals a number of distinctive properties of the system. For example, sharing does not affect the level of service provided to the licensed users in an asymptotic sense even when the system is critically loaded. We then study the optimal sharing decisions of the system to maximize the system throughput rate while maintaining the delay probability of the licensed users below a certain level when the system is overloaded. Finally, we extend our study to systems with time-varying arrival rates and propose a diffusion approximation to complement our fluid one. The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1707 .
- 20 March 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in OR Spectrum
- Vol. 36 (2) , 503-524
Optimal replenishment and pricing decisions under the collect-on-delivery payment scheme
- 20 March 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in OR Spectrum
- Vol. 36 (2) , 503-524
Optimal replenishment and pricing decisions under the collect-on-delivery payment scheme
- 11 July 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 192 (1) , 49-66
Fighting strategies in a market with counterfeits
- 11 July 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 192 (1) , 49-66
Fighting strategies in a market with counterfeits