Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis
Authors:
- Fuhito KojimaFKFuhito Kojima
- Akihisa TamuraATAkihisa Tamura
- Makoto YokooMYMakoto Yokoo
- 1 July 2018
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 176, 803-833
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
Funding Information
- National Research Foundation (2016S1A2A2912564)
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (BR2013-005)
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (17H00761)
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (16K00023)
This publication has 57 references indexed in Scilit:
- Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching MechanismJournal of Political Economy, 2013
- Contracts versus Salaries in MatchingAmerican Economic Review, 2012
- Assignment Messages and ExchangesAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2009
- Matching with Contracts: CommentAmerican Economic Review, 2008
- Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and ComplementsEconometrica, 2006
- A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functionsDiscrete Applied Mathematics, 2006
- The Boston Public School MatchAmerican Economic Review, 2005
- The New York City High School MatchAmerican Economic Review, 2005
- Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending AuctionJournal of Political Economy, 2000
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross SubstitutesEconometrica, 1982