Fuhito Kojima
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Fuhito Kojima has a total of 47 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Yuichiro Kamada
Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley
7 shared publications- John William Hatfield
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305
6 shared publications - M. Bumin Yenmez
Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA
6 shared publications - İsa Emin Hafalır
University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, Australia
6 shared publications - Koji Yokote
University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
3 shared publications Yeon-Koo Che
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 187
Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: An equivalence
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 187
Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: An equivalence
- Open Access
The Walras-Bowley Lecture: Fragmentation of Matching Markets and How Economics Can Help Integrate Them
Fragmentation of matching markets is a ubiquitous problem across countries and across applications. In order to study the implications of fragmentation and possibilities for integration, we first document and discuss a variety of fragmentation cases in practice such as school choice, medical residency matching, and so forth. Using the real-life dataset of daycare matching markets in Japan, we then empirically evaluate the impact of interregional transfer of students by estimating student utility functions under a variety of specifications and then using them for counterfactual simulation. Our simulation compares a fully integrated market and a partially integrated one with a "balancedness" constraint -- for each region, the inflow of students from the other regions must be equal to the outflow to the other areas. We find that partial integration achieves 39.2 to 59.6% of the increase in the child welfare that can be attained under full integration, which is equivalent to a 3.3 to 4.9% reduction of travel time. The percentage decrease in the unmatch rate is 40.0 to 52.8% under partial integration compared to the case of full integration. The results suggest that even in environments where full integration is not a realistic option, partial integration, i.e., integration that respects the balancedness constraint, has a potential to recover a nontrivial portion of the loss from fragmentation.
Open AccessThe Walras-Bowley Lecture: Fragmentation of Matching Markets and How Economics Can Help Integrate Them
Fragmentation of matching markets is a ubiquitous problem across countries and across applications. In order to study the implications of fragmentation and possibilities for integration, we first document and discuss a variety of fragmentation cases in practice such as school choice, medical residency matching, and so forth. Using the real-life dataset of daycare matching markets in Japan, we then empirically evaluate the impact of interregional transfer of students by estimating student utility functions under a variety of specifications and then using them for counterfactual simulation. Our simulation compares a fully integrated market and a partially integrated one with a "balancedness" constraint -- for each region, the inflow of students from the other regions must be equal to the outflow to the other areas. We find that partial integration achieves 39.2 to 59.6% of the increase in the child welfare that can be attained under full integration, which is equivalent to a 3.3 to 4.9% reduction of travel time. The percentage decrease in the unmatch rate is 40.0 to 52.8% under partial integration compared to the case of full integration. The results suggest that even in environments where full integration is not a realistic option, partial integration, i.e., integration that respects the balancedness constraint, has a potential to recover a nontrivial portion of the loss from fragmentation.
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1019
Rationalizing Path-Independent Choice Rules
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1019
Open AccessRationalizing Path-Independent Choice Rules
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1210
Market Design with Distributional Objectives
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1210
Open AccessMarket Design with Distributional Objectives
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 311
Equal Pay for Similar Work
Equal pay laws increasingly require that workers doing "similar" work are paid equal wages within firm. We study such "equal pay for similar work" (EPSW) policies theoretically and test our model's predictions empirically using evidence from a 2009 Chilean EPSW. When EPSW only binds across protected class (e.g., no woman can be paid less than any similar man, and vice versa), firms segregate their workforce by gender. When there are more men than women in a labor market, EPSW increases the gender wage gap. By contrast, EPSW that is not based on protected class can decrease the gender wage gap. Link to full paper: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2306.17111
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 311
Open AccessEqual Pay for Similar Work
Equal pay laws increasingly require that workers doing "similar" work are paid equal wages within firm. We study such "equal pay for similar work" (EPSW) policies theoretically and test our model's predictions empirically using evidence from a 2009 Chilean EPSW. When EPSW only binds across protected class (e.g., no woman can be paid less than any similar man, and vice versa), firms segregate their workforce by gender. When there are more men than women in a labor market, EPSW increases the gender wage gap. By contrast, EPSW that is not based on protected class can decrease the gender wage gap. Link to full paper: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2306.17111
- Open Access
- 7 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 849
Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives
In a matching market with distributional objectives, we study the existence of mechanisms that weakly improve the distributional objective (compared to a status-quo matching), and satisfy constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.
- 7 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 849
Open AccessEfficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives
In a matching market with distributional objectives, we study the existence of mechanisms that weakly improve the distributional objective (compared to a status-quo matching), and satisfy constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.
- Open Access
- 21 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 91 (2) , 1162-1199
Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications
This paper studies a general model of matching with constraints. Observing that a stable matching typically does not exist, we focus on feasible, individually rational, and fair matchings. We characterize such matchings by fixed points of a certain function. Building on this result, we characterize the class of constraints on individual schools under which there exists a student-optimal fair matching, the matching that is the most preferred by every student among those satisfying the three desirable properties. We study the numerical relevance of our theory using data on government-organized daycare allocation.
- 21 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 91 (2) , 1162-1199
Open AccessFair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications
This paper studies a general model of matching with constraints. Observing that a stable matching typically does not exist, we focus on feasible, individually rational, and fair matchings. We characterize such matchings by fixed points of a certain function. Building on this result, we characterize the class of constraints on individual schools under which there exists a student-optimal fair matching, the matching that is the most preferred by every student among those satisfying the three desirable properties. We study the numerical relevance of our theory using data on government-organized daycare allocation.
- Open Access
Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives
Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. We show that such a mechanism need not exist in general. We introduce a new notion of discrete concavity, which we call pseudo M$^{\natural}$-concavity, and construct a mechanism with the desirable properties when the distributional objective satisfies this notion. We provide several practically relevant distributional objectives that are pseudo M$^{\natural}$-concave.
Open AccessEfficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives
Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. We show that such a mechanism need not exist in general. We introduce a new notion of discrete concavity, which we call pseudo M$^{\natural}$-concavity, and construct a mechanism with the desirable properties when the distributional objective satisfies this notion. We provide several practically relevant distributional objectives that are pseudo M$^{\natural}$-concave.
- Open Access
- 24 February 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 91 (1) , 372-402
Job Matching with Subsidy and Taxation
In markets for indivisible resources such as workers and objects, subsidy and taxation for an agent may depend on the set of acquired resources and prices. This paper investigates how such transfer policies interfere with the substitutes condition, which is critical for market equilibrium existence and auction mechanism performance among other important issues. For environments where the condition holds in the absence of policy intervention, we investigate which transfer policies preserve the substitutes condition in various economically meaningful settings, establishing a series of characterization theorems. For environments where the condition may fail without policy intervention, we examine how to use transfer policies to reestablish it, finding exactly when transfer policies based on scales are effective for that purpose. These results serve to inform policymakers, market designers, and market participants of how transfer policies may impact markets, so more informed decisions can be made.
- 24 February 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 91 (1) , 372-402
Open AccessJob Matching with Subsidy and Taxation
In markets for indivisible resources such as workers and objects, subsidy and taxation for an agent may depend on the set of acquired resources and prices. This paper investigates how such transfer policies interfere with the substitutes condition, which is critical for market equilibrium existence and auction mechanism performance among other important issues. For environments where the condition holds in the absence of policy intervention, we investigate which transfer policies preserve the substitutes condition in various economically meaningful settings, establishing a series of characterization theorems. For environments where the condition may fail without policy intervention, we examine how to use transfer policies to reestablish it, finding exactly when transfer policies based on scales are effective for that purpose. These results serve to inform policymakers, market designers, and market participants of how transfer policies may impact markets, so more informed decisions can be made.
- Open Access
Design on Matroids: Diversity vs. Meritocracy
We provide optimal solutions to an institution that has dual goals of diversity and meritocracy when choosing from a set of applications. For example, in college admissions, administrators may want to admit a diverse class in addition to choosing students with the highest qualifications. We provide a class of choice rules that maximize merit subject to attaining a diversity level. Using this class, we find all subsets of applications on the diversity-merit Pareto frontier. In addition, we provide two novel characterizations of matroids.
Open AccessDesign on Matroids: Diversity vs. Meritocracy
We provide optimal solutions to an institution that has dual goals of diversity and meritocracy when choosing from a set of applications. For example, in college admissions, administrators may want to admit a diverse class in addition to choosing students with the highest qualifications. We provide a class of choice rules that maximize merit subject to attaining a diversity level. Using this class, we find all subsets of applications on the diversity-merit Pareto frontier. In addition, we provide two novel characterizations of matroids.