Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind
Author:
- 27 May 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 4 (3) , 515-532
Abstract
Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism and reaches the following conclusions. Computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidence for testing computational theories comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant too. Computationalism comes in many versions, which continue to guide competing research programs in philosophy of mind as well as psychology and neuroscience. Although our understanding of computationalism has deepened in recent years, much work in this area remains to be done.Keywords
This publication has 50 references indexed in Scilit:
- Causal Theories of Mental ContentPhilosophy Compass, 2008
- Learning and Representation2008
- Computation, External Factors, and Cognitive ExplanationsPhilosophical Psychology, 2007
- Functional Analysis and the Autonomy of PsychologyPhilosophy of Science, 2003
- ‘Radical’ simulationism1996
- What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?The Journal of Philosophy, 1995
- Wide ComputationalismMind, 1994
- Minds, brains, and programsBehavioral and Brain Sciences, 1980
- Computer science as empirical inquiryCommunications of the ACM, 1976
- I.—COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCEMind, 1950