Fairness, ambiguity and dynamic consistency
Open Access
- 13 January 2025
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 101 (2-3) , 1-21
Abstract
Considerations of dynamic inconsistency have figured prominently in debates over the rationality of preferences that violate the separability conditions characteristic of expected utility theory. These debates have mostly focused on risk- and ambiguity averse preferences, but analogous considerations apply to preferences for fairness. We revisit these debates in the context of a specific hypothesis regarding the violations of separability by such preferences, namely that they are potentially both explained and rationalised by non-instrumental attitudes to the chances of the various possibilities involved. Our main aim is to argue that, first, when these violations of static separability are motivated by such non-instrumental attitudes to chances, then they need not result in dynamically inconsistent behaviour. Second, and more generally, considerations of dynamic consistency do not, we argue, undermine the rationality of non-instrumental attitudes towards the distribution of chances, despite the fact that such attitudes give rise to violations of the static separability assumptions of expected utility theory.Keywords
Funding Information
- Riksbankens Jubileumsfond
- Knut och Alice Wallenbergs Stiftelse (WAF 2023)
- Stockholms Universitet
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