Richard Bradley
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Richard Bradley has a total of 168 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aaron Watson
Aaron Watson, Independent researcher, United Kingdom
5 shared publications - H. Orri Stefansson
Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
3 shared publications Aaron Watson
Department of Archaeology, Durham University, South Road, Durham DH1 3LE
2 shared publications- Brian Hill
GREGHEC, CNRS, Jouy-en-Josas, France
2 shared publications - Casey Helgeson
Earth and Environmental Systems Institute Penn State University Park PA USA
2 shared publications - Charlotte Werndl
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Salzburg, Franziskanergasse 1, 5020 Salzburg, Austria
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 October 2026
- Published by The Journal of Catastrophe Risk and Resilience in Journal of Catastrophe Risk and Resilience
- Vol. 04 (09)
Confidence-Sensitive Anticipatory Responses to Cyclone Kenneth: A Counterfactual Analysis
This note tests the potential of a confidence-sensitive decision support tool for humanitarian anticipatory action, comparing the level and timing of alerts it would have triggered in advance of cyclone Kenneth landfalling in Mozambique in April 2019 against the alerts and actions taken historically. It demonstrates that even moderately uncertainty intolerant decision makers could have acted earlier had they employed the tool, potentially reducing the impact of the storm considerably.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by The Journal of Catastrophe Risk and Resilience in Journal of Catastrophe Risk and Resilience
- Vol. 04 (09)
Open AccessConfidence-Sensitive Anticipatory Responses to Cyclone Kenneth: A Counterfactual Analysis
This note tests the potential of a confidence-sensitive decision support tool for humanitarian anticipatory action, comparing the level and timing of alerts it would have triggered in advance of cyclone Kenneth landfalling in Mozambique in April 2019 against the alerts and actions taken historically. It demonstrates that even moderately uncertainty intolerant decision makers could have acted earlier had they employed the tool, potentially reducing the impact of the storm considerably.
- 16 February 2026
- Published by Antiquity Publications in Antiquity
- Vol. 100 (410) , 549-551
Jan Turek & Petr Krištuf 2025. The tombs of forefathers: Neolithic long barrows in ritual landscapes. Oxford: Oxbow; 979-8-88857-202-3 paperback £42.
- 16 February 2026
- Published by Antiquity Publications in Antiquity
- Vol. 100 (410) , 549-551
Jan Turek & Petr Krištuf 2025. The tombs of forefathers: Neolithic long barrows in ritual landscapes. Oxford: Oxbow; 979-8-88857-202-3 paperback £42.
- Open Access
- 27 October 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Antiquaries Journal
- Vol. 105, 415
KING ARTHUR’S ROUND TABLE, EAMONT BRIDGE, CUMBRIA: THE EXCAVATION OF AN EXCAVATION – CORRIGENDUM
- 27 October 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Antiquaries Journal
- Vol. 105, 415
Open AccessKING ARTHUR’S ROUND TABLE, EAMONT BRIDGE, CUMBRIA: THE EXCAVATION OF AN EXCAVATION – CORRIGENDUM
- Open Access
- 10 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Antiquaries Journal
- Vol. 105, 296-324
KING ARTHUR’S ROUND TABLE, EAMONT BRIDGE, CUMBRIA: THE EXCAVATION OF AN EXCAVATION
In 1937 the philosopher Robin Collingwood excavated a henge monument in Cumbria and identified the postholes of a series of timber buildings, which he compared with those at other sites. These structures at Eamont Bridge were replaced by a stone circle. He planned to continue the work for a second season, but was prevented by illness. His project was completed by the famous German scholar Gerhard Bersu, who concluded that many of the features identified two years earlier were of geological origin; others were rootholes and animal burrows. Their projects have played a part in the history of fieldwork, but in recent years influential researchers have tried to rehabilitate Collingwood’s reputation as an excavator. Their views were encouraged by his pivotal role in studies of the northern frontier of Roman Britain. In 2023 parts of the monument at King Arthur’s Round Table were re-excavated with the aim of settling the dispute. The new work supported Bersu’s interpretation, but recognised that Collingwood’s approach was not as misguided as his critics had supposed – it was directly based on his agenda for historical research. The real problem is that he had been working without sufficient experience on a difficult subsoil. This article considers the methods used by both researchers at King Arthur’s Round Table and compares their distinctive approaches to field archaeology.
- 10 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Antiquaries Journal
- Vol. 105, 296-324
Open AccessKING ARTHUR’S ROUND TABLE, EAMONT BRIDGE, CUMBRIA: THE EXCAVATION OF AN EXCAVATION
In 1937 the philosopher Robin Collingwood excavated a henge monument in Cumbria and identified the postholes of a series of timber buildings, which he compared with those at other sites. These structures at Eamont Bridge were replaced by a stone circle. He planned to continue the work for a second season, but was prevented by illness. His project was completed by the famous German scholar Gerhard Bersu, who concluded that many of the features identified two years earlier were of geological origin; others were rootholes and animal burrows. Their projects have played a part in the history of fieldwork, but in recent years influential researchers have tried to rehabilitate Collingwood’s reputation as an excavator. Their views were encouraged by his pivotal role in studies of the northern frontier of Roman Britain. In 2023 parts of the monument at King Arthur’s Round Table were re-excavated with the aim of settling the dispute. The new work supported Bersu’s interpretation, but recognised that Collingwood’s approach was not as misguided as his critics had supposed – it was directly based on his agenda for historical research. The real problem is that he had been working without sufficient experience on a difficult subsoil. This article considers the methods used by both researchers at King Arthur’s Round Table and compares their distinctive approaches to field archaeology.
- Open Access
- 14 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Climatic Change
- Vol. 178 (5) , 1-6
Navigating confidence–precision trade-offs in assessment
In this reply, we address a comment on our paper “Combining probability with qualitative degree-of-certainty metrics in assessment” (Helgeson et al. Clim Change 149(3):517–525, 2018). Our original paper proposes an incremental systematization of confidence and likelihood language used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Our goals were to improve consistency across findings and support use of confidence judgments in decision making. The comment critiques our proposal and recommends against its adoption. We argue that this recommendation is based on two misunderstandings. The first concerns trading off confidence against the precision of a finding (our proposal endorses and systematizes the practice). We defend this practice and attribute opposition to an overzealous Bayesianism inapt for the IPCC context. The second misunderstanding concerns our purported commitment to a specific procedure for producing confidence judgements. We clarify that our proposal makes no such commitment. We also note, contrary to the comment’s claim, that a version of the procedure in question has been used in the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report.
- 14 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Climatic Change
- Vol. 178 (5) , 1-6
Open AccessNavigating confidence–precision trade-offs in assessment
In this reply, we address a comment on our paper “Combining probability with qualitative degree-of-certainty metrics in assessment” (Helgeson et al. Clim Change 149(3):517–525, 2018). Our original paper proposes an incremental systematization of confidence and likelihood language used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Our goals were to improve consistency across findings and support use of confidence judgments in decision making. The comment critiques our proposal and recommends against its adoption. We argue that this recommendation is based on two misunderstandings. The first concerns trading off confidence against the precision of a finding (our proposal endorses and systematizes the practice). We defend this practice and attribute opposition to an overzealous Bayesianism inapt for the IPCC context. The second misunderstanding concerns our purported commitment to a specific procedure for producing confidence judgements. We clarify that our proposal makes no such commitment. We also note, contrary to the comment’s claim, that a version of the procedure in question has been used in the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report.
- Open Access
- 13 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 101 (2-3) , 1-21
Fairness, ambiguity and dynamic consistency
Considerations of dynamic inconsistency have figured prominently in debates over the rationality of preferences that violate the separability conditions characteristic of expected utility theory. These debates have mostly focused on risk- and ambiguity averse preferences, but analogous considerations apply to preferences for fairness. We revisit these debates in the context of a specific hypothesis regarding the violations of separability by such preferences, namely that they are potentially both explained and rationalised by non-instrumental attitudes to the chances of the various possibilities involved. Our main aim is to argue that, first, when these violations of static separability are motivated by such non-instrumental attitudes to chances, then they need not result in dynamically inconsistent behaviour. Second, and more generally, considerations of dynamic consistency do not, we argue, undermine the rationality of non-instrumental attitudes towards the distribution of chances, despite the fact that such attitudes give rise to violations of the static separability assumptions of expected utility theory.
- 13 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 101 (2-3) , 1-21
Open AccessFairness, ambiguity and dynamic consistency
Considerations of dynamic inconsistency have figured prominently in debates over the rationality of preferences that violate the separability conditions characteristic of expected utility theory. These debates have mostly focused on risk- and ambiguity averse preferences, but analogous considerations apply to preferences for fairness. We revisit these debates in the context of a specific hypothesis regarding the violations of separability by such preferences, namely that they are potentially both explained and rationalised by non-instrumental attitudes to the chances of the various possibilities involved. Our main aim is to argue that, first, when these violations of static separability are motivated by such non-instrumental attitudes to chances, then they need not result in dynamically inconsistent behaviour. Second, and more generally, considerations of dynamic consistency do not, we argue, undermine the rationality of non-instrumental attitudes towards the distribution of chances, despite the fact that such attitudes give rise to violations of the static separability assumptions of expected utility theory.
- 7 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Maritime Archaeology
- Vol. 20 (2) , 517-518
Ashley Lemke: Anthropological Archaeology Underwater
- 7 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Maritime Archaeology
- Vol. 20 (2) , 517-518
Ashley Lemke: Anthropological Archaeology Underwater
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 122 (5) , 197-230
Chance as a Guide to Life: The Other Principal Principle
When choosing between actions having the same two possible outcomes, we should choose the act for which the conditional chance of the preferred outcome, given its performance, is higher. This simple principle is, I argue, both a basic condition of instrumental rationality and the core of our conception of chance. To support this claim, I show that it in the presence of very weak rationality conditions on choice, the principle implies (1) a version of Lewis’s Principal Principle (and that the converse is false), (2) Stochastic Dominance, a principle endorsed by most theories of rational decision making under risk, and (3) that the evidential and causal decision values of an act, conditional on the chances, are the same. Finally, I argue that its appeal as a principle of instrumental rationality derives from the fact that securing a higher chance of a good outcome is better than securing a lower one.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in The Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 122 (5) , 197-230
Chance as a Guide to Life: The Other Principal Principle
When choosing between actions having the same two possible outcomes, we should choose the act for which the conditional chance of the preferred outcome, given its performance, is higher. This simple principle is, I argue, both a basic condition of instrumental rationality and the core of our conception of chance. To support this claim, I show that it in the presence of very weak rationality conditions on choice, the principle implies (1) a version of Lewis’s Principal Principle (and that the converse is false), (2) Stochastic Dominance, a principle endorsed by most theories of rational decision making under risk, and (3) that the evidential and causal decision values of an act, conditional on the chances, are the same. Finally, I argue that its appeal as a principle of instrumental rationality derives from the fact that securing a higher chance of a good outcome is better than securing a lower one.
- Open Access
- 10 October 2024
- Published by UCL Press in Archaeology International
- Vol. 27 (1)
Hidden valuables, hidden variables: hoards and related deposits from the Mesolithic to the present day (The Gordon Childe Lecture for 2024)
This article traces the deliberate deposition of artefacts, human remains and animal bones from the Mesolithic period to the twentieth century ad. Rather than presenting a straightforward narrative, their treatment is thematic and extends backwards in time from the most recent examples, about which a little is known, to the earliest, which remain enigmatic. The article also extends to single finds, grave goods and river metalwork. While the histories of these phenomena were continuous and unbroken, their significance often changed. The lecture considers nine specific examples and the very different ways in which they have been interpreted.
- 10 October 2024
- Published by UCL Press in Archaeology International
- Vol. 27 (1)
Open AccessHidden valuables, hidden variables: hoards and related deposits from the Mesolithic to the present day (The Gordon Childe Lecture for 2024)
This article traces the deliberate deposition of artefacts, human remains and animal bones from the Mesolithic period to the twentieth century ad. Rather than presenting a straightforward narrative, their treatment is thematic and extends backwards in time from the most recent examples, about which a little is known, to the earliest, which remain enigmatic. The article also extends to single finds, grave goods and river metalwork. While the histories of these phenomena were continuous and unbroken, their significance often changed. The lecture considers nine specific examples and the very different ways in which they have been interpreted.
- Open Access
- 11 September 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Economics and Philosophy
- Vol. 41 (1) , 161-177
Catastrophe insurance decision making when the science is uncertain
Insurers draw on sophisticated models for the probability distributions over losses associated with catastrophic events that are required to price insurance policies. But prevailing pricing methods don’t factor in the ambiguity around model-based projections that derive from the relative paucity of data about extreme events. I argue however that most current theories of decision making under ambiguity only partially support a solution to the challenge that insurance decision makers face and propose an alternative approach that allows for decision making that is responsive to both the evidential situation of the insurance decision maker and their attitude to ambiguity.
- 11 September 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Economics and Philosophy
- Vol. 41 (1) , 161-177
Open AccessCatastrophe insurance decision making when the science is uncertain
Insurers draw on sophisticated models for the probability distributions over losses associated with catastrophic events that are required to price insurance policies. But prevailing pricing methods don’t factor in the ambiguity around model-based projections that derive from the relative paucity of data about extreme events. I argue however that most current theories of decision making under ambiguity only partially support a solution to the challenge that insurance decision makers face and propose an alternative approach that allows for decision making that is responsive to both the evidential situation of the insurance decision maker and their attitude to ambiguity.