Counterfactuals: truth, probability and acceptance conditions
Author:
Open Access
- 15 April 2026
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 207 (4) , 178
Abstract
This paper aims at an integrated account of truth, probability and acceptance conditions of counterfactuals. The basic idea is that truth conditions are an abstract semantic device: they are not directly tested against semantic judgments, but determine the probability of a sentence, and via probabilistic acceptance conditions, they generate predictions of semantic judgments. The proposed account has two notable features: first, the probability of counterfactuals can be understood in a purely subjective sense, without reference to objective chance, and second, Lewis-style truth conditions for counterfactuals that quantify over multiple scenarios can be interpreted as describing their acceptance conditions.Keywords
Funding Information
- Università degli Studi di Torino
This publication has 40 references indexed in Scilit:
- Interventionist counterfactualsPhilosophical Studies, 2012
- A refined theory of counterfactualsJournal of Philosophical Logic, 1981
- Partition and revision: The semantics of counterfactualsJournal of Philosophical Logic, 1981
- A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle1980
- The Prior Propensity Account of Subjunctive Conditionals1980
- Prior Probabilities and Counterfactual Conditionals1976
- Indicative conditionalsPhilosophia, 1975
- The Logic of Conditionals1975
- A Theory of Conditionals1968
- Probability and the Logic of Conditionals1966