JSJan Sprenger

Jan Sprenger

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Jan Sprenger has a total of 132 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Trivalent conditionals, Kratzer style

    by Paul Égré, Lorenzo Rossi, Jan Sprenger

    This paper extends a trivalent semantics for indicative conditionals to a language including the modal operators might and must. Specifically, we combine Cooper’s truth-functional, trivalent analysis of the conditional connective with Kratzer’s idea that if-clauses restrict modal operators. By hard-wiring both trivalence and the restriction operation into the truth conditions of conditional-modal expressions, we obtain an attractive theory that yields plausible predictions for the interaction of conditionals and modals, explains the intuitive appeal of the Restrictor View, and avoids the typical problems of Kratzer-style accounts, especially regarding the probability of conditional-modal expressions.

  • Open Access

    Probability for Trivalent Conditionals

    by Paul Égré, Lorenzo Rossi, Jan Sprenger

    This paper presents a unified theory of the truth conditions and probability of indicative conditionals and their compounds in a trivalent framework. The semantics validates a Reduction Theorem: any compound of conditionals is semantically equivalent to a simple conditional. We obtain Stalnaker’s Thesis in full generality and generalize Adams’s p-validity into a criterion for valid uncertain inference. Finally, we show that Bayesian updating on an indicative conditional is tantamount to updating on the corresponding material conditional.

  • Open Access

    Counterfactuals: truth, probability and acceptance conditions

    by Jan Sprenger

    This paper aims at an integrated account of truth, probability and acceptance conditions of counterfactuals. The basic idea is that truth conditions are an abstract semantic device: they are not directly tested against semantic judgments, but determine the probability of a sentence, and via probabilistic acceptance conditions, they generate predictions of semantic judgments. The proposed account has two notable features: first, the probability of counterfactuals can be understood in a purely subjective sense, without reference to objective chance, and second, Lewis-style truth conditions for counterfactuals that quantify over multiple scenarios can be interpreted as describing their acceptance conditions.

  • Open Access

    Productive Explanation: A Framework for Evaluating Explanations in Psychological Science

    by Noah N'DJaye Nikolai van Dongen, Riet van Bork, Adam Finnemann, Jonas M B Haslbeck, Han L. J. van der Maas, Donald Robinaugh, Jill de Ron, Jan Sprenger, Denny Borsboom

    The explanation of psychological phenomena is a central aim of psychological science. However, the nature of explanation and the processes by which we evaluate whether a theory explains a phenomenon are often unclear. Consequently, it is often unknown whether a given psychological theory indeed explains a phenomenon. We address this shortcoming by characterizing the nature of explanation in psychology, and proposing a framework in which to evaluate explanation. We present a productive account of explanation: a theory putatively explains a phenomenon if and only if a formal model of the theory produces the statistical pattern representing the phenomenon. Using this account, we outline a workable methodology of explanation: (a) explicating a verbal theory into a formal model, (b) representing phenomena as statistical patterns in data, and (c) assessing whether the formal model produces these statistical patterns. In addition, we explicate three major criteria for evaluating the goodness of an explanation (precision, robustness, and empirical relevance), and examine some cases of explanatory breakdowns. Finally, we compare our proposal to other models of explanation from philosophy of science and discuss how our model contributes to constructing and developing psychological theories with high explanatory power.

  • The epistemic and the deontic preface paradox

    by Lina Maria Lissia, Jan Sprenger

    This paper generalizes the preface paradox beyond the conjunctive aggregation of beliefs and constructs an analogous paradox for deontic reasoning. The analysis of the deontic case suggests a systematic restriction of intuitive rules for reasoning with obligations. This proposal can be transferred to the epistemic case: It avoids the preface and the lottery paradox and saves one of the two directions of the Lockean Thesis (i.e. high credence is sufficient, but not necessary for rational belief). The resulting account compares favorably to competing proposals; in particular, we can formulate the rules of correct doxastic reasoning without reference to probabilistic features of the involved propositions.

  • Open Access

    Causal Conditionals, Tendency Causal Claims and Statistical Relevance

    by Michał Sikorski, Noah van Dongen, Jan Sprenger

    Indicative conditionals and tendency causal claims are closely related (e.g., Frosch and Byrne, 2012), but despite these connections, they are usually studied separately. A unifying framework could consist in their dependence on probabilistic factors such as high conditional probability and statistical relevance (e.g., Adams, 1975; Eells, 1991; Douven, 2008, 2015). This paper presents a comparative empirical study on differences between judgments on tendency causal claims and indicative conditionals, how these judgments are driven by probabilistic factors, and how these factors differ in their predictive power for both causal and conditional claims.


  • Gibbardian Collapse and Trivalent Conditionals

    by Paul Égré, Lorenzo Rossi, Jan Sprenger


  • Open Access

    Causal Modeling Semantics for Counterfactuals with Disjunctive Antecedents

    by Giuliano Rosella, Jan Sprenger

    Causal Modeling Semantics (CMS, e.g., Galles and Pearl 1998; Pearl 2000; Halpern 2000) is a powerful framework for evaluating counterfactuals whose antecedent is a conjunction of atomic formulas. We extend CMS to an evaluation of the probability of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents, and more generally, to counterfactuals whose antecedent is an arbitrary Boolean combination of atomic formulas. Our main idea is to assign a probability to a counterfactual (A v B) > C at a causal model M as a weighted average of the probability of C in those submodels that truthmake A v B (Briggs 2012; Fine 2016, 2017). The weights of the submodels are given by the inverse distance to the original model M, based on a distance metric proposed by Eva, Stern, and Hartmann (2019). Apart from solving a major problem in the epistemology of counterfactuals, our paper shows how work in semantics, causal inference and formal epistemology can be fruitfully combined.