A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
- 1 February 2005
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 95 (1) , 347-373
Abstract
Our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. We specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress andestimate this model using a newly collected dataset. Given estimates of the structural model, we assess reelection probabilities, estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages, and quantify the value of a congressional seat. Moreover, we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in Congress.Keywords
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