Abstract
Theory suggests that the effectiveness of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in compensation contracts is dependent on a firm’s ability to identify a suitable set of economically similar peers subject to common shocks and with a similar ability to respond to those shocks. We argue that within a life cycle stage firms are homogenous along a number of dimensions relevant in filtering systematic performance. Importantly, life cycle peers capture extra-industry shocks, as well as differential ability of firms within the same industry to respond to industry-specific shocks, characteristics highlighted by both RPE theory and compensation consultants as important facets of performance peers. Thus, we hypothesize and find that compensation committees choose performance peers that share the same life cycle stage, even when those peers are outside their industry, and exclude peers within their industry in favor of peers sharing the same life cycle stage. Additionally, we find that firms alter their peer groups to look outside of their industry when industry peers provide noisy information on systematic risk (i.e., industry peers are spread across life cycle stages) and look outside their life cycle stage when these peers less fully reflect common shocks (i.e., when the firm transitions between life cycle stages). Further, our findings suggest that cross-sectional differences in RPE use documented in prior literature result not from underlying differences in the use of RPE, but rather from the choice of peer group. Overall, our results suggest that RPE is a complex and dynamic process in which life cycle peers play a prominent role.

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