Melissa Martin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Melissa Martin has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Katharine D. Drake
The University of Arizona
5 shared publications- Jennifer L. Brown
Arizona State University
2 shared publications Annie S. McGowan
Texas A&M University - Department of Accounting
1 shared publication- Beverly R. Walther
Northwestern University
1 shared publication Brian D. Cadman
University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business
1 shared publicationClara Xiaoling Chen
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (6) , 5000-5026
Disclosure Costs of Relative Performance Evaluation
Relative performance evaluation has become an increasingly common component of executive compensation contracts. We study how these incentive plans relate to corporate disclosure and predict that they introduce an incremental disclosure cost. This cost arises because disclosures can help competitors make better investment decisions, enhancing their performance and thereby reducing managers’ expected compensation. Consistent with this prediction, we find a negative association between relative performance plans and voluntary value-relevant management forecasts, alongside a positive association with redactions in mandatory filings. This pattern is specific to plans with accounting-based metrics and absent for plans with price-based metrics. The results for price-based metrics are consistent with the idea that the incentive to reduce information asymmetry with market participants outweighs disclosure costs in these plans. The results for accounting-based metrics are more pronounced for managers whose plans provide stronger incentives and for those whose forecasts provide meaningful information spillovers to peers. Overall, this paper contributes the idea that relative performance plans can impose disclosure costs, thereby shedding light on contracting mechanisms that discourage disclosure—a less well-understood aspect of disclosure research. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06200 .
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (6) , 5000-5026
Disclosure Costs of Relative Performance Evaluation
Relative performance evaluation has become an increasingly common component of executive compensation contracts. We study how these incentive plans relate to corporate disclosure and predict that they introduce an incremental disclosure cost. This cost arises because disclosures can help competitors make better investment decisions, enhancing their performance and thereby reducing managers’ expected compensation. Consistent with this prediction, we find a negative association between relative performance plans and voluntary value-relevant management forecasts, alongside a positive association with redactions in mandatory filings. This pattern is specific to plans with accounting-based metrics and absent for plans with price-based metrics. The results for price-based metrics are consistent with the idea that the incentive to reduce information asymmetry with market participants outweighs disclosure costs in these plans. The results for accounting-based metrics are more pronounced for managers whose plans provide stronger incentives and for those whose forecasts provide meaningful information spillovers to peers. Overall, this paper contributes the idea that relative performance plans can impose disclosure costs, thereby shedding light on contracting mechanisms that discourage disclosure—a less well-understood aspect of disclosure research. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06200 .
- Open Access
- 25 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 82 (2)
Pay for(eign) performance: CEO pay incentives for foreign tax savings
- 25 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 82 (2)
Open AccessPay for(eign) performance: CEO pay incentives for foreign tax savings
- 27 May 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in European Accounting Review
- Vol. 32 (3) , 547-576
Innovative Data – Use-cases in Management Accounting Research and Practice
- 27 May 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in European Accounting Review
- Vol. 32 (3) , 547-576
Innovative Data – Use-cases in Management Accounting Research and Practice
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (8) , 6268-6297
Board Committee Overlap and the Use of Earnings in CEO Compensation Contracts
Using proxy statement data describing the terms of compensation contracts, we examine how overlapping membership between compensation and audit committees influences the use of earnings metrics in compensation. Although research predicts that such overlap could either increase or decrease the reliance on earnings, we find that firms with overlapping directors rely less on earnings-based performance measures in incentive contracts without altering the overall level of performance-contingent cash bonuses. In addition, we provide evidence that firms substitute earnings measures with measures less subject to earnings management. Our findings are robust to potential alternative explanations, extend to an implicit relation between earnings and compensation for a larger sample, and are not driven by the tendency toward an overlapping committee structure more broadly. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (8) , 6268-6297
Board Committee Overlap and the Use of Earnings in CEO Compensation Contracts
Using proxy statement data describing the terms of compensation contracts, we examine how overlapping membership between compensation and audit committees influences the use of earnings metrics in compensation. Although research predicts that such overlap could either increase or decrease the reliance on earnings, we find that firms with overlapping directors rely less on earnings-based performance measures in incentive contracts without altering the overall level of performance-contingent cash bonuses. In addition, we provide evidence that firms substitute earnings measures with measures less subject to earnings management. Our findings are robust to potential alternative explanations, extend to an implicit relation between earnings and compensation for a larger sample, and are not driven by the tendency toward an overlapping committee structure more broadly. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- 6 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 28 (2) , 533-569
Investigating discretion in executive contracting: extracting private information from valuation allowance decisions
- 6 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 28 (2) , 533-569
Investigating discretion in executive contracting: extracting private information from valuation allowance decisions
- 1 October 2019
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 32 (2) , 107-135
Implementing Relative Performance Evaluation: The Role of Life Cycle Peers
The effectiveness of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in compensation contracts depends on a firm's ability to identify peers that are subject to similar exogenous shocks with similar abilities to respond to such shocks. We expand the RPE literature by considering whether firms routinely select peers sharing a life cycle stage in RPE implementation. We argue that life cycle captures similarities in underlying economics and homogeneity along a number of dimensions relevant in filtering systematic performance. Using explicit peer firm disclosures and a peer selection model, we show that firms routinely select life cycle peers. Further, using implicit RPE tests, we document evidence of life cycle peers filtering common performance incremental to previously identified peer groups. We provide some of the first evidence that peer group composition differs with differing characteristics of the firm and its industry, highlighting that peer selection is a dynamic process evolving with the firm's changing nature. JEL Classifications: E32; J33; L2. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.
- 1 October 2019
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 32 (2) , 107-135
Implementing Relative Performance Evaluation: The Role of Life Cycle Peers
The effectiveness of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in compensation contracts depends on a firm's ability to identify peers that are subject to similar exogenous shocks with similar abilities to respond to such shocks. We expand the RPE literature by considering whether firms routinely select peers sharing a life cycle stage in RPE implementation. We argue that life cycle captures similarities in underlying economics and homogeneity along a number of dimensions relevant in filtering systematic performance. Using explicit peer firm disclosures and a peer selection model, we show that firms routinely select life cycle peers. Further, using implicit RPE tests, we document evidence of life cycle peers filtering common performance incremental to previously identified peer groups. We provide some of the first evidence that peer group composition differs with differing characteristics of the firm and its industry, highlighting that peer selection is a dynamic process evolving with the firm's changing nature. JEL Classifications: E32; J33; L2. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.
- 31 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 37 (2) , 741-772
Are Earnings Forecasts Informed by Proxy Statement Compensation Disclosures?
We investigate the extent to which market participants use compensation payouts released in the DEF 14A proxy statement (DEF14A) to assess future firm performance by examining sell‐side analysts' earnings forecasts. Consistent with prior work, we confirm that CEO compensation unexplained by current observable economic factors is positively associated with future firm performance. We find that both the likelihood that analysts revise their forecasts following release of the DEF14A and the magnitude and direction of analysts' forecast revisions are positively associated with unexplained CEO compensation. These associations are stronger after the SEC required additional compensation‐related disclosures in late 2006 but lower if the firm has weak corporate governance or more precise other information. Analysts' reactions are not complete, however. Analysts' forecast errors measured months after the DEF14A release are associated with past unexplained compensation, especially in the pre‐2006 period and for analysts who do not revise at the DEF14A release. Taken together, our results suggest that compensation payouts released in the DEF14A contain useful forward‐looking information that is recognized by at least some sophisticated market participants and that the increased disclosure regulations assisted market participants in incorporating this information.
- 31 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 37 (2) , 741-772
Are Earnings Forecasts Informed by Proxy Statement Compensation Disclosures?
We investigate the extent to which market participants use compensation payouts released in the DEF 14A proxy statement (DEF14A) to assess future firm performance by examining sell‐side analysts' earnings forecasts. Consistent with prior work, we confirm that CEO compensation unexplained by current observable economic factors is positively associated with future firm performance. We find that both the likelihood that analysts revise their forecasts following release of the DEF14A and the magnitude and direction of analysts' forecast revisions are positively associated with unexplained CEO compensation. These associations are stronger after the SEC required additional compensation‐related disclosures in late 2006 but lower if the firm has weak corporate governance or more precise other information. Analysts' reactions are not complete, however. Analysts' forecast errors measured months after the DEF14A release are associated with past unexplained compensation, especially in the pre‐2006 period and for analysts who do not revise at the DEF14A release. Taken together, our results suggest that compensation payouts released in the DEF14A contain useful forward‐looking information that is recognized by at least some sophisticated market participants and that the increased disclosure regulations assisted market participants in incorporating this information.
- Open Access
- 9 June 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Money for Nothing? Using Expectations of Loss Persistence to Examine Cash Compensation in Loss-Making Firms
We investigate boards’ compensation decisions in loss years when current observable performance measures are arguably less indicative of both current manager effort and future performance. We categorize loss firms based on expected loss persistence using information underlying valuation allowance disclosures. We identify a compensation premium in firms with anticipated transitory losses and among firms with long-term growth prospects but anticipated persistent losses. We test and find that both these current premiums are associated with future performance. Additionally, we identify a career risk premium for executives facing persistent losses, especially among high ability managers and those with high firm-related wealth. Lastly, as expected, we do not find evidence of a compensation premium among firms anticipating termination of their CEO – a group in which we do not expect a current compensation premium. Overall, our study provides some of the first large-scale evidence about executive compensation practices in loss-making entities.
- 9 June 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMoney for Nothing? Using Expectations of Loss Persistence to Examine Cash Compensation in Loss-Making Firms
We investigate boards’ compensation decisions in loss years when current observable performance measures are arguably less indicative of both current manager effort and future performance. We categorize loss firms based on expected loss persistence using information underlying valuation allowance disclosures. We identify a compensation premium in firms with anticipated transitory losses and among firms with long-term growth prospects but anticipated persistent losses. We test and find that both these current premiums are associated with future performance. Additionally, we identify a career risk premium for executives facing persistent losses, especially among high ability managers and those with high firm-related wealth. Lastly, as expected, we do not find evidence of a compensation premium among firms anticipating termination of their CEO – a group in which we do not expect a current compensation premium. Overall, our study provides some of the first large-scale evidence about executive compensation practices in loss-making entities.
- Open Access
- 17 May 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Implementing Relative Performance Evaluation: The Role of Life Cycle Peers
Theory suggests that the effectiveness of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in compensation contracts is dependent on a firm’s ability to identify a suitable set of economically similar peers subject to common shocks and with a similar ability to respond to those shocks. We argue that within a life cycle stage firms are homogenous along a number of dimensions relevant in filtering systematic performance. Importantly, life cycle peers capture extra-industry shocks, as well as differential ability of firms within the same industry to respond to industry-specific shocks, characteristics highlighted by both RPE theory and compensation consultants as important facets of performance peers. Thus, we hypothesize and find that compensation committees choose performance peers that share the same life cycle stage, even when those peers are outside their industry, and exclude peers within their industry in favor of peers sharing the same life cycle stage. Additionally, we find that firms alter their peer groups to look outside of their industry when industry peers provide noisy information on systematic risk (i.e., industry peers are spread across life cycle stages) and look outside their life cycle stage when these peers less fully reflect common shocks (i.e., when the firm transitions between life cycle stages). Further, our findings suggest that cross-sectional differences in RPE use documented in prior literature result not from underlying differences in the use of RPE, but rather from the choice of peer group. Overall, our results suggest that RPE is a complex and dynamic process in which life cycle peers play a prominent role.
- 17 May 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessImplementing Relative Performance Evaluation: The Role of Life Cycle Peers
Theory suggests that the effectiveness of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in compensation contracts is dependent on a firm’s ability to identify a suitable set of economically similar peers subject to common shocks and with a similar ability to respond to those shocks. We argue that within a life cycle stage firms are homogenous along a number of dimensions relevant in filtering systematic performance. Importantly, life cycle peers capture extra-industry shocks, as well as differential ability of firms within the same industry to respond to industry-specific shocks, characteristics highlighted by both RPE theory and compensation consultants as important facets of performance peers. Thus, we hypothesize and find that compensation committees choose performance peers that share the same life cycle stage, even when those peers are outside their industry, and exclude peers within their industry in favor of peers sharing the same life cycle stage. Additionally, we find that firms alter their peer groups to look outside of their industry when industry peers provide noisy information on systematic risk (i.e., industry peers are spread across life cycle stages) and look outside their life cycle stage when these peers less fully reflect common shocks (i.e., when the firm transitions between life cycle stages). Further, our findings suggest that cross-sectional differences in RPE use documented in prior literature result not from underlying differences in the use of RPE, but rather from the choice of peer group. Overall, our results suggest that RPE is a complex and dynamic process in which life cycle peers play a prominent role.
- Open Access
- 2 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Are Firms Myopic?: The Case of Contracting on Performance and Risk
Academic and anecdotal evidence has consistently shown that incentive systems often provide short-term payouts without regard for long-term risk. To prevent man
- 2 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAre Firms Myopic?: The Case of Contracting on Performance and Risk
Academic and anecdotal evidence has consistently shown that incentive systems often provide short-term payouts without regard for long-term risk. To prevent man