Incompleteness of boundedly axiomatizable theories
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Abstract
Our main result (Theorem A) shows the incompleteness of any consistent sequential theory T formulated in a finite language such that T is axiomatized by a collection of sentences of bounded quantifier-alternation-depth. Our proof employs an appropriate reduction mechanism to rule out the possibility of completeness by simply invoking Tarski's Undefinability of Truth theorem. We also use the proof strategy of Theorem A to obtain other incompleteness results (as in Theorems A+; B and B+).Keywords
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