Emulative envy and loving admiration
Author:
Open Access
- 16 January 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 33 (1) , 202-219
Abstract
Would you rather your friends, family, and partners envy you, or admire you, when you flourish? Many people would prefer to be admired, and so we often strive to tame our envy. Recently, however, Sara Protasi offered an intriguing defence of “emulative envy” which apparently improves us and our relationships, and is compatible with love. I find her account unconvincing, and defend loving admiration in this article. In Section 2, I summarize Protasi's nuanced account of envy. In Section 2, I argue that irrespective of how we analyze emotions in general we can argue that it is preferable to prioritize the cultivation of some emotions over others. In Section 4, I challenge Protasi's assumptions about the affinity between love and envy. My core argument is in Section 5 where I examine envy's impact on the envier, the envied, and relationships. Envy impedes an authentic relationship to the goods and goals in the envier's life, alienates the envied, and stifles joint‐action. From all perspectives admiration typically fares better. After briefly considering the objection that admiration may impede love in Section 6, I conclude, in section seven, that admiration should be preferred to emulative envy in our intimate relationships.Keywords
This publication has 40 references indexed in Scilit:
- Emotion regulation: Taking stock and moving forward.Emotion, 2013
- The Influence of Affective States on Cognitive Broadening/Narrowing: Considering the Importance of Motivational IntensitySocial and Personality Psychology Compass, 2012
- Aristotle's Theory of the Emotions: Emotions as Pleasures and Pains2011
- Moral Testimony and Moral EpistemologyEthics, 2009
- These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct Phenomena2009
- On the Pleasures and Displeasures of Being Envied2008
- The envious mindCognition and Emotion, 2007
- Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy2006
- The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of EmotionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2000
- Friendship and Moral DangerThe Journal of Philosophy, 2000