Luke Brunning
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Luke Brunning has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aaron Ben‐Ze’eV
Department of Philosophy University of Haifa Israel
1 shared publication - Natasha McKeever
University of Leeds
1 shared publication - Per-Erik Milam
University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Tiredness and the Capacity to Decide: The Example of Maternity Care
Tiredness is taken seriously in healthcare where clinicians are concerned since good decisions require the ability to think clearly. The impact of patient tiredness is neglected. This is surprising, as there are healthcare contexts, like maternity care, where tiredness is nearly ubiquitous. Empirical research into sleep deprivation suggests that tiredness undermines substantially our abilities to understand and reason about potential choices. Since these abilities are necessary components of having capacity, tired patients may lack capacity in moments when important choices have to be made, for example a late intervention in active labour. I defend this argument. Tiredness can sometimes impair capacity and so justifies testing for capacity in some cases. Taking tiredness seriously and assessing it in practice is not paternalistic. Indeed, I argue that recognising the impact of tiredness, while failing to act on that fact, constitutes ‘dependency denial’ which harms women in maternity care.
Open AccessTiredness and the Capacity to Decide: The Example of Maternity Care
Tiredness is taken seriously in healthcare where clinicians are concerned since good decisions require the ability to think clearly. The impact of patient tiredness is neglected. This is surprising, as there are healthcare contexts, like maternity care, where tiredness is nearly ubiquitous. Empirical research into sleep deprivation suggests that tiredness undermines substantially our abilities to understand and reason about potential choices. Since these abilities are necessary components of having capacity, tired patients may lack capacity in moments when important choices have to be made, for example a late intervention in active labour. I defend this argument. Tiredness can sometimes impair capacity and so justifies testing for capacity in some cases. Taking tiredness seriously and assessing it in practice is not paternalistic. Indeed, I argue that recognising the impact of tiredness, while failing to act on that fact, constitutes ‘dependency denial’ which harms women in maternity care.
- Open Access
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Contemporary Political Theory
- Vol. 25 (1) , 48
Love troubles: A philosophy of eros
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Contemporary Political Theory
- Vol. 25 (1) , 48
Open AccessLove troubles: A philosophy of eros
- Open Access
- 2 October 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 84 (4) , 711-719
Microaggression and ambiguous experience
Regina Rini argues that ambiguity about whether behaviour instantiates oppression is constitutive of microaggression. I give reasons to doubt this: people can be clear that someone’s behaviour towards them instantiates oppression; ambiguity does not seem to feature centrally in apologies for microaggression; ambiguity can be present when someone is a victim of microaggression due to external causes such as fatigue; ambiguity can be introduced or dispelled by the corroborating input of third parties, some of whom have expertise as oppressed people themselves. These points lend support to a structural account of microaggression where ambiguity is an optional aggravating feature of some microagressive behaviour.
- 2 October 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 84 (4) , 711-719
Open AccessMicroaggression and ambiguous experience
Regina Rini argues that ambiguity about whether behaviour instantiates oppression is constitutive of microaggression. I give reasons to doubt this: people can be clear that someone’s behaviour towards them instantiates oppression; ambiguity does not seem to feature centrally in apologies for microaggression; ambiguity can be present when someone is a victim of microaggression due to external causes such as fatigue; ambiguity can be introduced or dispelled by the corroborating input of third parties, some of whom have expertise as oppressed people themselves. These points lend support to a structural account of microaggression where ambiguity is an optional aggravating feature of some microagressive behaviour.
- Open Access
- 16 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 33 (1) , 202-219
Emulative envy and loving admiration
Would you rather your friends, family, and partners envy you, or admire you, when you flourish? Many people would prefer to be admired, and so we often strive to tame our envy. Recently, however, Sara Protasi offered an intriguing defence of “emulative envy” which apparently improves us and our relationships, and is compatible with love. I find her account unconvincing, and defend loving admiration in this article. In Section 2, I summarize Protasi's nuanced account of envy. In Section 2, I argue that irrespective of how we analyze emotions in general we can argue that it is preferable to prioritize the cultivation of some emotions over others. In Section 4, I challenge Protasi's assumptions about the affinity between love and envy. My core argument is in Section 5 where I examine envy's impact on the envier, the envied, and relationships. Envy impedes an authentic relationship to the goods and goals in the envier's life, alienates the envied, and stifles joint‐action. From all perspectives admiration typically fares better. After briefly considering the objection that admiration may impede love in Section 6, I conclude, in section seven, that admiration should be preferred to emulative envy in our intimate relationships.
- 16 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 33 (1) , 202-219
Open AccessEmulative envy and loving admiration
Would you rather your friends, family, and partners envy you, or admire you, when you flourish? Many people would prefer to be admired, and so we often strive to tame our envy. Recently, however, Sara Protasi offered an intriguing defence of “emulative envy” which apparently improves us and our relationships, and is compatible with love. I find her account unconvincing, and defend loving admiration in this article. In Section 2, I summarize Protasi's nuanced account of envy. In Section 2, I argue that irrespective of how we analyze emotions in general we can argue that it is preferable to prioritize the cultivation of some emotions over others. In Section 4, I challenge Protasi's assumptions about the affinity between love and envy. My core argument is in Section 5 where I examine envy's impact on the envier, the envied, and relationships. Envy impedes an authentic relationship to the goods and goals in the envier's life, alienates the envied, and stifles joint‐action. From all perspectives admiration typically fares better. After briefly considering the objection that admiration may impede love in Section 6, I conclude, in section seven, that admiration should be preferred to emulative envy in our intimate relationships.
- 15 May 2023
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 49 (12) , 799-802
Revisiting the comparison between healthcare strikes and just war
In the UK, healthcare workers are again considering whether to strike, and the moral status of strike action is being publicly debated. Mpho Selemogo argued that we can think productively about the ethical status of healthcare strikes by using the ethical framework often applied to armed conflict (2014). On this view, strikes need to be just, proportionate, likely to succeed, a last resort, pursued by a legitimate organisation and publicly communicated. In this article, I argue for a different approach to the just war comparison. Selemogo adopts a traditional, collectivist conception of just war reasoning but this is not the only view. So-called ‘individualist’ approaches to the morality of war can also be applied to strike action. Taking an individualist perspective complicates the traditional picture of a dispute arising between three well-defined groups of healthcare workers, employers and the innocent subjects of collateral damage: patients and the public. We arrive instead at a more complicated moral picture: some people might be more morally liable to be harmed than others during a strike, or can justly bear increased risks, and some are more obliged to strike than others. I describe this shift of framework before critically examining some of the traditionaljus ad bellumconditions as applied to strikes.
- 15 May 2023
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 49 (12) , 799-802
Revisiting the comparison between healthcare strikes and just war
In the UK, healthcare workers are again considering whether to strike, and the moral status of strike action is being publicly debated. Mpho Selemogo argued that we can think productively about the ethical status of healthcare strikes by using the ethical framework often applied to armed conflict (2014). On this view, strikes need to be just, proportionate, likely to succeed, a last resort, pursued by a legitimate organisation and publicly communicated. In this article, I argue for a different approach to the just war comparison. Selemogo adopts a traditional, collectivist conception of just war reasoning but this is not the only view. So-called ‘individualist’ approaches to the morality of war can also be applied to strike action. Taking an individualist perspective complicates the traditional picture of a dispute arising between three well-defined groups of healthcare workers, employers and the innocent subjects of collateral damage: patients and the public. We arrive instead at a more complicated moral picture: some people might be more morally liable to be harmed than others during a strike, or can justly bear increased risks, and some are more obliged to strike than others. I describe this shift of framework before critically examining some of the traditionaljus ad bellumconditions as applied to strikes.
- 9 January 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 40 (2) , 382-384
Sad Love: Romance and the Search for Meaning. CarrieJenkins, 2022. Cambridge, Polity. xviii + 153 pp, £14.99 (pb) £45.00 (hb)
- 9 January 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 40 (2) , 382-384
Sad Love: Romance and the Search for Meaning. CarrieJenkins, 2022. Cambridge, Polity. xviii + 153 pp, £14.99 (pb) £45.00 (hb)
- Open Access
- 13 October 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 38 (3) , 497-517
Asexuality
Asexuality is overlooked in the philosophical literature and in wider society. Such neglect produces incomplete or inaccurate accounts of romantic life and harms asexual people. We develop an account of asexuality to redress this neglect and enrich discussion of romantic life. Asexual experiences are diverse. Some asexual people have sex; some have romantic relationships in the absence of sex. We accept the common definition of asexuality as the absence of sexual attraction and explain how sexual attraction and sexual desire differ by giving an affordance‐like account of sexual attraction. Armed with that distinction, we show that asexuality is clearly different from celibacy or disorders of desire and that some existing philosophical theories of sexual desire struggle to accommodate asexual sexuality. We then build on asexual testimony about the diversity of non‐sexual attractions to answer two common objections levelled at asexual romance: that romantic relationships require sexual attraction or that sex in the absence of sexual attraction is insufficiently focused on someone as an individual. Finally, we describe some of the ways asexuality has been erased or denigrated in society, and the specific injustices and harms that result.
- 13 October 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 38 (3) , 497-517
Open AccessAsexuality
Asexuality is overlooked in the philosophical literature and in wider society. Such neglect produces incomplete or inaccurate accounts of romantic life and harms asexual people. We develop an account of asexuality to redress this neglect and enrich discussion of romantic life. Asexual experiences are diverse. Some asexual people have sex; some have romantic relationships in the absence of sex. We accept the common definition of asexuality as the absence of sexual attraction and explain how sexual attraction and sexual desire differ by giving an affordance‐like account of sexual attraction. Armed with that distinction, we show that asexuality is clearly different from celibacy or disorders of desire and that some existing philosophical theories of sexual desire struggle to accommodate asexual sexuality. We then build on asexual testimony about the diversity of non‐sexual attractions to answer two common objections levelled at asexual romance: that romantic relationships require sexual attraction or that sex in the absence of sexual attraction is insufficiently focused on someone as an individual. Finally, we describe some of the ways asexuality has been erased or denigrated in society, and the specific injustices and harms that result.
- 13 August 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Moral Philosophy
- Vol. 17 (4) , 449-452
Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality, written by Lisa Tessman
"Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality, written by Lisa Tessman" published on 13 Aug 2020 by Brill.
- 13 August 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Moral Philosophy
- Vol. 17 (4) , 449-452
Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality, written by Lisa Tessman
"Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality, written by Lisa Tessman" published on 13 Aug 2020 by Brill.
- 31 March 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Vol. 6 (2) , 225-245
Compersion: An Alternative to Jealousy?
Compersion is an important concept for non-monogamous people. Often described as jealousy's opposite, compersion labels positive feelings toward the intimacy of a beloved with other people. Since many people think jealousy is ordinary, intransigent, and even appropriate, compersion can seem psychologically and ethically dubious. I make the case for compersion, arguing it focuses on the flourishing of others and is thus not akin to pride, vicarious enjoyment, or masochistic pleasure. People cultivate compersion by softening their propensity to be jealous and by attending to the flourishing of others, which requires them to tackle entitlement and temper vulnerability. I argue that jealousy is not a valuable emotional disposition; its instrumental benefits are minor, unstable, and have to be traded against the harms of aggression. Arguments that conclude that jealousy is a virtue rest on contentious premises and overlook the practical question as to whether jealousy and compersion could be cultivated together.
- 31 March 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Vol. 6 (2) , 225-245
Compersion: An Alternative to Jealousy?
Compersion is an important concept for non-monogamous people. Often described as jealousy's opposite, compersion labels positive feelings toward the intimacy of a beloved with other people. Since many people think jealousy is ordinary, intransigent, and even appropriate, compersion can seem psychologically and ethically dubious. I make the case for compersion, arguing it focuses on the flourishing of others and is thus not akin to pride, vicarious enjoyment, or masochistic pleasure. People cultivate compersion by softening their propensity to be jealous and by attending to the flourishing of others, which requires them to tackle entitlement and temper vulnerability. I argue that jealousy is not a valuable emotional disposition; its instrumental benefits are minor, unstable, and have to be traded against the harms of aggression. Arguments that conclude that jealousy is a virtue rest on contentious premises and overlook the practical question as to whether jealousy and compersion could be cultivated together.
- 1 September 2019
- Published by Berghahn Books in Theoria
- Vol. 66 (160) , 53-70
The Avoidance Approach to Plural Value
Value monists and value pluralists disagree deeply. Pluralists want to explain why moral life feels frustrating; monists want clear action guidance. If pluralism is true, our actions may be unable to honour irredeemably clashing values. This possibility could prompt pessimism, but the ‘avoidance approach’ to pluralism holds that although values may conflict inherently, we can take pre-emptive action to avoid situations where they would conflict in practice, rather like a child pirouetting to avoid the cracks on a pavement. Sadly, this view is hostage to epistemic problems and unforeseen consequences and is liable to generate timidity. It rests on the intuition that honouring values in action is more important than doing so in other ways, but this is a premise we have reason to reconsider.
- 1 September 2019
- Published by Berghahn Books in Theoria
- Vol. 66 (160) , 53-70
The Avoidance Approach to Plural Value
Value monists and value pluralists disagree deeply. Pluralists want to explain why moral life feels frustrating; monists want clear action guidance. If pluralism is true, our actions may be unable to honour irredeemably clashing values. This possibility could prompt pessimism, but the ‘avoidance approach’ to pluralism holds that although values may conflict inherently, we can take pre-emptive action to avoid situations where they would conflict in practice, rather like a child pirouetting to avoid the cracks on a pavement. Sadly, this view is hostage to epistemic problems and unforeseen consequences and is liable to generate timidity. It rests on the intuition that honouring values in action is more important than doing so in other ways, but this is a premise we have reason to reconsider.