Multidimensional Reasoning in Games: Framework, Equilibrium, and Applications
- 1 August 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 11 (3) , 285-318
Abstract
We develop a framework for analyzing multidimensional reasoning in strategic interactions, which is motivated by two experimental findings: (i) in games with a large and complex strategy space, players tend to think in terms of strategy characteristics rather than the strategies themselves; (ii) in their strategic deliberation, players consider one characteristic at a time. A multidimensional equilibrium is a vector of characteristics representing a stable mode of behavior: a player does not wish to modify any one characteristic. The concept is applied to several economic interactions, where a vector of characteristics, rather than a distribution of strategies, is identified as stable. (JEL C72, D11, D91)Keywords
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