Is it wrong to impose the harms of human life? A reply to Benatar
- 14 July 2010
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
- Vol. 31 (4) , 317-331
Abstract
Might it be morally wrong to procreate? David Benatar answers affirmatively in Better Never to Have Been, arguing that coming into existence is always a great harm. I counter this view in several ways. First, I argue against Benatar’s asserted asymmetry between harm and benefit—which would support the claim that any amount of harm in a human life would make it not worth starting—while questioning the significance of his distinction between a life worth starting and one worth continuing. I further contend that his understanding of hedonism and desire-fulfillment theories distorts their implications for the quality of human life; as for objective-list theories, I rebut his critique of their human-centered basis of evaluation. Notwithstanding this multi-tiered challenge to Benatar’s reasoning, I conclude with praise for his work and the intellectual virtues it embodies.Keywords
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