Harnessing Biased Faults in Attacks on ECC-Based Signature Schemes
Authors:
- Kimmo JarvinenKJKimmo Jarvinen
- Celine BlondeauCBCeline Blondeau
- Dan PageDPDan Page
- Michael TunstallMTMichael Tunstall
- 1 September 2012
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 72-82
Abstract
This paper presents an extension of the byte-fault attack on signature schemes presented by Giraud et al. Our work extends their attack in a number of ways, but the main focus is an alternative fault model motivated by existing fault injection results. Instead of assuming faults are uniformly distributed (i.e., a given bit is flipped with probability 1/2), we consider the case where faults are biased (i.e., the probability differs from 1/2). Our results show that injecting biased faults allows an attacker to reveal security-critical data with significantly fewer faults and/or a significantly faster search through the remaining candidates.Keywords
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