Shared Intelligence and Misaligned Firm Entry
Authors:
- Feng ChiFCFeng Chi
- Nathan YangNYNathan Yang
Preprint
- 29 July 2026
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Firms increasingly buy forecasts from the same analytics platforms. Pooling data sharpens each forecast, but routing decisions through one layer replaces idiosyncratic error, which averages out, with shared error, which does not. Finitely many firms screen candidate markets, each choosing proprietary research or a shared platform. Adoption raises a firm's own precision, which it internalizes, and correlates evaluation errors, which it does not. When a good market's value is realized if some firm recognizes it, this correlation lowers the value of independent evaluation, so private adoption exceeds the screening optimum whenever the shared error is present. Whether adoption is excessive on net turns on the precision adoption buys. Provider multiplicity diversifies the exposure only in proportion to providers' structural independence.Keywords
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