NYNathan Yang

Nathan Yang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Nathan Yang has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Can Agency Exist in Demand Models?

    by Nathan Yang

    A seller's comparison question can change evaluation and purchases at fixed prices and material information. I construct models reproducing demand that satisfy three axioms consistent with free will. Removing the same comparison can yield opposite welfare effects under specified consumption values, even at zero procedural cost. Moreover, a common value ranking yields sharp bounds on purchases. Purchases, repeated answers, and post-purchase answers can identify the gain under a common updating rule. Finally, the same demand function preserves price predictions under a fixed procedure and common supply conditions; firms' procedural control can change these predictions.

  • Open Access

    Agentic Nash Equilibrium

    by Nathan Yang

    Individuals with agency can choose how to evaluate participation in a joint project. To accommodate this philosophical premise, I define Agentic Nash Equilibrium through axioms and self-authorized evaluation. The axioms distinguish constructive judgment from fixed answers. Within this framework, I establish conditions preserving agency under strategic mixing and ensuring equilibrium existence. Procedures with identical direct choices yield different participation after deliberation, sustaining multiple equilibria. Restricting procedural choice can cost more than withholding information while preserving agency. A quantum probability construction supports these results; classical processes with memory reproduce its responses, whereas fixed-answer models fail constructive sourcehood.

  • Open Access

    Agency in Agent-Based Models

    by Nathan Yang

    Firms can induce purchases by controlling the procedures behind how consumers evaluate an offer. Using an agent-based model, I connect choice-theoretic axioms about free will to potential consumer losses and producer gains as producers erode consumer agency. Seller questioning preserves irreducible alternativism and constructive sourcehood while violating reasons-responsive control. Restoring reasons-responsive control recovers less consumer surplus than effective consumer control, and identical responses permit opposite total-surplus changes. Purchase data from past experimental research studies calibrate responses in simulations of seller learning. Ultimately, the quantified surplus analysis articulates how values, heterogeneous responses, and adaptive procedure choice contribute to each stakeholder's welfare.

  • Open Access

    Agency and the Persistence of Choice

    by Nathan Yang

    Sellers and advisers use questions to shape intended choices before implementation. Grocery, entertainment, electricity, and AI examples show how commitment conceals revisions, aggregate stability hides opposing changes, retention accompanies different review processes, and assistance timing interacts with time available. Motivated by temporal experience and agency, I use quantum probabilities to model how evaluations reopen earlier judgments while supplied information stays fixed. The model gives sharp bounds linking a question's influence on choice to revision, even when people respond differently. The framework shows how costly review can sustain persistence and explains how manufactured urgency preserves acceptance by discouraging review.

  • Open Access

    Agency Erosion

    by Nathan Yang

    Firms can influence consumer decisions by choosing which questions come first. I study the welfare consequences when a firm's preferred outcome conflicts with the consumer's values. Choices satisfy three requirements for free will: openness, development through answering questions, and responsiveness to values. I bound the consumption loss from transferring control to the firm and show how experimentation can select the most harmful tested sequence. Authority to refuse preceding interactions can also have separate value when final choices are unchanged. A subscription cancellation experiment illustrates how these costs can accompany higher profits and total surplus.

  • Open Access

    Free Will and a Choice-Theoretic Separation of Classical and Quantum Models

    by Nathan Yang

    I formalize free will through three choice axioms: reasons-responsive control, irreducible alternativism, and constructive sourcehood. For open systems, sourcehood implies alternativism; control is independent of both. A deliberately stochastic rule satisfies alternativism but admits a non-invasive classical extension, separating the two openness conditions. A quantum system with two binary contexts satisfies all three axioms and yields an explicit discrepancy between direct and sequenced probabilities. The separation concerns non-invasive representations; classical processes with state disturbance can also satisfy the axioms.

  • Open Access

    When does First-mover Advantage Reflect Preemptive Motives?

    by Nathan Yang

    An early entrant's success may reflect lower costs, stronger demand, or gains from discouraging rivals. I show that timing and performance alone cannot distinguish these motives without restrictions on costs. For Japanese convenience stores, the model fits the same outlet patterns whether preemption explains all or none of the incentive to enter. A published cost estimate rules out some stated assumptions about future costs and entry incentives; under others, it limits preemption's contribution to 8.3%. The results show what additional cost and performance evidence is needed to measure preemption.

  • Open Access

    Shared Intelligence and Misaligned Firm Entry

    by Feng Chi, Nathan Yang

    Firms increasingly buy forecasts from the same analytics platforms. Pooling data sharpens each forecast, but routing decisions through one layer replaces idiosyncratic error, which averages out, with shared error, which does not. Finitely many firms screen candidate markets, each choosing proprietary research or a shared platform. Adoption raises a firm's own precision, which it internalizes, and correlates evaluation errors, which it does not. When a good market's value is realized if some firm recognizes it, this correlation lowers the value of independent evaluation, so private adoption exceeds the screening optimum whenever the shared error is present. Whether adoption is excessive on net turns on the precision adoption buys. Provider multiplicity diversifies the exposure only in proportion to providers' structural independence.

  • Open Access

    Purposeful Structural Model Design

    by Nathan Yang

    Structural models enable marketing researchers to evaluate counterfactual decisions such as pricing, market entry, and platform design, yet their credibility depends critically on choices made prior to estimation. In strategic settings, the mapping from primitives to outcomes can be locally flat, so distinct mechanisms generate similar behavior, while equilibrium responses attenuate policy effects and limit their detectability. This paper develops a framework linking identification geometry to counterfactual feasibility, showing that model complexity redistributes identifying information across competing mechanisms and that statistical insignificance can reflect equilibrium constraints rather than lack of data. The results imply that credible structural analysis requires aligning model design with the decision margin and the informational content of the data, rather than relying solely on estimation advances.