A Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy
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- 12 August 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 56 (4) , 359-385
Abstract
Many phenomena appear to be indeterminate, including material macro-object boundaries and certain open future claims. Here I provide an account of indeterminacy in metaphysical, rather than semantic or epistemic, terms. Previous accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) have typically taken this to involve its being indeterminate which of various determinate (precise) states of affairs obtain. On my alternative account, MI involves its being determinate (or just plain true) that an indeterminate (imprecise) state of affairs obtains. I more specifically suggest that MI involves an object's (i) having a determinable property, but (ii) not having any unique determinate of that determinable. I motivate the needed extension of the traditional understanding of determinables, then argue that a determinable-based account of MI accommodates, in illuminating fashion, both ‘glutty’ and ‘gappy’ cases of MI, while satisfactorily treating concerns about MI stemming from Evans’ argument and the problem of the many.Keywords
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