Jessica Wilson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jessica Wilson has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Stephen Biggs
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Iowa State University, Ames, USA
4 shared publications - Claudio Calosi
Department of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage, Ca’ Foscari University, Venice, Italy
2 shared publications Claudio Calosi
University of Geneva
1 shared publication- David Builes
Philosophy Department, Princeton University, Princeton, USA
1 shared publication - Umut Baysan1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 4 (2) , 1-21
Closure, counterfactualist causation, and Zhong’s new causal argument for physicalism
- 11 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 4 (2) , 1-21
Closure, counterfactualist causation, and Zhong’s new causal argument for physicalism
- 6 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (3) , 1-17
Does anti-exceptionalism about logic entail that logic is a posteriori?
- 6 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (3) , 1-17
Does anti-exceptionalism about logic entail that logic is a posteriori?
- 21 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 179 (7) , 2199-2236
In defense of Countabilism
- 21 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 179 (7) , 2199-2236
In defense of Countabilism
- 4 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 178 (10) , 3291-3317
Quantum indeterminacy and the double-slit experiment
- 4 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 178 (10) , 3291-3317
Quantum indeterminacy and the double-slit experiment
- 4 March 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 214-251
Consciousness
Wilson considers whether consciousness is either Weakly or Strongly emergent. Some have seen consciousness as the best case for a Strongly emergent phenomenon, reflecting that subjective or qualitative aspects of consciousness depart so greatly from physical features that some anti-physicalist view (perhaps Strong emergence) must be true. Wilson considers two such ‘explanatory gap’ strategies, associated with the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986) and the conceivability argument (Chalmers 1996, 2009). She argues that each strategy fails, for reasons not much previously explored; hence while the Strong emergence of consciousness remains an open empirical possibility, there is currently no motivation for taking this to actually be so. Wilson then argues that attention to the determinable nature of qualitative conscious states provides good reason to take such states to be Weakly emergent by lights of a determinable-based account, and defends the application of such an account to mental states against various objections.
- 4 March 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 214-251
Consciousness
Wilson considers whether consciousness is either Weakly or Strongly emergent. Some have seen consciousness as the best case for a Strongly emergent phenomenon, reflecting that subjective or qualitative aspects of consciousness depart so greatly from physical features that some anti-physicalist view (perhaps Strong emergence) must be true. Wilson considers two such ‘explanatory gap’ strategies, associated with the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986) and the conceivability argument (Chalmers 1996, 2009). She argues that each strategy fails, for reasons not much previously explored; hence while the Strong emergence of consciousness remains an open empirical possibility, there is currently no motivation for taking this to actually be so. Wilson then argues that attention to the determinable nature of qualitative conscious states provides good reason to take such states to be Weakly emergent by lights of a determinable-based account, and defends the application of such an account to mental states against various objections.
- 4 March 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 75-119
The viability of Weak emergence
Wilson considers and responds to a range of objections to the schema for Weak emergence and the associated ‘subset of powers’-based approach to realization. These include that satisfaction of the conditions in the schema is compatible with anti-realism about, reductionism about, or physical unacceptability of the emergent entities or features, or is not necessary for physically acceptable emergence. Each challenge admits of one or more responses available on any sensible implementation of the schema for Weak emergence; certain additional responses draw on features of Wilson’s preferred accounts of Weak emergence, appealing to the determinable/determinate relation or to an elimination of degrees of freedom.
- 4 March 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 75-119
The viability of Weak emergence
Wilson considers and responds to a range of objections to the schema for Weak emergence and the associated ‘subset of powers’-based approach to realization. These include that satisfaction of the conditions in the schema is compatible with anti-realism about, reductionism about, or physical unacceptability of the emergent entities or features, or is not necessary for physically acceptable emergence. Each challenge admits of one or more responses available on any sensible implementation of the schema for Weak emergence; certain additional responses draw on features of Wilson’s preferred accounts of Weak emergence, appealing to the determinable/determinate relation or to an elimination of degrees of freedom.
- 27 October 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation by Douglas Ehring
Tropes is a systematic investigation into the metaphysics of properties, aiming to motivate and defend trope theory, and more specifically Natural Class Trope Nominalism (NCTN). Ehring’s book treats an impressive span of relevant positions, considerations, debates and objections with charity and clarity; it’s also a real page-turner, at least if one has (as I do) a taste for analytic twists and turns.
- 27 October 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation by Douglas Ehring
Tropes is a systematic investigation into the metaphysics of properties, aiming to motivate and defend trope theory, and more specifically Natural Class Trope Nominalism (NCTN). Ehring’s book treats an impressive span of relevant positions, considerations, debates and objections with charity and clarity; it’s also a real page-turner, at least if one has (as I do) a taste for analytic twists and turns.
- Open Access
- 28 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 38 (1) , 261
Correction to: Grounding-Based Formulations of Physicalism
- 28 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 38 (1) , 261
Open AccessCorrection to: Grounding-Based Formulations of Physicalism
- 13 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (S8) , 2045-2076
Abduction versus conceiving in modal epistemology
- 13 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (S8) , 2045-2076
Abduction versus conceiving in modal epistemology