Wage Insurance Within German Firms: Do Institutions Matter?
Author:
- 22 May 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A: Statistics in Society
- Vol. 177 (2) , 345-369
Abstract
Summary: Using a large linked employer–employee data set, the paper studies the extent to which German employers insure workers against transitory and permanent firm level shocks. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the amount of wage insurance depends on the nature of industrial relations. Adopting the identification strategy that was introduced by Guiso and co-workers, it is shown that industry level contracts and local works councils are important insurance providers. These findings lend support to the notion that collective institutions may mitigate the enforcement problems that typically arise within risk sharing agreements. Moreover, the ability of industry level contracts to insulate workers' wages from shocks appears to decrease with plant size, whereas works councils' ability to provide insurance increases with plant size. This latter finding is consistent with works councils having, by law, more information rights at larger employers.Keywords
Funding Information
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (GU 1081/1-3)
This publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
- Micro Foundations for Wage Flexibility: Wage Insurance at the Firm Level*The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2009
- Insurance within the FirmJournal of Political Economy, 2005
- Do Employers Provide Insurance against Low Frequency Shocks? Industry Employment and Industry WagesJournal of Labor Economics, 2005
- The Reform of the German Works Constitution Act: A Critical AssessmentIndustrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 2004
- Long‐Term Wage Fluctuations with Industry‐Specific Human CapitalJournal of Labor Economics, 2001
- Instrument Relevance in Multivariate Linear Models: A Simple MeasureReview of Economics and Statistics, 1997
- Long-Term Risk-Sharing Wage Contracts in an Economy Subject to Permanent and Temporary ShocksJournal of Labor Economics, 1988
- Trade Unions and Optimal Labour ContractsThe Economic Journal, 1986
- Trade Unions and Economic EfficiencyThe Economic Journal, 1983
- A NEO-CLASSICAL THEORY OF KEYNESIAN UNEMPLOYMENT*Economic Inquiry, 1974