Nicole Guertzgen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Nicole Guertzgen has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alfred Alexander Garloff
IAB Hessen
1 shared publication Maresa Sprietsma
ZEW Mannheim
1 shared publicationMarkus Clauss
Centre for European Economic Research , L 7.1, D-68161 Mannheim
1 shared publicationMichaela Niefert
ZEW Mannheim
1 shared publicationReinhold Schnabel
University of Essen, Duisburg , Germany
1 shared publicationSandra Gottschalk
ZEW Mannheim
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 May 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A: Statistics in Society
- Vol. 177 (2) , 345-369
Wage Insurance Within German Firms: Do Institutions Matter?
Summary: Using a large linked employer–employee data set, the paper studies the extent to which German employers insure workers against transitory and permanent firm level shocks. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the amount of wage insurance depends on the nature of industrial relations. Adopting the identification strategy that was introduced by Guiso and co-workers, it is shown that industry level contracts and local works councils are important insurance providers. These findings lend support to the notion that collective institutions may mitigate the enforcement problems that typically arise within risk sharing agreements. Moreover, the ability of industry level contracts to insulate workers' wages from shocks appears to decrease with plant size, whereas works councils' ability to provide insurance increases with plant size. This latter finding is consistent with works councils having, by law, more information rights at larger employers.
- 22 May 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A: Statistics in Society
- Vol. 177 (2) , 345-369
Wage Insurance Within German Firms: Do Institutions Matter?
Summary: Using a large linked employer–employee data set, the paper studies the extent to which German employers insure workers against transitory and permanent firm level shocks. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the amount of wage insurance depends on the nature of industrial relations. Adopting the identification strategy that was introduced by Guiso and co-workers, it is shown that industry level contracts and local works councils are important insurance providers. These findings lend support to the notion that collective institutions may mitigate the enforcement problems that typically arise within risk sharing agreements. Moreover, the ability of industry level contracts to insulate workers' wages from shocks appears to decrease with plant size, whereas works councils' ability to provide insurance increases with plant size. This latter finding is consistent with works councils having, by law, more information rights at larger employers.
- 6 October 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for Labour Market Research
- Vol. 45 (3-4) , 303-330
Auswirkungen des gesetzlichen Mindestlohnes auf die Beschäftigung und den Arbeitnehmerschutz in der Abfallwirtschaft
- 6 October 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for Labour Market Research
- Vol. 45 (3-4) , 303-330
Auswirkungen des gesetzlichen Mindestlohnes auf die Beschäftigung und den Arbeitnehmerschutz in der Abfallwirtschaft
- 21 June 2012
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 51 (3) , 731-748
Collective Wage Contracts, Opt‐Out Clauses, and Firm Wage Differentials: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data
Using a large linked employer–employee data set, this article studies whether the existence and use of flexibility provisions within centralized collective wage agreements alter the structure of pay across employers. Using level regressions and first‐difference methods, we find that—compared with contracts without any flexibility—wages under opt‐out clauses are more responsive to local profitability conditions in below‐average‐performing establishments. In contrast, the sensitivity of wages to local profitability is smaller in high‐performance establishments. Our results provide further evidence for a threat potential of the existence of opt‐out clauses whose impact on flexibility is larger than the real application.
- 21 June 2012
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 51 (3) , 731-748
Collective Wage Contracts, Opt‐Out Clauses, and Firm Wage Differentials: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data
Using a large linked employer–employee data set, this article studies whether the existence and use of flexibility provisions within centralized collective wage agreements alter the structure of pay across employers. Using level regressions and first‐difference methods, we find that—compared with contracts without any flexibility—wages under opt‐out clauses are more responsive to local profitability conditions in below‐average‐performing establishments. In contrast, the sensitivity of wages to local profitability is smaller in high‐performance establishments. Our results provide further evidence for a threat potential of the existence of opt‐out clauses whose impact on flexibility is larger than the real application.
- 3 May 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 44 (19) , 2403-2421
Assessing the employment effects of the German welfare reform – an integrated CGE-microsimulation approach
The purpose of this article is to quantify the employment effects of the recent German welfare reform. The key element of this reform was to merge the coexisting transfer systems Social Assistance (SA) and Unemployment Assistance (UA) into one unified benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II – ALG II). We also consider a second reform scenario that is intended to further improve the labour supply incentives of low-skilled workers. Our methodological contribution is to use an integrated CGE-microsimulation model. In adopting such an approach, we are able to combine the advantages of microsimulation studies by accounting for the large amount of heterogeneity in terms of households’ preferences and budget constraints with the advantages of an applied general equilibrium model. The latter permits us to identify potential general equilibrium repercussions through changes in wages and unemployment. The simulations indicate that the introduction of ALG II results in a negligible increase in employment of only 45 000 individuals. In contrast, a cut in benefit levels combined with a decrease in transfer withdrawal is shown to produce somewhat larger employment effects of about 190 000 individuals.
- 3 May 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 44 (19) , 2403-2421
Assessing the employment effects of the German welfare reform – an integrated CGE-microsimulation approach
The purpose of this article is to quantify the employment effects of the recent German welfare reform. The key element of this reform was to merge the coexisting transfer systems Social Assistance (SA) and Unemployment Assistance (UA) into one unified benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II – ALG II). We also consider a second reform scenario that is intended to further improve the labour supply incentives of low-skilled workers. Our methodological contribution is to use an integrated CGE-microsimulation model. In adopting such an approach, we are able to combine the advantages of microsimulation studies by accounting for the large amount of heterogeneity in terms of households’ preferences and budget constraints with the advantages of an applied general equilibrium model. The latter permits us to identify potential general equilibrium repercussions through changes in wages and unemployment. The simulations indicate that the introduction of ALG II results in a negligible increase in employment of only 45 000 individuals. In contrast, a cut in benefit levels combined with a decrease in transfer withdrawal is shown to produce somewhat larger employment effects of about 190 000 individuals.
- Open Access
- 10 February 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for Labour Market Research
- Vol. 44 (1) , 155-161
Behindern Flächentarifverträge eine betriebliche Differenzierung der Entlohnung?
- 10 February 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for Labour Market Research
- Vol. 44 (1) , 155-161
Open AccessBehindern Flächentarifverträge eine betriebliche Differenzierung der Entlohnung?
- 28 April 2009
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 111 (2) , 323-349
Rent‐sharing and Collective Bargaining Coverage: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data
Using a linked employer–employee dataset, this paper analyses the relationship between firm profitability and wages. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm‐specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector‐ and firm‐specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. Our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm‐specific quasi‐rents in the non‐union sector and under firm‐specific contracts. Industry‐wide wage contracts, however, are associated with a significantly lower responsiveness of wages to firm‐level profitability.
- 28 April 2009
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 111 (2) , 323-349
Rent‐sharing and Collective Bargaining Coverage: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data
Using a linked employer–employee dataset, this paper analyses the relationship between firm profitability and wages. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm‐specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector‐ and firm‐specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. Our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm‐specific quasi‐rents in the non‐union sector and under firm‐specific contracts. Industry‐wide wage contracts, however, are associated with a significantly lower responsiveness of wages to firm‐level profitability.
- 1 April 2009
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik
- Vol. 229 (2-3) , 239-253
Firm Heterogeneity and Wages under Different Bargaining Regimes: Does a Centralised Union Care for Low-Productivity Firms?
Summary: This paper studies the relationship between wages and the degree of firm heterogeneity in a given industry under different wage setting structures. To derive testable hypotheses, we set up a theoretical model that analyses the sensitivity of wages to the variability in productivity conditions in a unionised oligopoly framework. The model distinguishes centralised and decentralised wage determination. The theoretical results predict wages to be negatively associated with the degree of firm heterogeneity under centralised wage-setting, as unions internalise negative externalities of a wage increase for low-productivity firms.We test this prediction using a linked employer-employee panel data set from the German mining and manufacturing sector. Consistent with our hypotheses, the empirical results suggest that under industry-level bargaining workers in more heterogeneous sectors receive lower wages than workers in more homogeneous sectors. In contrast, the degree of firm heterogeneity is found to have no negative impact on wages in uncovered firms and under firm-level contracts.
- 1 April 2009
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik
- Vol. 229 (2-3) , 239-253
Firm Heterogeneity and Wages under Different Bargaining Regimes: Does a Centralised Union Care for Low-Productivity Firms?
Summary: This paper studies the relationship between wages and the degree of firm heterogeneity in a given industry under different wage setting structures. To derive testable hypotheses, we set up a theoretical model that analyses the sensitivity of wages to the variability in productivity conditions in a unionised oligopoly framework. The model distinguishes centralised and decentralised wage determination. The theoretical results predict wages to be negatively associated with the degree of firm heterogeneity under centralised wage-setting, as unions internalise negative externalities of a wage increase for low-productivity firms.We test this prediction using a linked employer-employee panel data set from the German mining and manufacturing sector. Consistent with our hypotheses, the empirical results suggest that under industry-level bargaining workers in more heterogeneous sectors receive lower wages than workers in more homogeneous sectors. In contrast, the degree of firm heterogeneity is found to have no negative impact on wages in uncovered firms and under firm-level contracts.
- 13 September 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in AStA Wirtschafts- und Sozialstatistisches Archiv
- Vol. 2 (3) , 223-240
Das Forschungspotenzial von Linked-Employer-Employee-Daten am Beispiel von Lohneffekten der Tarifbindung
- 13 September 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in AStA Wirtschafts- und Sozialstatistisches Archiv
- Vol. 2 (3) , 223-240
Das Forschungspotenzial von Linked-Employer-Employee-Daten am Beispiel von Lohneffekten der Tarifbindung
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in German Economic Review
- Vol. 7 (4) , 363-388
Reforming Social Welfare in Germany: An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis
In this paper, the effects of social assistance reform proposals are discussed for the case of Germany using a computable general equilibrium model that incorporates a discrete choice model of labour supply. This allows us to identify general equilibrium effects of the reforms on wages and unemployment. The simulation results show that general equilibrium wage reactions mitigate labour supply effects and that unemployment in fact decreases. Wage reactions are thus sufficiently strong to prevent additional labour supply from translating into higher unemployment. The simulations indicate that major cuts in welfare payments are necessary to produce substantial employment effects.
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in German Economic Review
- Vol. 7 (4) , 363-388
Reforming Social Welfare in Germany: An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis
In this paper, the effects of social assistance reform proposals are discussed for the case of Germany using a computable general equilibrium model that incorporates a discrete choice model of labour supply. This allows us to identify general equilibrium effects of the reforms on wages and unemployment. The simulation results show that general equilibrium wage reactions mitigate labour supply effects and that unemployment in fact decreases. Wage reactions are thus sufficiently strong to prevent additional labour supply from translating into higher unemployment. The simulations indicate that major cuts in welfare payments are necessary to produce substantial employment effects.