Correlated Equilibrium and Evolutionary Stability in 3-Player Rock-Paper-Scissors
Open Access
Abstract
In the game of rock-paper-scissors with three players, this paper identifies conditions for a correlated equilibrium that differs from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and is evolutionarily stable. For this to occur, the correlation device attaches more probability to three-way ties and solo-winner outcomes than would result from the Nash equilibrium. The correlated equilibrium is evolutionarily stable because any mutant fares worse than a signal-following player when facing two players who follow their own correlated signals. The critical quality of the correlation device is to make this true both for potential mutants who would disobey their signal and instead choose the action which would beat the action signaled to the player, as well as for potential mutants who would deviate to the action that would be beaten by what the device signals to the player. These findings reveal how a strict correlated equilibrium can produce evolutionarily stable strategies for rock-paper-scissors with three players.Keywords
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