William C. Grant
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
William C. Grant has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Teresa L. Kauf
University of Florida
3 shared publicationsVance W. Berger
Therese Dupin-Spriet Rick Chappell
3 shared publications- Kevin A. Schulman
Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, USA
2 shared publications - Ravi Jhaveri
Department of Pediatrics, Division of Infectious Diseases, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, Chicago, Illinois (R.J.)
2 shared publications - Barry M. Massie
School of Medicine University of California, and San Francisco VA Medical Center San Francisco California
1 shared publication - C. Daniel Mullins
Department of Practice, Sciences, and Health Outcomes Research, University of Maryland School of Pharmacy, Baltimore, MD
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
Don’t Come Around Here no More: Sequential Hawk-Dove with a Female-Absent Contest
While searching over large territories, solitary males find a potential mating location and encounter a rival there. This paper presents an evolutionary game with a sequence of moves that precede an ultimate hawk-dove subgame. First, the rival males face a choice between being aggressive (hawk) or passive (dove) when encountering each other before the female is present, and subsequently, each chooses whether or not to return for the ultimate hawk-dove subgame during mating season. Depending on the travel costs of returning to the location, there exist neutrally stable behavioral strategies (NSS) assigning different probability of aggression at the initial female-absent encounter than at the ultimate contest. Initial randomization over hawk-dove may facilitate partial coordination of the decisions to return to the mating spot. A male’s probability of returning to the potential mating spot is conditional on the outcome of the initial hawk-dove contest. The neutrally stable strategies of interest are not robust against indirect invasions.
- 23 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
Open AccessDon’t Come Around Here no More: Sequential Hawk-Dove with a Female-Absent Contest
While searching over large territories, solitary males find a potential mating location and encounter a rival there. This paper presents an evolutionary game with a sequence of moves that precede an ultimate hawk-dove subgame. First, the rival males face a choice between being aggressive (hawk) or passive (dove) when encountering each other before the female is present, and subsequently, each chooses whether or not to return for the ultimate hawk-dove subgame during mating season. Depending on the travel costs of returning to the location, there exist neutrally stable behavioral strategies (NSS) assigning different probability of aggression at the initial female-absent encounter than at the ultimate contest. Initial randomization over hawk-dove may facilitate partial coordination of the decisions to return to the mating spot. A male’s probability of returning to the potential mating spot is conditional on the outcome of the initial hawk-dove contest. The neutrally stable strategies of interest are not robust against indirect invasions.
- Open Access
Correlated Equilibrium and Evolutionary Stability in 3-Player Rock-Paper-Scissors
In the game of rock-paper-scissors with three players, this paper identifies conditions for a correlated equilibrium that differs from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and is evolutionarily stable. For this to occur, the correlation device attaches more probability to three-way ties and solo-winner outcomes than would result from the Nash equilibrium. The correlated equilibrium is evolutionarily stable because any mutant fares worse than a signal-following player when facing two players who follow their own correlated signals. The critical quality of the correlation device is to make this true both for potential mutants who would disobey their signal and instead choose the action which would beat the action signaled to the player, as well as for potential mutants who would deviate to the action that would be beaten by what the device signals to the player. These findings reveal how a strict correlated equilibrium can produce evolutionarily stable strategies for rock-paper-scissors with three players.
Open AccessCorrelated Equilibrium and Evolutionary Stability in 3-Player Rock-Paper-Scissors
In the game of rock-paper-scissors with three players, this paper identifies conditions for a correlated equilibrium that differs from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and is evolutionarily stable. For this to occur, the correlation device attaches more probability to three-way ties and solo-winner outcomes than would result from the Nash equilibrium. The correlated equilibrium is evolutionarily stable because any mutant fares worse than a signal-following player when facing two players who follow their own correlated signals. The critical quality of the correlation device is to make this true both for potential mutants who would disobey their signal and instead choose the action which would beat the action signaled to the player, as well as for potential mutants who would deviate to the action that would be beaten by what the device signals to the player. These findings reveal how a strict correlated equilibrium can produce evolutionarily stable strategies for rock-paper-scissors with three players.
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- Vol. 29 (4) , 263-274
Transparent players: the use of narrative voices in game theory
This paper examines methods for narrating consciousness in game theory. In order to represent how players process their environment, posture towards one another, and hold themselves accountable to their own thinking, I find two distinct ways that game theorists narrate the consciousness of their players. Quoted monologue is a player’s internal language, which can be articulated to show a player’s perspective to the reader. The other narrative mode is psycho-narration, which puts the external technical skills of the game-theorist into the narrator’s hands to describe a player’s mental activity with more complexity than quoted monologue. Quoted monologue and psycho-narration communicate players’ thoughts in ways that convince the readers of the players’ positions, clarify game solution concepts, and enliven the written text.
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- Vol. 29 (4) , 263-274
Transparent players: the use of narrative voices in game theory
This paper examines methods for narrating consciousness in game theory. In order to represent how players process their environment, posture towards one another, and hold themselves accountable to their own thinking, I find two distinct ways that game theorists narrate the consciousness of their players. Quoted monologue is a player’s internal language, which can be articulated to show a player’s perspective to the reader. The other narrative mode is psycho-narration, which puts the external technical skills of the game-theorist into the narrator’s hands to describe a player’s mental activity with more complexity than quoted monologue. Quoted monologue and psycho-narration communicate players’ thoughts in ways that convince the readers of the players’ positions, clarify game solution concepts, and enliven the written text.
- 5 August 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 32 (8) , 941-955
Trusting a Double Agent
We analyze trust in a game with a double agent and two adversarial intelligence organizations. Greater trust by one organization makes the agent more inclined to align against that organization because the intelligence advantage sought by the agent must come at the expense of a trustor. Conversely, trusting less than the rival organization makes the agent more tempted to double-cross the rival. We identify conditions for a sequential equilibrium where one organization mixes between trust and distrust and the profit-seeking double agent mixes her alignment between the two organizations. When the game includes both profit-seeking and organization-loyal types of agents, semi-separating equilibria are possible, depending on the distribution of agent types and the quality of information about agents’ trustworthiness. Pure-strategy trust by both organizations can be sequentially rational only with the existence of loyal types.
- 5 August 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 32 (8) , 941-955
Trusting a Double Agent
We analyze trust in a game with a double agent and two adversarial intelligence organizations. Greater trust by one organization makes the agent more inclined to align against that organization because the intelligence advantage sought by the agent must come at the expense of a trustor. Conversely, trusting less than the rival organization makes the agent more tempted to double-cross the rival. We identify conditions for a sequential equilibrium where one organization mixes between trust and distrust and the profit-seeking double agent mixes her alignment between the two organizations. When the game includes both profit-seeking and organization-loyal types of agents, semi-separating equilibria are possible, depending on the distribution of agent types and the quality of information about agents’ trustworthiness. Pure-strategy trust by both organizations can be sequentially rational only with the existence of loyal types.
- 13 March 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Economic Education
- Vol. 49 (2) , 180-193
Games superheroes play: Teaching game theory with comic book favorites
The valuable insights of game theory sometimes remain out of reach for students who are overwhelmed by the subject's complexity. Comic book applications of game theory, with superheroes as players, can facilitate enthusiasm and classroom interaction to enhance the learning of game theory. Drawing from content in superhero movies and books, the authors construct games to illustrate pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mixed strategies, sub-game perfection, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To help instructors build students' skills in finding and interpreting game solutions, they translate comic book scenarios into specific game forms; however, not all scenarios are obvious so they suggest instructors help students develop their own game-theoretic judgments to determine what game forms, payoffs, and solution concepts might be appropriate for understanding a situation.
- 13 March 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Economic Education
- Vol. 49 (2) , 180-193
Games superheroes play: Teaching game theory with comic book favorites
The valuable insights of game theory sometimes remain out of reach for students who are overwhelmed by the subject's complexity. Comic book applications of game theory, with superheroes as players, can facilitate enthusiasm and classroom interaction to enhance the learning of game theory. Drawing from content in superhero movies and books, the authors construct games to illustrate pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mixed strategies, sub-game perfection, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To help instructors build students' skills in finding and interpreting game solutions, they translate comic book scenarios into specific game forms; however, not all scenarios are obvious so they suggest instructors help students develop their own game-theoretic judgments to determine what game forms, payoffs, and solution concepts might be appropriate for understanding a situation.
- 30 October 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 29-38
Sympathetic Bias: A Neglected Source of Selection Bias
Sympathetic bias occurs when an investigator has overlapping sympathetic preferences with respect to the experimental sponsor. This bias may develop from repeated association with the sponsor, and it may be important for understanding why the investigator chooses an experimental design that is excessively predictable. Randomization methods are surprisingly predictable, and sympathetic bias may be partly responsible.
- 30 October 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 29-38
Sympathetic Bias: A Neglected Source of Selection Bias
Sympathetic bias occurs when an investigator has overlapping sympathetic preferences with respect to the experimental sponsor. This bias may develop from repeated association with the sponsor, and it may be important for understanding why the investigator chooses an experimental design that is excessively predictable. Randomization methods are surprisingly predictable, and sympathetic bias may be partly responsible.
- Open Access
- 16 June 2015
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 10 (6) , e0128812
Run-Reversal Equilibrium for Clinical Trial Randomization
In this paper, we describe a new restricted randomization method called run-reversal equilibrium (RRE), which is a Nash equilibrium of a game where (1) the clinical trial statistician chooses a sequence of medical treatments, and (2) clinical investigators make treatment predictions. RRE randomization counteracts how each investigator could observe treatment histories in order to forecast upcoming treatments. Computation of a run-reversal equilibrium reflects how the treatment history at a particular site is imperfectly correlated with the treatment imbalance for the overall trial. An attractive feature of RRE randomization is that treatment imbalance follows a random walk at each site, while treatment balance is tightly constrained and regularly restored for the overall trial. Less predictable and therefore more scientifically valid experiments can be facilitated by run-reversal equilibrium for multi-site clinical trials.
- 16 June 2015
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 10 (6) , e0128812
Open AccessRun-Reversal Equilibrium for Clinical Trial Randomization
In this paper, we describe a new restricted randomization method called run-reversal equilibrium (RRE), which is a Nash equilibrium of a game where (1) the clinical trial statistician chooses a sequence of medical treatments, and (2) clinical investigators make treatment predictions. RRE randomization counteracts how each investigator could observe treatment histories in order to forecast upcoming treatments. Computation of a run-reversal equilibrium reflects how the treatment history at a particular site is imperfectly correlated with the treatment imbalance for the overall trial. An attractive feature of RRE randomization is that treatment imbalance follows a random walk at each site, while treatment balance is tightly constrained and regularly restored for the overall trial. Less predictable and therefore more scientifically valid experiments can be facilitated by run-reversal equilibrium for multi-site clinical trials.
- 29 September 2014
- Published by Wiley
Randomization Procedures
- 29 August 2014
- Published by Wiley
- p. 799-812
Randomization Procedures
- 23 November 2012
- Published by Wiley in Statistics in Medicine
- Vol. 31 (29) , 4135-4136
Unequal allocation and allocation concealment
- 23 November 2012
- Published by Wiley in Statistics in Medicine
- Vol. 31 (29) , 4135-4136
Unequal allocation and allocation concealment