Where Do Mistakes Lead? A Survey of Games with Incompetent Players
Open Access
- 10 February 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 13 (1) , 1-34
Abstract
Mathematical models often aim to describe a complicated mechanism in a cohesive and simple manner. However, reaching perfect balance between being simple enough or overly simplistic is a challenging task. Frequently, game-theoretic models have an underlying assumption that players, whenever they choose to execute a specific action, do so perfectly. In fact, it is rare that action execution perfectly coincides with intentions of individuals, giving rise to behavioural mistakes. The concept of incompetence of players was suggested to address this issue in game-theoretic settings. Under the assumption of incompetence, players have non-zero probabilities of executing a different strategy from the one they chose, leading to stochastic outcomes of the interactions. In this article, we survey results related to the concept of incompetence in classic as well as evolutionary game theory and provide several new results. We also suggest future extensions of the model and argue why it is important to take into account behavioural mistakes when analysing interactions among players in both economic and biological settings.Keywords
Funding Information
- Centre of Excellence in Plant Energy Biology, Australian Research Council (DP180101602)
- Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (754411)
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