Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms
Author:
- 10 November 2004
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 48 (4) , 779-804
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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