On the externality-free Shapley–Shubik index
Authors:
- M. Álvarez-MozosMÁM. Álvarez-Mozos
- J.M. Alonso-MeijideJAJ.M. Alonso-Meijide
- M.G. Fiestras-JaneiroMFM.G. Fiestras-Janeiro
- 1 September 2017
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 105, 148-154
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Generalitat de Catalunya (2014SGR40)
- Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ECO2014-52340-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P)
- Xunta de Galicia (ED431C 2016/040)
This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
- Externalities, potential, value and consistencyJournal of Economic Theory, 2010
- The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structureJournal of Economic Theory, 2009
- Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the ValueEconometrica, 2008
- Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalitiesJournal of Economic Theory, 2007
- AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORMInternational Game Theory Review, 2005
- On weighted Shapley valuesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1987
- Power indices for multicandidate voting gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1986
- Values of games in partition function formInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1977
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley valueInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1975
- A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee SystemAmerican Political Science Review, 1954