Mikel Alvarez-Mozos
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Mikel Alvarez-Mozos has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jose Maria Alonso-Meijide
MODESTYA Research Group, Department of Statistics, Mathematical Analysis and Optimisation, Faculty of Sciences, University of Santiago de Compostela, Lugo, Spain
13 shared publications - Andres Jimenez-Losada
Department of Applied Mathematics II, University of Seville, Seville, Spain
6 shared publications M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro
5 shared publicationsOriol Tejada
ETH Zürich - CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich
5 shared publications- María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
Departamento de Estatística e Investigación Operativa, Universidade de Vigo, Vigo, Spain
4 shared publications - Alberto Adrego Pinto
DM and LIAAD-INESC TEC, Faculty of Sciences, University of Porto, Rua do Campo Alegre, s/n, 4169-007 Porto, Portugal
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Partition Lattice Value for Global Cooperative Games
We introduce a new value for global cooperative games that we call the Partition lattice value. A global cooperative game describes the overall utility that a set of agents generates depending on how they are organized in coalitions without specifying what part of that utility is each coalition responsible for. Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) proposed a generalization of the Shapley value to this family of games that may imply a big loss of information. Here we take an alternative approach motivated by how the Shapley value distributes payoffs in unanimity games. More precisely, we consider that each link in the lattice of partitions represents a contribution and use them to define our value. We provide three characterizations of the new value by means of five properties. The difference between the three characterizations is restricted to one property.
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Partition Lattice Value for Global Cooperative Games
We introduce a new value for global cooperative games that we call the Partition lattice value. A global cooperative game describes the overall utility that a set of agents generates depending on how they are organized in coalitions without specifying what part of that utility is each coalition responsible for. Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) proposed a generalization of the Shapley value to this family of games that may imply a big loss of information. Here we take an alternative approach motivated by how the Shapley value distributes payoffs in unanimity games. More precisely, we consider that each link in the lattice of partitions represents a contribution and use them to define our value. We provide three characterizations of the new value by means of five properties. The difference between the three characterizations is restricted to one property.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 155, 149-166
Sequential creation of surplus and the Shapley value
- 1 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 155, 149-166
Open AccessSequential creation of surplus and the Shapley value
- Open Access
- 3 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 79 (1) , 181-199
Two families of values for global cooperative games
A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (Int J Game Theory 20:129–147, 1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of point valued solutions that contain the Gilboa–Lehrer value. We characterize each family by means of reasonable properties, which are related to the ones used by Gilboa and Lehrer.
- 3 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 79 (1) , 181-199
Open AccessTwo families of values for global cooperative games
A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (Int J Game Theory 20:129–147, 1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of point valued solutions that contain the Gilboa–Lehrer value. We characterize each family by means of reasonable properties, which are related to the ones used by Gilboa and Lehrer.
- Open Access
- 13 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 128, 10-15
Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games
- 13 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 128, 10-15
Open AccessExternalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games
- Open Access
- 7 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
- Vol. 94 (1) , 99-121
Marginality and convexity in partition function form games
In this paper an order on the set of embedded coalitions is studied in detail. This allows us to define new notions of superaddivity and convexity of games in partition function form which are compared to other proposals in the literature. The main results are two characterizations of convexity. The first one uses non-decreasing contributions to coalitions of increasing size and can thus be considered parallel to the classic result for cooperative games without externalities. The second one is based on the standard convexity of associated games without externalities that we define using a partition of the player set. Using the later result, we can conclude that some of the generalizations of the Shapley value to games in partition function form lie within the cores of specific classic games when the original game is convex.
- 7 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
- Vol. 94 (1) , 99-121
Open AccessMarginality and convexity in partition function form games
In this paper an order on the set of embedded coalitions is studied in detail. This allows us to define new notions of superaddivity and convexity of games in partition function form which are compared to other proposals in the literature. The main results are two characterizations of convexity. The first one uses non-decreasing contributions to coalitions of increasing size and can thus be considered parallel to the classic result for cooperative games without externalities. The second one is based on the standard convexity of associated games without externalities that we define using a partition of the player set. Using the later result, we can conclude that some of the generalizations of the Shapley value to games in partition function form lie within the cores of specific classic games when the original game is convex.
- 4 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 74 (1) , 265-292
On convexity in cooperative games with externalities
- 4 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 74 (1) , 265-292
On convexity in cooperative games with externalities
- 3 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 89 (2) , 157-178
Power distribution in the Basque Parliament using games with externalities
- 3 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 89 (2) , 157-178
Power distribution in the Basque Parliament using games with externalities
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Expert Systems with Applications
- Vol. 135, 1-11
Complete null agent for games with externalities
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Expert Systems with Applications
- Vol. 135, 1-11
Complete null agent for games with externalities
- 1 May 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 93, 114-122
Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games: Two ways how to allocate the surplus
- 1 May 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 93, 114-122
Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games: Two ways how to allocate the surplus
- 1 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 105, 148-154
On the externality-free Shapley–Shubik index
- 1 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 105, 148-154
On the externality-free Shapley–Shubik index