Competing Sales Channels with Captive Consumers
Authors:
Open Access
- 16 September 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 132 (642) , 741-766
Abstract
We study strategic interactions in markets in which firms sell to consumers both directly and via a competitive channel (CC), such as a price comparison website or marketplace, where multiple sellers’ offers are visible at once. We ask how a CC’s size influences market outcomes when some consumers have limited price information. A bigger CC means more consumers compare prices, increasing within-channel competition. However, we show such seemingly pro-competitive developments can raise prices and harm consumers by weakening between-channel competition.Keywords
This publication has 38 references indexed in Scilit:
- Price Competition Under Limited ComparabilityThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2012
- On the Optimality of Clickthrough Fees in Online MarketsThe Economic Journal, 2011
- Two‐Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing StructuresJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2009
- Chapter 6 Information, Search, and Price Dispersion2006
- Contracts, Externalities, and Incentives in Shopping MallsReview of Economics and Statistics, 2005
- Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product MarketsAmerican Economic Review, 2001
- Exclusive Dealing and Price PromotionsThe Journal of Business, 1996
- Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing RulesEconometrica, 1990
- Competitive Promotional StrategiesThe Journal of Business, 1988
- A Model in which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher PriceEconometrica, 1980