We show that the execution of market orders on the New-York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is not instantaneous upon reception of the orders as is often assumed. From traders' point of view, market orders are more costly compared to limit orders as the execution price is uncertain in the case of market orders, Since such trade orders are taking place instead of limit orders presumably for arbitrage purposes the question of the speed of execution of market orders is of utmost importance. From the specialist point of view, controlling the speed of execution may be a tool that she might use to mitigate information advantage of informed traders. Delaying of executions may enable the specialist to learn better whether the order flow originates from an informed trader, thus revising her probability of informed trader orders. Consequently a revision of informed trader probability may affect her decision whether to participate in the trade as supplying the counter side of the order to provide liquidity and insures 'an orderly market'. We test the hypothesis that the specialist revises informed trader probability thru a Bayesian process that utilizes time as a decision tool in three different ways: 1. In a low information environment: 2. In an intense information environment, and 3. When a constraint is imposed on a supplementary decision tool that is available to the specialist. It is shown that delays in the execution of market orders are significant and are derived by information intensity, where the order volume is used as surrogate for the magnitude of information intensity. We find that the extent of the execution delay depends on the magnitude of the information, the surprise factor in the order. and that the use of execution time as a decision tool varies between specialists. It is shown that timing of market orders execution are correlated with the well known information mitigating tool - the bid-offer spread. We find that the determination of execution time is also correlated and with adjustments in the inventory levels of the specialists. We also find that the use of timing of execution becomes more aggressive when the ability of the specialist to determine the bid-offer spread is limited.