Annalisa Prencipe
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Annalisa Prencipe has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Sasson Bar-Yosef
3 shared publications- Gianfranco Siciliano
China Europe International Business School
2 shared publications Alessandro Minichilli
1 shared publication- Alessandro Minichilli
Department of Management and Technology, Bocconi University, Milan 20146, Italy
1 shared publication - Carlo D'Augusta
Department of Accounting, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy
1 shared publication - Garen Markarian
HEC - University of Lausanne
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
To Disclose or not to Disclose? Reputational incentives and ESG Disclosure in Private Family Firms
This study examines how reputation linked to family identity affects voluntary ESG disclosure in private family firms, focusing on eponymous firms-those named after their founders or controlling families. Drawing on legitimacy theory, we argue that when family and firm identities are closely aligned, ESG disclosure serves to protect and signal legitimacy to external stakeholders. Using a sample of 2,769 Italian private family firms from 2013 to 2021, we find that eponymous firms are significantly more likely to publish ESG reports. The effect is stronger when reputational exposure is higher, including cases of rarer surnames, greater press visibility, and more positive prior media sentiment. Eponymous firms also report more substantive ESG actions-particularly in social and environmental domains-and exhibit lower realized environmental impact, suggesting that disclosure reflects genuine engagement rather than symbolic reporting. Robustness tests address alternative governance, visibility, reporting standardization, and selection explanations. Overall, the evidence indicates that owner identity, reputation, and legitimacy concerns jointly shape voluntary ESG disclosure and sustainability outcomes in private family firms.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTo Disclose or not to Disclose? Reputational incentives and ESG Disclosure in Private Family Firms
This study examines how reputation linked to family identity affects voluntary ESG disclosure in private family firms, focusing on eponymous firms-those named after their founders or controlling families. Drawing on legitimacy theory, we argue that when family and firm identities are closely aligned, ESG disclosure serves to protect and signal legitimacy to external stakeholders. Using a sample of 2,769 Italian private family firms from 2013 to 2021, we find that eponymous firms are significantly more likely to publish ESG reports. The effect is stronger when reputational exposure is higher, including cases of rarer surnames, greater press visibility, and more positive prior media sentiment. Eponymous firms also report more substantive ESG actions-particularly in social and environmental domains-and exhibit lower realized environmental impact, suggesting that disclosure reflects genuine engagement rather than symbolic reporting. Robustness tests address alternative governance, visibility, reporting standardization, and selection explanations. Overall, the evidence indicates that owner identity, reputation, and legitimacy concerns jointly shape voluntary ESG disclosure and sustainability outcomes in private family firms.
- 1 March 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (3) , 2330-2348
What’s in a Name? Eponymous Private Firms and Financial Reporting Quality
This study examines the relation between financial reporting quality (FRQ) and eponymy, that is, naming a firm after the founder. We hypothesize that compared with noneponymous firms, eponymous firms have higher FRQ because of reputation concerns. Using a sample of 2,271 large Italian private firms, we document that eponymy is positively associated with accrual-based FRQ measures, a Benford’s law–based FRQ measure, and a tax-related misstatement–based FRQ measure. Consistent with the reputation concern rationale, we find that the positive association between eponymy and FRQ is attributable to eponymous firms that have rarer names or receive more press coverage. Furthermore, the positive association between FRQ and eponymy is similar whether the top executives/board members belong to the founding family’s first or later generations. We also find that eponymous firms are more conditionally conservative. Collectively, the results suggest that reputation concerns act as a disciplining mechanism for FRQ in private firms. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- 1 March 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (3) , 2330-2348
What’s in a Name? Eponymous Private Firms and Financial Reporting Quality
This study examines the relation between financial reporting quality (FRQ) and eponymy, that is, naming a firm after the founder. We hypothesize that compared with noneponymous firms, eponymous firms have higher FRQ because of reputation concerns. Using a sample of 2,271 large Italian private firms, we document that eponymy is positively associated with accrual-based FRQ measures, a Benford’s law–based FRQ measure, and a tax-related misstatement–based FRQ measure. Consistent with the reputation concern rationale, we find that the positive association between eponymy and FRQ is attributable to eponymous firms that have rarer names or receive more press coverage. Furthermore, the positive association between FRQ and eponymy is similar whether the top executives/board members belong to the founding family’s first or later generations. We also find that eponymous firms are more conditionally conservative. Collectively, the results suggest that reputation concerns act as a disciplining mechanism for FRQ in private firms. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- Open Access
- 23 November 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
- Vol. 38 (2) , 271-301
The Effects of Board Interlocks With an Allegedly Fraudulent Company on Audit Fees
Drawing on prior literature on audit fees, client reputation, and corporate governance, we posit that a material adverse event at a firm, such as a financial fraud allegation, leads to an increase in the audit fees of firms connected to the former by a board interlock. We propose two possible mechanisms to explain the upward pressure on audit fees: a client-side effect, where the client demands additional audit services, and an auditor-side effect, where the auditor raises its audit fees due to a perceived increase in audit engagement risk. The results indicate an average marginal increase of 12.86% in audit fees in the year following the public revelation of financial fraud. Additional analyses suggest that an auditor-side effect is in place, while we cannot find clear evidence supporting the client-side effect. Furthermore, we document that the positive effect on audit fees persists for up to at least 2 years after public disclosure of the event when the interlocked director serves as a member of the audit committee. JEL Descriptors: G34, M40, M42
- 23 November 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
- Vol. 38 (2) , 271-301
Open AccessThe Effects of Board Interlocks With an Allegedly Fraudulent Company on Audit Fees
Drawing on prior literature on audit fees, client reputation, and corporate governance, we posit that a material adverse event at a firm, such as a financial fraud allegation, leads to an increase in the audit fees of firms connected to the former by a board interlock. We propose two possible mechanisms to explain the upward pressure on audit fees: a client-side effect, where the client demands additional audit services, and an auditor-side effect, where the auditor raises its audit fees due to a perceived increase in audit engagement risk. The results indicate an average marginal increase of 12.86% in audit fees in the year following the public revelation of financial fraud. Additional analyses suggest that an auditor-side effect is in place, while we cannot find clear evidence supporting the client-side effect. Furthermore, we document that the positive effect on audit fees persists for up to at least 2 years after public disclosure of the event when the interlocked director serves as a member of the audit committee. JEL Descriptors: G34, M40, M42
- Open Access
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Egea Spa in ECONOMIA & MANAGEMENT
- Vol. 3 (3) , 73
Una nuova era contabile per il leasing
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Egea Spa in ECONOMIA & MANAGEMENT
- Vol. 3 (3) , 73
Open AccessUna nuova era contabile per il leasing
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Conservative Reporting and Investors’ Divergence of Opinion
In this paper we examine whether the level of a firm’s conditional conservatism affects investor disagreement around the earnings announcement date. Investor di
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessConservative Reporting and Investors’ Divergence of Opinion
In this paper we examine whether the level of a firm’s conditional conservatism affects investor disagreement around the earnings announcement date. Investor di
- Open Access
- 24 March 2009
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Earnings Management and Corporate Governance in Family-Controlled Companies
Corporate governance literature advances the idea that certain aspects of board of directors' structure improve monitoring of managerial decisions. Among these is the managers' decision to manage earnings. Prior studies have shown that earnings management, in widely-held public companies, is less prevalent when there is a high level of board independence. However, there is less evidence on the effectiveness of board independence on earnings management in family-controlled companies. This issue is interesting in particular as such companies are susceptible to various types of agency concerns. It is the purpose of this study to shed light on the earnings management issue in family-controlled companies, characterized by a potentially low board independence environment. In this study, board independence is estimated by two parameters (i) proportion of independent directors on board, and (ii) lack of CEO/Board Chairman duality function, with special attention paid to the case where the CEO is a member of the controlling-family. Our empirical results provide evidence that, indeed, the impact of board independence on earnings management is weaker in family-controlled companies. The same effects are also found for the cases where the CEO is a member of the controlling-family, even though she is not also the Board Chairman.
- 24 March 2009
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEarnings Management and Corporate Governance in Family-Controlled Companies
Corporate governance literature advances the idea that certain aspects of board of directors' structure improve monitoring of managerial decisions. Among these is the managers' decision to manage earnings. Prior studies have shown that earnings management, in widely-held public companies, is less prevalent when there is a high level of board independence. However, there is less evidence on the effectiveness of board independence on earnings management in family-controlled companies. This issue is interesting in particular as such companies are susceptible to various types of agency concerns. It is the purpose of this study to shed light on the earnings management issue in family-controlled companies, characterized by a potentially low board independence environment. In this study, board independence is estimated by two parameters (i) proportion of independent directors on board, and (ii) lack of CEO/Board Chairman duality function, with special attention paid to the case where the CEO is a member of the controlling-family. Our empirical results provide evidence that, indeed, the impact of board independence on earnings management is weaker in family-controlled companies. The same effects are also found for the cases where the CEO is a member of the controlling-family, even though she is not also the Board Chairman.
- Open Access
- 2 March 2008
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Speed of Execution of Market Order Trades and Specialists' Inventory Risk-Management at the NYSE
We show that the execution of market orders on the New-York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is not instantaneous upon reception of the orders as is often assumed. From traders' point of view, market orders are more costly compared to limit orders as the execution price is uncertain in the case of market orders, Since such trade orders are taking place instead of limit orders presumably for arbitrage purposes the question of the speed of execution of market orders is of utmost importance. From the specialist point of view, controlling the speed of execution may be a tool that she might use to mitigate information advantage of informed traders. Delaying of executions may enable the specialist to learn better whether the order flow originates from an informed trader, thus revising her probability of informed trader orders. Consequently a revision of informed trader probability may affect her decision whether to participate in the trade as supplying the counter side of the order to provide liquidity and insures 'an orderly market'. We test the hypothesis that the specialist revises informed trader probability thru a Bayesian process that utilizes time as a decision tool in three different ways: 1. In a low information environment: 2. In an intense information environment, and 3. When a constraint is imposed on a supplementary decision tool that is available to the specialist. It is shown that delays in the execution of market orders are significant and are derived by information intensity, where the order volume is used as surrogate for the magnitude of information intensity. We find that the extent of the execution delay depends on the magnitude of the information, the surprise factor in the order. and that the use of execution time as a decision tool varies between specialists. It is shown that timing of market orders execution are correlated with the well known information mitigating tool - the bid-offer spread. We find that the determination of execution time is also correlated and with adjustments in the inventory levels of the specialists. We also find that the use of timing of execution becomes more aggressive when the ability of the specialist to determine the bid-offer spread is limited.
- 2 March 2008
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSpeed of Execution of Market Order Trades and Specialists' Inventory Risk-Management at the NYSE
We show that the execution of market orders on the New-York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is not instantaneous upon reception of the orders as is often assumed. From traders' point of view, market orders are more costly compared to limit orders as the execution price is uncertain in the case of market orders, Since such trade orders are taking place instead of limit orders presumably for arbitrage purposes the question of the speed of execution of market orders is of utmost importance. From the specialist point of view, controlling the speed of execution may be a tool that she might use to mitigate information advantage of informed traders. Delaying of executions may enable the specialist to learn better whether the order flow originates from an informed trader, thus revising her probability of informed trader orders. Consequently a revision of informed trader probability may affect her decision whether to participate in the trade as supplying the counter side of the order to provide liquidity and insures 'an orderly market'. We test the hypothesis that the specialist revises informed trader probability thru a Bayesian process that utilizes time as a decision tool in three different ways: 1. In a low information environment: 2. In an intense information environment, and 3. When a constraint is imposed on a supplementary decision tool that is available to the specialist. It is shown that delays in the execution of market orders are significant and are derived by information intensity, where the order volume is used as surrogate for the magnitude of information intensity. We find that the extent of the execution delay depends on the magnitude of the information, the surprise factor in the order. and that the use of execution time as a decision tool varies between specialists. It is shown that timing of market orders execution are correlated with the well known information mitigating tool - the bid-offer spread. We find that the determination of execution time is also correlated and with adjustments in the inventory levels of the specialists. We also find that the use of timing of execution becomes more aggressive when the ability of the specialist to determine the bid-offer spread is limited.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2007
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Capitalization of R&D Costs and Earnings Management: Evidence from Italian Listed Companies
The capitalization of research and development (R&D) costs is a controversial accounting issue because of the contention that such capitalization is motivated by incentives to manipulate earnings. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, this paper examines whether companies' decisions to capitalize R&D costs are affected by earnings management motivations. Italy provides a natural context for testing our hypothesized relationships because Italian GAAP allows for the capitalization of R&D costs. Using a Tobit regression model to test our hypotheses, we show that companies tend to use cost capitalization for earnings-smoothing purposes. The hypothesis that firms capitalize R&D costs in order to reduce the risk of violating debt covenants is not supported.
- 1 October 2007
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCapitalization of R&D Costs and Earnings Management: Evidence from Italian Listed Companies
The capitalization of research and development (R&D) costs is a controversial accounting issue because of the contention that such capitalization is motivated by incentives to manipulate earnings. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, this paper examines whether companies' decisions to capitalize R&D costs are affected by earnings management motivations. Italy provides a natural context for testing our hypothesized relationships because Italian GAAP allows for the capitalization of R&D costs. Using a Tobit regression model to test our hypotheses, we show that companies tend to use cost capitalization for earnings-smoothing purposes. The hypothesis that firms capitalize R&D costs in order to reduce the risk of violating debt covenants is not supported.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2002
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Proprietary Costs and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Evidence from Italian Listed Companies
This paper aims to identify some new determinants of the quality of voluntary segment disclosure by using the theoretical framework of Proprietary Costs Theory.
- 1 January 2002
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessProprietary Costs and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Evidence from Italian Listed Companies
This paper aims to identify some new determinants of the quality of voluntary segment disclosure by using the theoretical framework of Proprietary Costs Theory.