Mental ownership and higher-order thought: Response to Rosenthal
- 30 April 2010
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 70 (3) , 496-501
Abstract
Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental ownership is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’. In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue of a higher-order thought (HOT), then the HOT necessarily represents the subject as the owner of the state. But, we contend, one of the lessons to be learned from pathological states like somatoparaphrenia is that conscious awareness of a mental state does not guarantee first-person ownership. That is to say,...Keywords
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