CLCaleb Liang

Caleb Liang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Caleb Liang has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Body-as-Subject in the Four-Hand Illusion

    by Caleb Liang, Yen-Tung Lee, Wen-Yeo Chen, Hsu-Chia Huang

    In a recent study (Chen et al., 2018), we conducted a series of experiments that induced the “four-hand illusion”: using a head-mounted display (HMD), the participant adopted the experimenter's first-person perspective (1PP) as if it was his/her own 1PP. The participant saw four hands via the HMD: the experimenter's two hands from the adopted 1PP and the subject's own two hands from the adopted third-person perspective (3PP). In the active four-hand condition, the participant tapped his/her index fingers, imitated by the experimenter. Once all four hands acted synchronously and received synchronous tactile stimulations at the same time, many participants felt as if they owned two more hands. In this paper, we argue that there is a philosophical implication of this novel illusion. According to Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) and Legrand (2010), one can experience one's own body or body-part either as-object or as-subject but cannot experience it as both simultaneously, i.e., these two experiences are mutually exclusive. Call this view the Experiential Exclusion Thesis. We contend that a key component of the four-hand illusion—the subjective experience of the 1PP-hands that involved both “kinesthetic sense of movement” and “visual sense of movement” (the movement that the participant sees via the HMD)—provides an important counter-example against this thesis. We argue that it is possible for a healthy subject to experience the same body-part both as-subject and as-object simultaneously. Our goal is not to annihilate the distinction between body-as-object and body-as-subject, but to show that it is not as rigid as suggested by the phenomenologists.


  • Open Access

    Body ownership and the four-hand illusion

    by Wen-Yeo Chen, Hsu-Chia Huang, Yen-Tung Lee, Caleb Liang

    Recent studies of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) have shown that the sense of body ownership is constrained by several factors and yet is still very flexible. However, exactly how flexible is our sense of body ownership? In this study, we address this issue by investigating the following question: is it possible that one may have the illusory experience of owning four hands? Under visual manipulation, the participant adopted the experimenter’s first-person perspective (1PP) as if it was his/her own. Sitting face to face, the participant saw four hands—the experimenter’s two hands from the adopted 1PP together with the subject’s own two hands from the adopted third-person perspective (3PP). We found that: (1) the four-hand illusion did not occur in the passive four-hand condition. (2) In the active four-hand condition, the participants tapped their index fingers, imitated by the experimenter. When tactile stimulations were not provided, the key illusion was not induced, either. (3) Strikingly, once all four hands began to act with the same pattern and received synchronous tactile stimulations at the same time, many participants felt as if they had two more hands. These results show that the sense of body ownership is much more flexible than most researchers have suggested.


  • Open Access

    The Sense of 1PP-Location Contributes to Shaping the Perceived Self-location Together with the Sense of Body-Location

    by Hsu-Chia Huang, Yen-Tung Lee, Wen-Yeo Chen, Caleb Liang

    Self-location—the sense of where I am in space—provides an experiential anchor for one’s interaction with the environment. In the studies of full-body illusions, many researchers have defined self-location solely in terms of body-location—the subjective feeling of where my body is. Although this view is useful, there is an issue regarding whether it can fully accommodate the role of 1PP-location—the sense of where my first-person perspective is located in space. In this study, we investigate self-location by comparing body-location and 1PP-location: using a head-mounted display (HMD) and a stereo camera, the subjects watched their own body standing in front of them and received tactile stimulations. We manipulated their senses of body-location and 1PP-location in three different conditions: the participants standing still (Basic condition), asking them to move forward (Walking condition), and swiftly moving the stereo camera away from their body (Visual condition). In the Walking condition, the participants watched their body moving away from their 1PP. In the Visual condition, the scene seen via the HMD was systematically receding. Our data show that, under different manipulations of movement, the spatial unity between 1PP-location and body-location can be temporarily interrupted. Interestingly, we also observed a “double-body effect”. We further suggest that it is better to consider body-location and 1PP-location as interrelated but distinct factors that jointly support the sense of self-location.


  • Open Access

    Body ownership and experiential ownership in the self-touching illusion

    by Caleb Liang, Si-Yan Chang, Wen-Yeo Chen, Hsu-Chia Huang, Yen-Tung Lee

    We investigate two issues about the subjective experience of one’s body: first, is the experience of owning a full-body fundamentally different from the experience of owning a body-part? Second, when I experience a bodily sensation, does it guarantee that I cannot be wrong about whether it is me who feels it? To address these issues, we conducted a series of experiments that combined the rubber hand illusion (RHI) and the “body swap illusion.” The subject wore a head mounted display (HMD) connected with a stereo camera set on the experimenter’s head. Sitting face to face, they used their right hand holding a paintbrush to brush each other’s left hand. Through the HMD, the subject adopted the experimenter’s first-person perspective (1PP) as if it was his/her own 1PP: the subject watched either the experimenter’s hand from the adopted 1PP, and/or the subject’s own hand from the adopted third-person perspective (3PP) in the opposite direction (180°), or the subject’s full body from the adopted 3PP (180°, with or without face). The synchronous full-body conditions generate a “self-touching illusion”: many participants felt that “I was brushing my own hand!” We found that (1) the sense of body-part ownership and the sense of full-body ownership are not fundamentally different from each other; and (2) our data present a strong case against the mainstream philosophical view called the immunity principle (IEM). We argue that it is possible for misrepresentation to occur in the subject’s sense of “experiential ownership” (the sense that I am the one who is having this bodily experience). We discuss these findings and conclude that not only the sense of body ownership but also the sense of experiential ownership call for further interdisciplinary studies.


  • Open Access

    Self-Consciousness and Immunity

    by Timothy Lane, Caleb Liang


  • Mental ownership and higher-order thought: Response to Rosenthal

    by Timothy Lane, Caleb Liang

    Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental ownership is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’. In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue of a higher-order thought (HOT), then the HOT necessarily represents the subject as the owner of the state. But, we contend, one of the lessons to be learned from pathological states like somatoparaphrenia is that conscious awareness of a mental state does not guarantee first-person ownership. That is to say,...


  • Open Access

    Higher-order thought and pathological self: the case of somatoparaphrenia

    by Caleb Liang, Timothy Lane

    Somatoparaphrenia, a pathology of self, is philosophically perplexing. It poses a significant challenge for theories of consciousness, including David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory, which holds that HOTs are scientific posits in a theory that aims for explanatory adequacy. In a recent series of papers Rosenthal (e.g. 2005: 341) has employed the HOT theory as part of an attempt to explain ‘our sense of having a unified consciousness’, a ‘sense’ which he understands as the ‘compelling intuition’ that we have a single self. He develops his explanation in terms of an immunity-to-error principle (thin immunity), which holds that we are immune to error in certain restricted judgements concerning self. After presenting Rosenthal's theory in §2, in §3 we argue that it fails to explain...