Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting
Authors:
- Jun-Ichi ItayaJIJun-Ichi Itaya
- Makoto OkamuraMOMakoto Okamura
- Chikara YamaguchiCYChikara Yamaguchi
Open Access
- 1 June 2014
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 34, 263-278
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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