Chikara Yamaguchi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Chikara Yamaguchi has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jun-Ichi Itaya
Faculty of Economics and Business
3 shared publicationsMakoto Okamura
Economics Department Gakushuin University
3 shared publicationsEmilson C.D. Silva
Georgia Institute of Technology
1 shared publication- Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva
Department of Economics, University of Auckland, Auckland 1142, New Zealand
1 shared publication Jun‐Ichi Itaya
Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration Hokkaido University; CESifo
1 shared publication- Jun‐Ichi Itaya
Hokusei Gakuen University Sapporo Japan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 12 October 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 25 (2) , 276-300
Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition
In this study, the endogenous timing of moves is analyzed in an infinitely repeated game setting of capital tax competition between a subgroup (a tax union) of countries agreeing on partial tax harmonization and outside countries. It is shown that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated tax competition game, they simultaneously set capital taxes in every stage game when a tax union comprises similar countries with respect to productivity, whereas they may set capital taxes sequentially in every stage game when a tax union comprises dissimilar countries. This finding is significantly different from Ogawa (2013), although we also assume that capital is owned by the country's residents, as in Ogawa's model. This is because a disadvantaged member country of the tax union would suffer from larger losses when a tax union comprising dissimilar countries, and thus the tax union will choose the strategy of moving Late for the sake of sustaining tax harmonization to avoid such losses.
- 12 October 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 25 (2) , 276-300
Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition
In this study, the endogenous timing of moves is analyzed in an infinitely repeated game setting of capital tax competition between a subgroup (a tax union) of countries agreeing on partial tax harmonization and outside countries. It is shown that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated tax competition game, they simultaneously set capital taxes in every stage game when a tax union comprises similar countries with respect to productivity, whereas they may set capital taxes sequentially in every stage game when a tax union comprises dissimilar countries. This finding is significantly different from Ogawa (2013), although we also assume that capital is owned by the country's residents, as in Ogawa's model. This is because a disadvantaged member country of the tax union would suffer from larger losses when a tax union comprising dissimilar countries, and thus the tax union will choose the strategy of moving Late for the sake of sustaining tax harmonization to avoid such losses.
- Open Access
Overlapping Climate Clubs: Self-Enforcing R&D Networks to Mitigate Global Warming
Free riding incentives make it difficult to control climate change. To improve the chances of the Paris Agreement’s ambitious goal, many nations are forming scientific networks in carbon capture and storage (CCS). These networks take many forms (bilateral, hub-and-spoke, and multilateral). Studies of social interactions among scientists demonstrate that research networks are limited because of relational issues, such as lack of trust. This paper provides a rationale for the formation of various types of international CCS networks and examines their impacts on climate change. Our concept of stability focuses on Nash equilibria that are immune to coalitional deviations in overlapping networks. Players may belong to various research networks. A particular research network is a climate club. We show that in the absence of top-down coordination in clubs, the type of global network that forms depends on relational attrition. The complex task is to mitigate free riding while enhancing trust.
Open AccessOverlapping Climate Clubs: Self-Enforcing R&D Networks to Mitigate Global Warming
Free riding incentives make it difficult to control climate change. To improve the chances of the Paris Agreement’s ambitious goal, many nations are forming scientific networks in carbon capture and storage (CCS). These networks take many forms (bilateral, hub-and-spoke, and multilateral). Studies of social interactions among scientists demonstrate that research networks are limited because of relational issues, such as lack of trust. This paper provides a rationale for the formation of various types of international CCS networks and examines their impacts on climate change. Our concept of stability focuses on Nash equilibria that are immune to coalitional deviations in overlapping networks. Players may belong to various research networks. A particular research network is a climate club. We show that in the absence of top-down coordination in clubs, the type of global network that forms depends on relational attrition. The complex task is to mitigate free riding while enhancing trust.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Mohr Siebeck in FinanzArchiv
- Vol. 76 (2) , 165-190
Are Moderate Leviathans Harmful to Tax Coordination?
This study investigates how the sustainability of partial tax coordination among a subset of countries (i.e., a tax union) is affected when the governments objective function is moderate Leviathan in that policymakers are neither entirely benevolent nor fully self-interested. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail either when moderate-Leviathan-type governments become more revenue-maximizing Leviathans or when more wasteful government expenditure is engaged in. Nevertheless, the well-being of the residents in the member countries of the tax union unambiguously deteriorates, while that in nonmember countries is ambiguous.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Mohr Siebeck in FinanzArchiv
- Vol. 76 (2) , 165-190
Open AccessAre Moderate Leviathans Harmful to Tax Coordination?
This study investigates how the sustainability of partial tax coordination among a subset of countries (i.e., a tax union) is affected when the governments objective function is moderate Leviathan in that policymakers are neither entirely benevolent nor fully self-interested. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail either when moderate-Leviathan-type governments become more revenue-maximizing Leviathans or when more wasteful government expenditure is engaged in. Nevertheless, the well-being of the residents in the member countries of the tax union unambiguously deteriorates, while that in nonmember countries is ambiguous.
- 1 November 2016
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 49 (4) , 1599-1630
Implementing partial tax harmonization in an asymmetric tax competition game with repeated interaction
- 1 November 2016
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 49 (4) , 1599-1630
Implementing partial tax harmonization in an asymmetric tax competition game with repeated interaction
- Open Access
- 1 June 2014
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 34, 263-278
Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting
- 1 June 2014
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 34, 263-278
Open AccessPartial tax coordination in a repeated game setting
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Urban Economics
- Vol. 67 (2) , 219-225
Interregional competition, spillovers and attachment in a federation
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Urban Economics
- Vol. 67 (2) , 219-225
Interregional competition, spillovers and attachment in a federation
- 1 December 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 92 (12) , 2403-2411
Are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting?
- 1 December 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 92 (12) , 2403-2411
Are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting?