Two stage mechanisms for matching students and supervisors
Open Access
- 13 March 2026
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 67
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- Nemzeti Kutatási Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal (142873)
- Nemzeti Kutatási Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal (EK\u00D6P-24-4-II-BME-30)
- Hungarian Scientific Research Fund
- Magyar Tudományos Akadémia
- Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovaciós Alap
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