Abstract
The consequence argument purports to show that determinism is true only if no one has free will. 1 Judgements about whether the argument is sound depend on how one understands locutions of the form ‘p and no one can render p false’. 2 The main interpretation on offer appeals to counterfactual sufficiency: s can render p false just in case there is something s can do such that, were s to do it, p would be false; otherwise, s cannot render p false. Here I show that, in the context of the consequence argument, this interpretation conflicts with widely endorsed principles governing the logic of counterfactuals. For the version of the consequence argument we are interested in, 3 we let Φ characterize the intrinsic state of the world at some time in the remote past conjoined with a statement of the laws of nature. On determinism, the laws and past states of the world jointly determine the history of the world at any time; so, if determinism is true then Φ entails every truth. We also let Np abbreviate ‘p and no one can render p false’. (As a stylistic variant: ‘p and no one has a choice about p’.) Now assume that if a truth p is something no one can render false, and p entails some further truth q, then no one can render q false:

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