JWJohn William Waldrop
John William Waldrop
*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.
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John William Waldrop has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fabio Lampert
University of Vienna
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 June 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 83 (3) , 527-535
A problem for counterfactual sufficiency
The consequence argument purports to show that determinism is true only if no one has free will. 1 Judgements about whether the argument is sound depend on how one understands locutions of the form ‘p and no one can render p false’. 2 The main interpretation on offer appeals to counterfactual sufficiency: s can render p false just in case there is something s can do such that, were s to do it, p would be false; otherwise, s cannot render p false. Here I show that, in the context of the consequence argument, this interpretation conflicts with widely endorsed principles governing the logic of counterfactuals. For the version of the consequence argument we are interested in, 3 we let characterize the intrinsic state of the world at some time in the remote past conjoined with a statement of the laws of nature. On determinism, the laws and past states of the world jointly determine the history of the world at any time; so, if determinism is true then entails every truth. We also let Np abbreviate ‘p and no one can render p false’. (As a stylistic variant: ‘p and no one has a choice about p’.) Now assume that if a truth p is something no one can render false, and p entails some further truth q, then no one can render q false:- 14 June 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 83 (3) , 527-535
A problem for counterfactual sufficiency
The consequence argument purports to show that determinism is true only if no one has free will. 1 Judgements about whether the argument is sound depend on how one understands locutions of the form ‘p and no one can render p false’. 2 The main interpretation on offer appeals to counterfactual sufficiency: s can render p false just in case there is something s can do such that, were s to do it, p would be false; otherwise, s cannot render p false. Here I show that, in the context of the consequence argument, this interpretation conflicts with widely endorsed principles governing the logic of counterfactuals. For the version of the consequence argument we are interested in, 3 we let characterize the intrinsic state of the world at some time in the remote past conjoined with a statement of the laws of nature. On determinism, the laws and past states of the world jointly determine the history of the world at any time; so, if determinism is true then entails every truth. We also let Np abbreviate ‘p and no one can render p false’. (As a stylistic variant: ‘p and no one has a choice about p’.) Now assume that if a truth p is something no one can render false, and p entails some further truth q, then no one can render q false:- Open Access
- 22 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 180 (8) , 2291-2307
A puzzle about moral responsibility
We present a new puzzle about logical truth, necessity, and moral responsibility. We defend one solution to the puzzle. A corollary of our preferred solution is that prominent arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility are invalid.
- 22 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 180 (8) , 2291-2307
Open AccessA puzzle about moral responsibility
We present a new puzzle about logical truth, necessity, and moral responsibility. We defend one solution to the puzzle. A corollary of our preferred solution is that prominent arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility are invalid.