We develop a game-theoretic framework to analyze the strategic use of non-informational, hostile rhetoric in electoral competition. In a baseline setting of proportional representation, candidates engage in a "rhetorical arms race," escalating identity-based hostility to avoid ceding affective advantage despite mutual welfare losses. We generalize this model by embedding the contest within a general institutional framework that maps vote shares to political power under varying degrees of disproportionality. Under mild regularity conditions and a cost-dominance restriction, we establish the existence of a unique interior Nash equilibrium. The analysis reveals that equilibrium hostility rises with voters' affective responsiveness and falls with the cost of aggression. Crucially, we find that greater institutional disproportionality-such as winner-take-all rules-strictly amplifies hostility and magnifies the electoral impact of small asymmetries between candidates. Furthermore, the local curvature of the institutional mapping endogenously determines whether rhetorical campaign efforts function as strategic substitutes or complements. These findings characterize toxic political discourse as a predictable equilibrium outcome driven by institutional design rather than idiosyncratic behavior.