Alejandro Saporiti
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Alejandro Saporiti has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yizhi Wang
Tianjin University, Tianjin, China
3 shared publications - Carlo Reggiani
University of Manchester, Manchester, England
1 shared publication - Dario Debowicz
Swansea University, Swansea, UK
1 shared publication - Fernando Tohmé
Department of Economics, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Bahía Blanca, Argentina
1 shared publication - Germán Coloma
CEMA University, Buenos Aires, Argentina
1 shared publication - Jorge Miguel Streb
Universidad del Cema
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Rhetorical Arms Race: Strategic Hostility and Institutional Amplification
We develop a game-theoretic framework to analyze the strategic use of non-informational, hostile rhetoric in electoral competition. In a baseline setting of proportional representation, candidates engage in a "rhetorical arms race," escalating identity-based hostility to avoid ceding affective advantage despite mutual welfare losses. We generalize this model by embedding the contest within a general institutional framework that maps vote shares to political power under varying degrees of disproportionality. Under mild regularity conditions and a cost-dominance restriction, we establish the existence of a unique interior Nash equilibrium. The analysis reveals that equilibrium hostility rises with voters' affective responsiveness and falls with the cost of aggression. Crucially, we find that greater institutional disproportionality-such as winner-take-all rules-strictly amplifies hostility and magnifies the electoral impact of small asymmetries between candidates. Furthermore, the local curvature of the institutional mapping endogenously determines whether rhetorical campaign efforts function as strategic substitutes or complements. These findings characterize toxic political discourse as a predictable equilibrium outcome driven by institutional design rather than idiosyncratic behavior.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Rhetorical Arms Race: Strategic Hostility and Institutional Amplification
We develop a game-theoretic framework to analyze the strategic use of non-informational, hostile rhetoric in electoral competition. In a baseline setting of proportional representation, candidates engage in a "rhetorical arms race," escalating identity-based hostility to avoid ceding affective advantage despite mutual welfare losses. We generalize this model by embedding the contest within a general institutional framework that maps vote shares to political power under varying degrees of disproportionality. Under mild regularity conditions and a cost-dominance restriction, we establish the existence of a unique interior Nash equilibrium. The analysis reveals that equilibrium hostility rises with voters' affective responsiveness and falls with the cost of aggression. Crucially, we find that greater institutional disproportionality-such as winner-take-all rules-strictly amplifies hostility and magnifies the electoral impact of small asymmetries between candidates. Furthermore, the local curvature of the institutional mapping endogenously determines whether rhetorical campaign efforts function as strategic substitutes or complements. These findings characterize toxic political discourse as a predictable equilibrium outcome driven by institutional design rather than idiosyncratic behavior.
- Open Access
- 17 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 206 (1-2) , 81-106
Inequity aversion and the stability of majority rule
Despite the empirical support for other-regarding behavior in humans, spatial voting theory has largely overlooked the role of social preferences. This work takes the perspective that individuals not only harbour selfish preferences regarding material possessions, but also experience emotions such as envy and guilt regarding the possessions of others. By exploring how these emotions, manifested as inequity aversion, shape collective decision-making, this research deviates from the predominant focus on self-interest. Instead, it delves into the influence of guilt and envy on distributive politics, proposing two sensible constraints on these emotions, called limited and chained other-regardingness . These domain conditions on social preferences are aligned with the empirical estimates of inequity aversion; and they aim to ensure the stability (non-emptiness), uniqueness, and fairness of the majority-rule core.
- 17 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 206 (1-2) , 81-106
Open AccessInequity aversion and the stability of majority rule
Despite the empirical support for other-regarding behavior in humans, spatial voting theory has largely overlooked the role of social preferences. This work takes the perspective that individuals not only harbour selfish preferences regarding material possessions, but also experience emotions such as envy and guilt regarding the possessions of others. By exploring how these emotions, manifested as inequity aversion, shape collective decision-making, this research deviates from the predominant focus on self-interest. Instead, it delves into the influence of guilt and envy on distributive politics, proposing two sensible constraints on these emotions, called limited and chained other-regardingness . These domain conditions on social preferences are aligned with the empirical estimates of inequity aversion; and they aim to ensure the stability (non-emptiness), uniqueness, and fairness of the majority-rule core.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 57 (2) , 197-228
Redistribution, power sharing and inequality concern
We analyze a political competition model of redistributive policies. We provide an equilibrium existence result and a full characterization of the net transfers to the different income groups. We also derive several testable predictions about the way in which the net group transfers and the after-tax Gini coefficient vary with the main parameters of the model. In accordance with the theory, the empirical evidence from a sample of developed and developing democracies supports a highly statistically significant association between: (i) the net group transfer and the gap between the population and the group mean initial income, and (ii) the net group transfer (and resp., the Gini coefficient) and power sharing disproportionality. In addition, the data also provide some empirical evidence confirming a significant relationship between the net transfers to the poor (and resp., the Gini) and the concern of the political parties with income inequality.
- 10 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 57 (2) , 197-228
Open AccessRedistribution, power sharing and inequality concern
We analyze a political competition model of redistributive policies. We provide an equilibrium existence result and a full characterization of the net transfers to the different income groups. We also derive several testable predictions about the way in which the net group transfers and the after-tax Gini coefficient vary with the main parameters of the model. In accordance with the theory, the empirical evidence from a sample of developed and developing democracies supports a highly statistically significant association between: (i) the net group transfer and the gap between the population and the group mean initial income, and (ii) the net group transfer (and resp., the Gini coefficient) and power sharing disproportionality. In addition, the data also provide some empirical evidence confirming a significant relationship between the net transfers to the poor (and resp., the Gini) and the concern of the political parties with income inequality.
- 8 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 23 (2) , 203-227
Distributive politics with other‐regarding preferences
This paper analyzes a nonsmooth model of probabilistic voting with two parties and a broad family of other‐regarding behavior, including fairness and quasi‐maximin preferences, income‐dependent altruism, and inequity aversion. The paper provides conditions for equilibrium existence and uniqueness. It also characterizes the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies when parties hold either symmetric payoffs, or minor forms of asymmetries. The characterization shows that the two parties converge to an equilibrium policy that maximizes a mixture of a “self‐regarding utilitarian” social welfare function and an aggregate of society's other‐regarding preferences. These results are shown to be applicable to other nonsmooth frameworks, such as probabilistic voting with loss averse voters. The characterization also shows that the direction and the size of the inefficiencies emerging from electoral competition depend in a subtle way on the nature of the other‐regarding preferences (and resp., loss aversion).
- 8 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 23 (2) , 203-227
Distributive politics with other‐regarding preferences
This paper analyzes a nonsmooth model of probabilistic voting with two parties and a broad family of other‐regarding behavior, including fairness and quasi‐maximin preferences, income‐dependent altruism, and inequity aversion. The paper provides conditions for equilibrium existence and uniqueness. It also characterizes the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies when parties hold either symmetric payoffs, or minor forms of asymmetries. The characterization shows that the two parties converge to an equilibrium policy that maximizes a mixture of a “self‐regarding utilitarian” social welfare function and an aggregate of society's other‐regarding preferences. These results are shown to be applicable to other nonsmooth frameworks, such as probabilistic voting with loss averse voters. The characterization also shows that the direction and the size of the inefficiencies emerging from electoral competition depend in a subtle way on the nature of the other‐regarding preferences (and resp., loss aversion).
- 2 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 22 (1) , 170-189
Group identification with (incomplete) preferences
We consider the problem of identifying members of a group based on individual opinions. Since agents do not have preferences in the model, properties of rules that concern preferences (e.g., strategy‐proofness and efficiency) have not been studied in the literature. We fill this gap by working with a class of incomplete preferences derived directly from opinions. Our main result characterizes a new family of group identification rules, called voting‐by‐equitable‐committees rules, using two well‐known properties: strategy‐proofness and equal treatment of equals. Our family contains as a special case the consent rules (Samet & Schmeidler. J. Econ. Theory, 110 (2003), pp. 213–233), which are symmetric and embody various degrees of liberalism and democracy; and it also includes dictatorial and oligarchic rules that value agents’ opinions differently. In the presence of strategy‐proofness, efficiency turns out to be equivalent to non‐degeneracy (i.e., any agent may potentially be included or excluded from the group). This implies that a rule satisfies strategy‐proofness, efficiency, and equal treatment of equals if, and only if, it is a non‐degenerate voting‐by‐equitable‐committees rule.
- 2 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 22 (1) , 170-189
Group identification with (incomplete) preferences
We consider the problem of identifying members of a group based on individual opinions. Since agents do not have preferences in the model, properties of rules that concern preferences (e.g., strategy‐proofness and efficiency) have not been studied in the literature. We fill this gap by working with a class of incomplete preferences derived directly from opinions. Our main result characterizes a new family of group identification rules, called voting‐by‐equitable‐committees rules, using two well‐known properties: strategy‐proofness and equal treatment of equals. Our family contains as a special case the consent rules (Samet & Schmeidler. J. Econ. Theory, 110 (2003), pp. 213–233), which are symmetric and embody various degrees of liberalism and democracy; and it also includes dictatorial and oligarchic rules that value agents’ opinions differently. In the presence of strategy‐proofness, efficiency turns out to be equivalent to non‐degeneracy (i.e., any agent may potentially be included or excluded from the group). This implies that a rule satisfies strategy‐proofness, efficiency, and equal treatment of equals if, and only if, it is a non‐degenerate voting‐by‐equitable‐committees rule.
- Open Access
- 10 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Social Information and Consumer Heterogeneity
We study the incentives of a social network to control two types of information circulating on its platform, namely display advertising by two quality-differentiated firms and "social information" (purchasing decisions shared among consumers). Consumers' choices are influenced by both of these communication channels, whereas the network gets revenue only through advertising. We characterize the equilibrium level of network diffusion of social information and the firms' expenditure on advertising. We show that depending on consumers' heterogeneous response to advertising, social information can compete with or complement display advertising. Moreover, in every equilibrium each consumer almost surely purchases the superior product with a strictly higher probability, and that receiving social information almost surely further increases such probability. Finally, social information almost surely raises social welfare, thereby establishing the existence of a welfare-maximizing equilibrium.
- 10 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSocial Information and Consumer Heterogeneity
We study the incentives of a social network to control two types of information circulating on its platform, namely display advertising by two quality-differentiated firms and "social information" (purchasing decisions shared among consumers). Consumers' choices are influenced by both of these communication channels, whereas the network gets revenue only through advertising. We characterize the equilibrium level of network diffusion of social information and the firms' expenditure on advertising. We show that depending on consumers' heterogeneous response to advertising, social information can compete with or complement display advertising. Moreover, in every equilibrium each consumer almost surely purchases the superior product with a strictly higher probability, and that receiving social information almost surely further increases such probability. Finally, social information almost surely raises social welfare, thereby establishing the existence of a welfare-maximizing equilibrium.
- Open Access
- 14 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Distributive Politics with Other-Regarding Preferences
We extend upon the results of Lindbeck and Weibull [Public Choice 52 (3), 1987] to study distributive politics when voters have not only self-interested preferences, but also other-regarding concerns. We consider a broad family of other-regarding behavior (including fairness preferences, income-dependent altruism, and inequality aversion), for which results on equilibrium existence and optimality have not been established yet. We provide a sufficient condition for smooth and non-smooth payoffs that generalizes Lindbeck and Weibull's condition, and guarantees the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In addition, we determine conditions under which the equilibrium results in an income distribution that can be rationalised as the outcome of maximizing a mixture of a "self-regarding utilitarian" social welfare function and society's other-regarding preferences.
- 14 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDistributive Politics with Other-Regarding Preferences
We extend upon the results of Lindbeck and Weibull [Public Choice 52 (3), 1987] to study distributive politics when voters have not only self-interested preferences, but also other-regarding concerns. We consider a broad family of other-regarding behavior (including fairness preferences, income-dependent altruism, and inequality aversion), for which results on equilibrium existence and optimality have not been established yet. We provide a sufficient condition for smooth and non-smooth payoffs that generalizes Lindbeck and Weibull's condition, and guarantees the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In addition, we determine conditions under which the equilibrium results in an income distribution that can be rationalised as the outcome of maximizing a mixture of a "self-regarding utilitarian" social welfare function and society's other-regarding preferences.
- 1 November 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 154, 216-228
Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- 1 November 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 154, 216-228
Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 83, 86-115
Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 83, 86-115
Open AccessPolitical motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence
- 28 August 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 55 (3) , 705-729
Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
- 28 August 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 55 (3) , 705-729
Power sharing and electoral equilibrium