Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly
- 27 March 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 83 (3) , 365-383
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ECO2015-68856-P)
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